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Abstract
Sustainable Human Development (SHD), rooted in Amartya Sen’s development theory on
the capability approach, envisions achieving sustainable human capabilities at the local and
global levels. One major area of contention within this field of research concerns determination
and valuation of capabilities. How a community decides which capabilities should be developed
is as important as the development itself. Some capability scholars argue that a small group of
experts or “philosophers” should make this determination, while others argue that a deliberative
democratic process needs to be followed. I seek to reconcile these two positions by introducing a
third way of determining and valuing capabilities: the reflexive approach.
Using the 2010 Hillsborough County Transit Referendum as my case study, I examine the
democratic process through the lens of capability determination and valuation. I find that the
political process anticipating the 2010 referendum more closely followed a philosopher’s
position process supported by Martha Nussbaum and others. Furthermore, a lack of reflexivity,
or capitalizing on the opportunities to reincorporate the public into an otherwise top-down
approach, led to the project’s ultimate failure. Partially because of these missed opportunities,
important issues facing the referendum were ignored, ultimately contributing to the vote’s defeat.
The results are telling for future mass transit proposals in Tampa Bay and other similarly sized
metro areas.
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Chapter One: Introduction
“The reach and effectiveness of open dialogue are often underestimated in assessing social and
political problems” (Sen, Development as Freedom, 1999, p. 153)
Seven years. Seven years is the time remaining to keep global warming under the 1.5
degree celecius increase that the United Nations’ climate scientists predict will generate the
worst catastrophies. Seven years is what the world has left to avoid this possible future and
protect our planet. It it is not just the planet we must save, but ourselves as well. As economist
and philosopher Amartya Sen eloquently stated, “It is not so much that humanity is trying to
sustain the natural world, but rather that humanity is trying to sustain itself. It is us that will have
to ‘go' unless we can put the world around us in reasonable order. The precariousness of nature is
our peril, our fragility” (Sen, 2013). With the specter of climate change looming over our shared
future, this realization is more poignant than ever. Despite some continued resistance among the
Republican party and its older constituents, for a majority of the public, the “debate” over
climate change is shifting toward acceptance and to a conversation about what to do next (Funk
& Kennedy, 2020). The world does not need new technologies, innovative ideas, or bold
policies. Many of the laws and projects required for a sustainable future are already well
documented (Sachs, 2015). Rather, the debate centers on how we achieve sustainability. This
debate forms part of a larger conversation about the future of the democratic process and the
participation of its citizens. My research occupies the heart of that debate as we watch
democracy attempt to create a more sustainable transit system in the metro area of Tampa Bay.
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Research Problem
The most recent United Nations publications cite a dismal scenario due to global climate
change and its societal impacts occurring within our generation (Change, 2014). Carbon dioxide
emissions undoubtedly contribute the most to global warming, reaching 400 parts per million in
2016. Consequently, 2020 was the hottest global year on record (Greene & Jacobs, 2021). The
recent Paris Agreement by the Conference of Parties (COP 21) seeks to limit global temperature
rise to just 2 degrees Celsius and “to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5
degrees C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks
and impacts of climate change” (Change, 2014). They allow that the climate will change and
recognize the world sits at a tipping point where effective social measures are needed to avoid
the worst outcomes.
In this fight against climate change, Hillsborough County and the city of Tampa confront
many of the same sustainability issues as other cities in the USA and around the world. Few
matters are more relevant to a Tampanian than that of mobility, or how one travels around the
city of Tampa and its surrounding areas. In a car-centric country, in a sprawling metro area with
poor public transit options, traffic is among the most pressing concerns to local citizens
(Hillsborough Metropolitan Planning Organization, 2011). Coincidentally, emissions from
transportation provide the second-largest source of carbon dioxide (the primary greenhouse gas
causing global warming) in the USA. Thus, how citizens move around—to get to work, school,
travel, business, pleasure, etc.— is central to achieving a sustainable future. Enter the story of
Hillsborough County and mass transit.
In a county of almost 1.5 million people, mass transit in Hillsborough has the potential to
move everyone more efficiently and sustainably than motor vehicles. Yet, when asked about the
public transit system, most residents reply along these lines: slow, infrequent trips, does not go
2

where I need to it, etc. Urban development experts agree that building more roads only leads to
more traffic; thus, significantly expanding the public transit in Hillsborough County is indeed the
most sustainable path forward. But what is the best process by which we achieve this future?
Broadly speaking, democratic participation includes variants that are more individual
dialogic, or deliberative, and those that are more representative (republic). A similar divide exists
among scholars and experts on sustainability. What is the best method by which to achieve a
more sustainable future—a more bottom-up citizen-oriented approach or a more top-down
technocratic one? The latter argues that in this time of existential crisis, experts and scholars of
development know what is best, and the average citizen should defer to them for leadership to
save time spent deliberating. The former argues that democracy is inherently about people
(demos) with power (Kratos) leading government, rather than the other way around; thus,
citizens should be at the heart of the process forward. Before discussing the research at hand, I
will define useful terms of development and sustainability.

Conceptual Framework and Definitions
“The capability approach has provided a compelling alternative to income/growthcentered methods for conceptualising the ends of development, evaluating wellbeing/
poverty and formulating development policy” (Srinivasan, 2007, p. 459).

How humankind achieves a sustainable future is at the forefront of development research.
What does sustainable future mean? The generally accepted term used, broadly speaking, is
“sustainable development.” Sustainable development (SD) was defined by the United Nation’s
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Figure 1. Three Pillars of Sustainable
Development

Brundtland Commission as “development that promotes the needs of the present generation
without compromising the needs of future generations” (UN 1987, Section 3 Article 27).
This conceptualization of development addresses increasing the well-being of humans through
development without eliminating the possibility of the same well-being of future human
generations. To achieve both the spatial (basic needs and well-being of an ever-increasing
number of people) and the temporal (for many generations) aspects of this definition, SD
research and policies attempt to balance the Three P’s: People (society), Planet (environment),
and Progress (economic). Figure 1 depicts the possible outcomes of these three goals, with SD
being the ultimate equilibrium between all three. However, focusing solely on the needs of
People, Planet, and Prosperity as a measurement of well-being for current and future generations
is a low threshold for development; needs imply only the basic necessities required for survival,
not true human dignity or human development. This is where one current theory of development,
the capability approach, can add to the understanding of SD.
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The capability approach is a theory of development created by Amartya Sen that attempts
to bridge two traditions within development literature. Some development theories emphasize an
expansion of what John Rawls calls primary goods (tangible resources or rights) while others
stress the equality of outcomes. I will discuss the capability approach in Chapter Two, but its
essence involve creating a new space of focus for development research between these two
traditions. Capabilities, or a person’s actual ability to achieve their well-being, is now used in
development spheres, including the United Nations Human Development Index. However, a
conversation within the capability approach literature concerns these specific capabilities. Who
should decide which capabilities are important to be developed? Who determines which are the
most valuable to a given community, and by what process do they make this decision? This
literature focuses on the determination and valuation of capabilities. These conversations mimic
similar discussions among scholars of the democratic process, dating back to seminal works of
John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas, and others. Chapter Two further explores these connections; for
now, what is the importance of this debate within development and democracy literature and its
broader implications for sustainable human development?

Significance and Purpose Statement
Much of the debate between capability scholars over the determination and valuation of
capabilities occurs at a theoretical level. In the tradition of Martha Nussbaum, some scholars
support the philosophical position or approach. The philosophical position’s general stance is
that a group of “philosophers”— technocrats, experts, or elites—should determine a specific list
of important capabilities to develop in a community. These “philosophers” are often elected
representatives in a democracy or leaders within a particular civic society. Although not
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authoritarian, capabilities are determined by these elected/chosen officials without any deep
deliberation. Contrarily, another vein of research that advocates for a more bottom-up approach.
This paradigm is coined the democratic position or approach. Those from the democratic
position argue that people in a specific community should be involved from the beginning,
through a political process, in determining and valuing specific capabilities. In other words, they
should be involved in the list-making. I will expound on this debate in Chapter Two,
demonstrating the benefits and disadvantages of each side, ultimately attempting to reconcile
some of their differences into a new third approach, which I coin the “reflexive position” or
approach.
To that end, this research is a case study with the intent of using a normative theory of
determination and valuation of capabilities; ultimately, I hope to create a more practical theory
for capability scholars. This dissertation focuses on the attempts to expand sustainable
transportation to one metro area, Tampa, and the surrounding Hillsborough County. The purpose
of my research is to examine the process leading up to the 2010 referendum, determining what
policy process was followed (philosophical or democratic) and then, using my new reflexive
position, determine if a lack of reflexive opportunities contributed to the failed tax referendum.
Although my intent is not necessarily to create a generalizable conclusion on political
participation or sustainable development processes, the goal is to shed light on why the 2010
referendum failed. In turn, this may assist in a better future of political processes toward
sustainability in Tampa and other similar cities.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Praxis, or the practical application of a theory, occupies the core of this research.
6

Although capability scholarship is not ubiquitous or closely followed by local elected officials,
the general theoretical arguments of the philosophical and democratic positions still hold. Some
communities tend to take a more bottom-up, citizen-oriented approach while others a more topdown, technocratic approach. Between 2004 and 2010, the city of Tampa and Hillsborough
County officials enacted a political process with the intent of creating a more sustainable mass
transit system: light rail. The outcome is general knowledge: a resounding defeat at the ballot
box, 58% against to 42% for. In a metro area known for its horrendous traffic and large public
support for better public transit, why was the referendum defeated? More specifically, the
research question at the heart of this work asks: How did the political process of the 2010
referendum affect the outcome of the vote?
To answer the general question and my research question, I follow a phronetic
methodology outlined by Bent Flyvbjerg and expanded on in Chapter Three. This methodology
incorporates his Foucauldian notion of power with the capability approach’s emphasis on
capabilities as the focal point of development. Furthermore, I propose the following hypotheses.
H1: The political process leading up to the 2010 referendum more closely followed a
philosopher’s position process supported by Martha Nussbaum and others.
H2: A lack of reflexivity, or capitalizing on the opportunities to reincorporate the public
into an otherwise top-down approach, led to public distrust and the eventual failure at the
end of the process, a defeat of the referendum.

Key Research Findings
In the Tampa metro area, with documented issues around mobility and transportation, the
idea of a more robust public transit system often sits at the top of policy priorities. Yet when
7

given the opportunity to fund and build just a project, through the 2010 tax referendum, a vast
majority of citizens voted against the proposal. For a seemingly obvious beneficial reform, why
did this vote fail? Society often hopes for a singular causal explanation for the success or failure
of any political process or policy. My research of public documents, news articles, and
interviews with key stakeholders made this hope very apparent. Many individual stakeholders
focused on one or two explanations for why the vote failed, but the reality is that many factors
contributed to the defeat.
Leading up to and during the 2010 referendum vote, Tampa and the USA experienced the
worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. Asking citizens of a community to raise
taxes on themselves, even for a project as necessary as public transit, was a tall demad.
Furthermore, a strong national political movement of anti-government, anti-tax libertarianism
swept the nation. Though not actually a grassroots movement, the ideas and actions permeated
down into local politics, including the democratic process in Tampa to fund a light rail system.
Finally, a lack of knowledge about light rail and confusion over a different high-speed rail
project confounded many supporters and opponents alike. Despite these barriers, throughout the
years-long process, many opportunities existed for high-level stakeholders to address these issues
and more through reflexive opportunities. A key finding in this research shows that a purely
bottom-up (democratic position) approach nor a purely top-down (philosophical position)
approach seemed to work well in this case. Instead, opportunities existed where stakeholders
from all backgrounds had a chance to address the aformentioned concerns and create a better
process and plan forward. As most democracies are not direct but representative, the back and
forth of deliberation concerning the determination and valuation of capabilities between elected
officials and constituents is of utmost importance. Instead, those opportunities were ignored,
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resulting in very little reflexivity between different stakeholder groups. This left serious process
and policy issues unaddressed or poorly reformed. In the end, it is my argument that a more
reflexive approach may have created a “winning” outcome with a majority ‘yes’ vote on the tax
referendum, but it also may have simply allowed for the process to stop when it was apparent
that the goal was doomed to failure.

Organization of Remaining Chapters
This chapter outlined the broad scope of my research. I introduced the capability approach
(CA) as my foundational theory and briefly discussed a major debate within that academic
community. CA scholars debate a similar praxis-centered issue as other fields: which democratic
process is more effective in achieving sustainable development? In Chapter Two, I expand more
on this dispute. I present both sides with their supporters’ arguments as well as the critiques from
opposing scholars. I argue that a new reflexive approach can potentially overcome many of these
critiques and serve as a more effective theory.
Chapter Three examines the methodology used for this study. Most political science
methodology argues that an individual case is generally useless in trying to understand the “how”
and “why” questions of a political phenomenon. Adhering to the work of Bent Flyvbjerg, I argue
that following the phronetic methodology, a singular case still can lead a researcher to a better
understanding of an event that proves useful to that specific community and the rest of
humankind.
In Chapter Four, I present my qualitative research on the 2010 referendum to fund a light
rail in Hillsborough County. The narrative I present consists of a combination of interviews,
public documents, meeting minutes, news articles, and public videos. Ultimately, I attempt to
9

expose the minutiae of the democratic process leading up to the 2010 vote while also placing it
in the larger contextual picture. Finally, in Chapter Five, I answer my research question by
summarizing why the 2010 vote ended the way it did. I conclude by proposing ideas for further
research, more successful political processes, and a more sustainable future.
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Chapter Two: Theory- Capability Approach, Deliberative Democracy, and Power
When discussing sustainable human development, the emphasis and research often focus
on the result. What is being developed? Renewable energy, potable water, and expansion of
voting rights are just a few examples. Rather than the end result, this research centers on the
process by which these are developed. In a democratic country, this process ultimately serves as
an analysis of the democratic process itself. While a great deal of urban planning research
concentrates on methods to include as many stakeholders as possible, or best practices (Gardner,
Prugh, Renner, & Mastny, 2016; Bolay, 2020; Diez Medina & Monclus, 2018), my work takes a
political science approach and thus focuses on the theoretical issues of democratic participation
itself.
In the broadest sense, this research utilizes the capability approach as its theoretical basis.
Though a theory of development and justice in most regards, more recent scholars have begun to
expand the issues that the capability approach covers. In particular, schools of the capability
approach have wrestled with the “how” questions of development, not just the “what” questions.
In a world already dealing with these same issues in regards to sustainable human development,
theory-building within this slice of capabilities is extremely relevant. Scholars essentially
examine the question, how does a given community decide which capabilities are important?
They then determine how to develop said capabilities. This research does not include the very
different approaches that would be taken under an authoritarian regime. The democratic process
is so fundamental to the capability approach as a theory of development that any examination of
autocracies or authoritarian regimes would require a drastically different method. Instead, this
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research will follow in the vein of most capability research on the determination and valuation of
capabilities, using democracies as the starting point. Within that sphere, capability scholars are
currently debating in a similar fashion to other scholars of democracy: how do people come to an
agreement about their society, given a diverse population and democratic institutions?
This dissertation eventually builds on the discussion within capability approach research
on determining and valuing capabilities. However, its foundation lies in the seminal works of
Jurgen Habermas, John Rawls, and their theoretical examination of the democratic process. In
many ways, capability scholars like Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, and others built their
arguments of the democratic process on the ideas and works of these two. I will begin this
theoretical chapter by reviewing the fundamental arguments about the ideal democratic process
from Rawls and Habermas. Then, within an understanding of their theoretical frameworks, I will
show how Sen and Nussbaum build on, yet diverge, in their research on valuing and determining
capabilities. Finally, I attempt to reconcile the differences between these two capability scholars
with the incorporation of Flyvbjerg’s notion of power as it pertains to the democratic process.
John Rawls dedicates much of his work to creating a complex thought experiment about
creating an ideal democratic society. To arrive at his ultimate theory of justice and its relation to
this dissertation, we should review the conceptional framework on which it is based. First,
Rawls’ writings are often a direct rebuttal to utilitarianism as a universal moral principle. Rawls
does not posit a single, unifying principle but rather states, “The correct regulative principle for
anything depends on the nature of that thing” (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971). He also
distinguishes between an ideal theory and a non-ideal theory. An ideal theory makes two major
assumptions in an attempt to “simplify” our understanding of our non-ideal world. It assumes
that actors comply with the principles agreed to by society and the conditions of that society are
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favorable (no famine, hunger, poverty, etc.). Once an ideal theory is created, it can be used as a
reference for the completion of a non-ideal theory. This is his primary goal, with the theory of
justice as fairness and how to best structure a democratic society.
In accomplishing this, Rawls sees two major barriers: that of legitimacy and stability. A
democratic society must create a set of unified laws that govern a diverse citizenry. The laws
must be seen as legitimate to be followed, yet the citizens may have widely diverging
worldviews about what is morally right and wrong. Furthermore, society is not stable if its
citizens are not willing to obey a law imposed on them by people who may have different
worldviews. Rawls considers political liberalism a way to overcome these barriers. His issues
with legitimacy concern the acceptable use of political power, which is “fully proper only when
it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to
their common human reason” (Rawls, Political Liberalism, 2005, p. 137). Rawls’ argument for
political liberalism overcoming issues of legitimacy is thus rooted in his ideas of a “reasonable
citizen.” In essence, a reasonable citizen has their own beliefs about the world, right and wrong,
and possibly religion, but does not hope to impose those beliefs on everyone else in their society.
Though this statement may be acceptable to most, Rawls has not yet explained how to create a
unifying set of laws for a disparate population. For this, he turns to a society’s public political
culture. Rawls writes, “Since justification is addressed to others, it proceeds from what is, or can
be, held in common; and so we begin from shared fundamental ideas implicit in the public
political culture in hope of developing from them a political conception that can gain free and
reasoned agreement in judgment” (Rawls, Political Liberalism, 2005, pp. 100-101). Reasonable
citizens have the ability to tolerate others and offer mutual respect to their peers while
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determining what fundamental ideas should shape a given society. Still, where would these
fundamental, implicit even, ideas originate? Rawls maintains that the public political culture
“comprises the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of their
interpretation (including those of the judiciary), as well as historic text and documents that are
common knowledge” (Rawls, Political Liberalism, 2005, pp. 13-14). What are these ideals, and
where do they come from? For answers, we must turn to Rawls’ political conception of justice.
Understanding that even liberal pluralistic societies have differing views of fundamental
ideals, Rawls argues that three vague (yet important) concepts uphold any political conception of
justice and thus an ideal democratic society: freedom, equality, and fairness. Regardless of their
interpretation of these ideals, in his ideal conception of justice, all share some core similarities: a
liberal tradition of negative liberties or freedom to do and act; expression, conscience, choice of
occupation, etc.; priority to these aforementioned liberties over general goods (discussed below);
and an environment where citizens can realize these freedoms.
The second obstacle to best structuring a democratic society that Rawls addresses is that
of stability. Whereas legitimacy concerns whether laws may be permissibly enforced, stability
refers to whether individual citizens have personal reasons to abide by these laws. Here Rawls
motions that an overlapping consensus can generate a stable society, even for a wide range of
individual worldviews and beliefs. In a society of overlapping consensus, individuals accept the
social order but do so from their personal beliefs. He argues that, for example, a Catholic, a
Muslim, a Jew, and an atheist will all agree to a liberal conception of justice for their personal
moral reasons (as reasonable citizens). Although their reasons for why they agree to the social
order may differ, in the end, it is the agreement that matters. With these two obstacles at least
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partially addressed, we can now explore Rawls’ full theory of a just liberal society: justice as
fairness.
Again, Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness consists of a thought experiment in that it
envisions an ideal situation with specific guidelines. Although this situation may never be
achievable, it gives existing societies a “benchmark” to approach the non-ideal world. The two
primary principles of justice as fairness are coined the “first principle” and the “second
principle” and are defined as:
First Principle: Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme
of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for
all;
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:
a. They are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity;
b. They are to be the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society
(the difference principle). (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971, pp. 42-43)
The ordering of these principles matters. That is, the political liberties guaranteed in the first
principle supersede the economic and social principles of the second. The argument is that for an
ideal just, liberal society, all citizens must have basic political rights and liberties, and it requires
a fair value of these political liberties. By this, Rawls means that all citizens should be formally
and substantively equal in their political rights, such as the right to vote and run for office.
These principles are essential to the subsequent debate within capability approach research on
the determination and valuation of capabilities. Now, the other pillar of these theoretical
approaches needs to be outlined: Jurgen Habermas and his ideas on discourse.
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Whereas Rawls dedicates much of his work to an ideal liberal democracy and how one
gets there through the thought experiment of the original position, Jurgen Habermas focuses on
the social aspect of humanity and the process of discourse. In any governmental structure that
requires communication between diverse individuals, how and why discourse occurs is
paramount to its success. Thus, both scholars are interested in the same goal of a wellfunctioning liberal democracy, but their approaches differ. In the broadest sense, Habermas
developed two separate, yet connected social theories: one of communicative rationality for
interpersonal speech and a theory of modernization. A key driving force of his theories—an
aspect that will return in my discussion of methodology—posits that social theory is inherently
pluralistic and reaches beyond normal general theories, as in the hard sciences. Instead,
Habermas argues one should strive to consolidate various theories and methods to best
understand and explain the social world: “Whereas the natural and the cultural or hermeneutic
sciences are capable of living in mutually indifferent, albeit more hostile than peaceful
coexistence, the social sciences must bear the tension of divergent approaches under one roof”
(Nicholsen & Stark, 1988, p. 3). At the crux of his research and theories sits a discussion of
rationality and its place in social theory and research. For Habermas, rationality is “how speaking
and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge” and not necessarily possession of particular
knowledge (Habermas, The theory of communicative action, 1984, p. 11).
Where does this speaking and acting take us? Here, Habermas draws a clear distinction
between what he coins strategic action and communicative action. Strategic actions are attempts
by an individual to use communication to achieve a particular goal, such as Actor A convincing
Actor B to go along with a particular plan that may not be in their self-interest. Communicative
action, on the other hand, is an attempt for speakers to come to some mutual understanding of
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shared interests and goals. Actors A and B, through rational speech, can come to a reasonable
agreement of goals or actions. This marks the beginning of Habermas’ ties to the democratic
process and this dissertation. When a listener believes a claim cannot be upheld by good reasons,
they may instinctively switch to a different type of communication: discourse, or the process of
testing a claim for its plausibility through dialogue.
In this discourse, Habermas overlaps with Rawls on reaching a societal level mutual
understanding of a valid claim or point of view. Whereas Rawls focuses on this issue from a
pluralistic societal level, Habermas argues that a claim is valid and discourse successful if it can
fulfill three criteria or “world relations”: sincerity, rightness, and truth (Habermas, The theory of
communicative action, 1984). This standard is an ideal type, however, and Habermas does
concede that in a diverse, pluralistic society, a weaker standard of communicative action may be
appropriate. Later theorists build on Habermas by expanding this relationship between
individuals to the idea of reciprocity. Indeed, Gutmann and Thompson make the crux of their
defense of deliberative democracy by arguing that reciprocity means that “that citizens owe one
another justifications for the institutions, laws, and public policies that collectively bind them.
Reciprocity suggests the aim of seeking agreement based on principles that can be justified to
others who also share the aim of reaching reasonable agreement" (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004,
p. 133).
Finally, we find ourselves at Habermas’ discourse theory and discourse principle. His
theory is important to my research as it deals specifically with issues of deliberation and validity.
Whereas Rawls framed his theory in a counterfactual, Habermas focuses on discourse and
argumentation as a way of reaching a democratic consensus. Initially, Habermas’ work presented
a rhetorical level in terms of an “ideal speech situation,” or a highly idealized version of
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communication (Habermas, 2001). Later, Habermas both tempered and clarified this position. He
instead argues for four presuppositions that should be acheived to make a deliberative outcome
reasonable. These presuppositions are key to laying the groundwork for a well-functioning
democracy: 1) no one capable of making a relevant contribution has been excluded, 2)
participants have an equal voice, 3) they are internally free to speak their honest opinion without
deception or self-deception, and 4) there are no sources of coercion built into the process and
procedures of discourse. As I show, these presuppositions are critical to capability approach
theorists.
Note that this outline relates to specific types of validity claims, or what Habermas calls
truth and rightness claims. Others, such as sincerity claims or claims about interior subjectivity,
do not fall under the same requirements. Rightness and truth claims refer to morality and
empirical-theoretical issues (respectively). Here, he argues that a strong consensus must be made
for a valid outcome to be reached. However, most democratic deliberation deals with matters of
policy and procedures or questions of the good life. For this “ethical discourse” around
“authenticity claims,” Habermas relaxes the standard of consensus, delcaring that universal
consensus should not be expected (Habermas, Justification and Application, 1993). Instead, the
reasons given for a valid argument can be rooted in particular histories, traditions, and values. In
summary, ethical claims are justified by those with a common history and values, whereas
rightness and truth claims are justified by reasons that ought to be acceptable by all of humanity.
Habermas’ discourse principle marks his attempt to connect practical discourse with the
democratic institutions that relate to decision-making. It is defined as: “only those norms can
claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as
participants in a practical discourse” (Habermas, Justification and Application, 1993). Although
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Habermas’ discourse ethics follows Kant in some regards, he argues that only through real
discourse (not simply following a Categorical Imperative) can a truly impartial view of morality
emerge. Through this discourse, he believes a group can obtain some type of collective
agreement about norms and ethics, or what he calls a dialogical principle of universalization: “A
[moral norm] is valid just in case the foreseeable consequences and side-effects of its general
observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be jointly accepted
by all concerned without coercion” (Cronin & DeGreiff, 1998). Here, Habermas breaks with
Rawls’ counterfactual idealization and instead states that this principle involves actual discourse
between individuals over moral judgments. Furthermore, this discourse must involve all those
affected and must end with a reasonable agreement among all, not simply gaining input from
those affected.
To make this argument empirically viable, Habermas does concede that in the real world,
partial justifications are to be expected for most moral rules and choices or arguments that are
not conclusively defeated but are also not convincing for all (Rehg W. , 2003). For the
democratic process, he argues that this deliberation must be seen as coequal with conceptions of
individual or private autonomy. For a democracy to function well, where all citizens accept the
legitimacy of the laws and structures it is built on, the people must have private autonomy to live
their lives as they see fit within legal boundaries. Equal to this is the idea of public autonomy,
that individuals must feel they are also included in the political participation aspect of lawmaking
to fully legitimize them. In other words, “only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet
with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally
constituted” (Rehg W. , 1996). By this, Habermas does not necessarily mean that all citizens
must participate in an ideal discourse, but rather, a society must agree on aggregate that the

19

institutions and structures allowed for a reasonable discourse over a particular issue and its
outcome. He dubs this “epistemic proceduralism,” in that it follows a methodical democratic
process and ends in collective learning by individuals. Habermas argues that if democratic
institutions are designed well, meaning they are subject to the input and deliberation of their
citizens, then laws will not degrade into a system based on nonlinguistic media of money and
power.
Both Rawls and Habermas form significant portions of the foundational theory for
modern debates within capability research, particularly those interested in capability
determination and valuation, as these concern themselves with the interactions of citizens,
leaders, and the democratic process. Before examining this conversation within capability
approach research, I will first present a general summary of the capability approach to
familiarize readers with its core concepts and arguments.

The Capability Approach
The capability approach (CA) is most well-known for its use as the theoretical
underpinning of the United Nations’ Human Development Report and Index. It is unclear why
focusing on capabilities, rather than solely on outcomes or resources, makes the CA the best
measurement for human development (and subsequently sustainable human development). I will
first briefly outline the theoretical framework of the CA to frame the relevant debate that I will
attempt to engage, determining and valuing capabilities.
The core concept of the capability approach focuses on on what individuals within a
society are able to do and achieve (have the capability to do). Sen’s theory has developed over
the years to now include many areas of sociology, political science, ethics, and economics (Sen,

20

1979; Sen, 1992; Sen, 1999). What exactly is the capability approach and how does it help us to
understand development? Sen breaks down an individual’s well-being into two concepts:
functionings and capabilities. Because these terms are novel to the capability approach, relating
them to the current development debate of “equality” can make the theory easier to understand.
Although they go by many names, the two generally opposing views on economic development
of the 20th century were centered around a debate on the “equality of what.” All theories argued
for “equality”—they greatly differed in their conception of which equality. Welfarism,
Keynesian economics, and similar theories generally stress equality of outcomes, or
achievements as the fairest and most just system. The capability approach coins these
functionings. Classical liberalism and other comparable theories focused on freedom or the
guarantee (equality) of rights, especially property rights and rights to the product of one’s labor.
Later conservative ideologies and theories focused more on opportunities, or generally the
potential to achieve. The capability approach uses the term ‘resources’ as a comparable term.
Most theories within each approach see a lack of equality in one variable as justifiable to
an increase in equality in another variable. Sen’s capability approach attempts to bridge the gap
between these two, examining resources and functionings with capabilities “in-between.” In

Figure 2. The Capabilities Approach (Verd & Lopez, 2011)
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essence, his new creation of a space termed “capabilities” means freedom as a different kind of
equality. Taken as a whole, the capability approach can be better understood from Figure 2.
Sen defines functionings as the “beings and doings” of a person, or their achievements:
“The functionings included can vary from most elementary ones, such as being well-nourished,
avoiding escapable morbidity and premature mortality, etc., to quite complex and sophisticated
achievements, such as having self-respect, being able to take part in the life of the community,
and so on” (Sen, 1992, p. 5). A society focused on equality of achievements or functionings may
tend to downplay or limit equality of opportunity.
Resources, on the other hand, refer to the goods or services available to a person. They
may also represent the opportunities (in a thin sense of the word) that a person has to achieve
something. For example, people in developing countries often need transportation to get to and
from work, school, etc. In a population of one million people, focusing on resources would say
that giving everyone a bicycle as means of transportation is development. But people are diverse,
unique in ways beyond counting. What of those people (in said hypothetical country) who do not
know how to ride a bike? What about those with physical disabilities who cannot ride a bike? Or
those who need to travel forty miles or more to earn a living and thus need a motorized vehicle?
This approach to development fails to take into consideration “conversion factors” such as
environmental or individual human features.
Capabilities, in the most general sense, are the alternative combinations of functionings a
person is able to achieve or the opportunity to pursue his or her objectives (Sen, 1992).
Capabilities comprise Sen’s attempt to incorporate several real-world variables that influence
development, including but not limited to: genetic and physical differences among people and
freedom as intrinsically valuable. Finally, capability requires that an individual must have the
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resources to achieve something: lacking water as a resource stops a person from having the
capability to achieve water nourishment. Sen argues that “individual claims are not to be
assessed in terms of the resources or primary goods the persons respectively hold, but by the
freedoms they actually enjoy; to choose the lives that they have reason to value” (Sen, Inequality
Reexamined, 1992, p. 81). From this perspective, development is understood as increasing the
capabilities of humans. This is a key distinction from other traditions of development. Whereas
some focus on the “start” of development and concepts like negative rights, liberties, or
protections from government influence, others advocate for positive rights of development or
things like food, housing, and education. The capability approach is Sen’s attempt to bridge these
two beliefs with the new space of capabilities. Substantive individual freedom is directly linked
in a causal way to the development of positive rights, just as positive rights feedback into an
expansion of freedom for individuals to be able to do the things one has reason to value (Sen,
1999).
The process by which development goals are attained is just as important as the goals
themselves. It is argued by some capability scholars that an inclusive, participatory, and
democratic process is by far the best and most effective way to achieve SD (Bohman, 1997;
Drydyk, 2013). Sen argues that defining the specific weights and importance of capabilities
should be done at the local or regional level, not as a predefined universal list. Allowing groups
to identify important capabilities while taking into account local culture, traditions, and practices
is just as important as developing the capabilities themselves. Srinivasan further explains why
Sen thinks democracy is key to capabilities determination and valuation:
Political participation and social choice are essential to the capability approach's liberal
foundations of individual agency and autonomy, as well as its respect for pluralism. This
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substantially explains Sen's reluctance to specify which capabilities matter more than
others and why, or to theoretically defend a substantive content of justice. Rather, Sen
gives a critical place to democracy, emphasising a participatory and deliberative
conception of democracy under which individuals participate in public reasoning, social
choice and decision-making in the determination and assessment of social arrangements.
(Srinivasan, 2007)
Others argue that a specific list of the most fundamental capabilities should be created a
priori any political process. Sen himself identified five broad “instrumental freedoms” that he
sees as both independent and interacting variables of development: social opportunities,
transparency guarantees, protective security, political freedom, and economic facilities (Sen,
Development as Freedom, 1999). Martha Nussbaum took this a step further and outlined a list of
ten basic capabilities as an “account of minimum core social entitlements” (Nussbaum, Frontiers
of Jusice: Disability, Nationality, and Species Membership, 2006) which were first outlined in
her book Sex and Social Justice (Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, 1999). These ten capabilities
are (briefly): 1) Life, 2) Bodily Health, 3) Bodily Integrity, 4) Sense, Imagination, and Thought,
5) Emotions, 6) Practical Reason, 7) Affiliation, 8) Other Species, 9) Play, and 10) Control over
One’s Environment (Nussbaum, 1999). Nussbaum’s argument for the CA extends further back
historically from the Sen/Rawls debate (although she does acknowledge the argument). The main
target of her critique is of contractarian theories: “the tradition has bequeathed to us a general
image of society as a contract for mutual advantage (people getting something by living together
that they could not each get on their own) among people who are ‘free, equal, and independent.’
It is this idea, deeply embedded in our political culture” (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 14). Clearly, Sen
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and Nussbaum possess opposing views about important capabilities and/or how people should
determine and value which ones are important to develop.
This disagreement over whether to create a preset list of necessary (but not sufficient) list
of capabilities strikes at the heart of determining and valuing capabilities, or the process by
which a community ranks and emphasizes certain capabilities over others. The opposing sides
(supported by divergent scholars Sen and Nussbaum) can be outlined in two paradigms, both
with strong arguments and critiques. If the capability approach is to remain a foundational theory
for sustainable human development in the 21st century, the issues of determining and valuing
capabilities must be addressed. Which capabilities should society choose to develop in a
sustainable world? More important to the discussion at hand, who should have a say in which
capabilities these are and how they are developed?

Determining and Valuing Capabilities: Two Paradigms
In capabilities literature, one of the most divisive issues concerns how to select and value
(rank) capabilities. Which capabilities are the most important to a specific community? Are there
certain capabilities necessary for all humans to enjoy, regardless of location or culture? Most
importantly, if democracy is requisite to any theory of development or justice, what role do
citizens play in this process of capability determination and valuation? Both Rawls and
Habermas approach these questions from different perspectives but produce similar results. They
both posit thought experiments about individuals rationally deciding how to structure their
societies. For Rawls, it is the veil of ignorance device; for Habermas, it is the “ideal speech act”,
but both recognize that individuals conduct this conversation in a way that abstracts from or
eliminates inequality, differences between people’s lived experience, etc., so that there can be
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rational discourse. They are, in a sense, doing the same thing. They are, in different ways,
building their theories on “abstract individuals” who are thinking, reasoning beings. They are
humans/citizens/people who are disembodied (or their bodies do not create differences in
power). However, Sen, Nussbaum, and others argue that these thought experiments lose what
matters most: the people themselves and their differences (in gender, race, wealth, ability,
history, language, etc.) As such, capability scholars have built on Rawls and Habermas and
formed their own approaches to how a given society makes political decisions.
Answers to these questions mark the starting point for two major stances within the
capability approach community of scholars. Byskov (2015) defines these two positions as the
“philosophical position” and the “democratic position” (Byskov, 2015). On the one hand, Martha
Nussbaum and scholars following in her stead argue that any theory of justice and development
requires philosophical reasoning to create a list of necessary capabilities. These predetermined
capabilities are so fundamentally important to living a life of dignity, they should be guaranteed
by societies and governments (Nussbaum, 2000). On the other hand, Amartya Sen and his
approach argue that the process of determining which capabilities to select and how to value
them should be a democratic one, performed by each unique political community (Sen, 1999).
This controversy began in the early 1990s and continues to this day, forming the center of a
plenary debate at the 2015 Human Development and Capabilities Association conference
between none other than Nussbaum and Sen. In research centered on democratic deliberation
within the framework of the capability approach, it is important to entertain this debate and fully
understand the critiques on both sides. Ultimately, I will show how these two approaches are not
nearly as dichotomous as they may seem, and many of their shortcomings can be addressed to
create a new “third way” of determining and valuing capabilities.
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Nussbaum and the Philosophical Position
First, I will discuss Nussbaum and others who tend to advocate for the philosophical
approach. It is primarily concerned with inequality and injustice at both the beginning of (and
before) a democratic process as well as the outcome of said process. To combat this inequality,
scholars of this approach argue for a predetermined list of necessary capabilities for equality or a
minimum level of particular capabilities. Based on Rawls’ First Principle, this position argues
that a certain level of political equality must exist before a democratic process begins.
One of the primary concerns of Nussbaum and others is that inequalities and injustice
exist in all political communities. These inequalities may, and often do, have negative impacts on
the democratic process and its eventual outcomes. Even the most open and democratic processes
will often reinforce and recreate existing patterns of exclusion and inequality (Sen, Social
Exclusion: Concept, Application, and Scrutiny, 2000). To avoid this, scholars of the
philosophical approach argue that a minimum list and/or level of capabilities is required a priori
any democratic process to guarantee a just system and outcome. Martha Nussbaum created a list
of ten “central human capabilities” necessary for human life to be “not so impoverished that it is
not worthy of the dignity of a human being” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 72). This list includes life;
bodily health; bodily integrity; sense, imagination, thought; emotions; practical reason;
affiliation; other species; play; and control over one’s environment (Nussbaum, 2006, pp. 76-78).
Although many would agree that these capabilities are indeed important, we must still justify the
need for a predetermined list.
The creation and determination of this list of capabilities are said to be philosophical in
nature. Philosophers, or scholars of philosophy and ethics, are in a unique position because of
their training in reasoning and justice to create a list of capabilities and are not susceptible to the
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pitfalls of the democratic process. Not inherently authoritarian, these philosophers may well be
democratically elected representatives or chosen leaders in civil society. Still, the argument is
that “the public should not decide which capabilities should be promoted by policy because
deliberators may suffer from poor skills of reasoning or flawed conceptions of what is
just….Thus, proponents of the philosophical position argue that the selection of capabilities need
to be informed or determined by justice-theoretical reasoning in order to ensure a (minimally)
just outcome” (Byskov, 2015, p. 3). Although reason is not a virtue unique to philosophers,
because of inequalities in education, skill, intelligence, money, power, etc., many stakeholders
involved in a deliberative process are not prepared to fully comprehend the issues of justice
when determining and valuing capabilities. The democratic approach offers several rebuttals to
this statement, one of which is its potential to be patronizing; I address these rebuttals later.
The most obvious critique of this approach is often called the paradox of deliberative
democracy; what is the point of a democratic process to determine capabilities if one has already
determined what is “good” and “bad”? In other words, this approach is inherently undemocratic,
and if democracy is a form of justice and equality, the said approach is contradictory. The
counterargument from the philosopher’s approach indicates that this list refers simpy to
minimum or abstract levels, open to reform and debate at the local or global level, taking into
account unique circumstances. Importantly, “The philosopher–citizen does not demand
compliance with her list independently of public deliberation. Rather she will offer her ‘theory as
input into a democratic process run by others’ and hope that it will ‘receive adherents who will
stand up for [its] realization’” (Claassen, 2011, p. 501). Rather than a be-all, end-all checklist of
necessary capabilities, the philosophers readily admit that the list is not sufficient for true
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equality or justice. It is assumed that the particulars of determining and valuing capabilities will
fall on stakeholders through the democratic process.
While it is true that capabilities scholars of the philosophical approach are concerned
with issues that exist before any democratic process even begins, they are equally concerned
with the outcome of said processes. It does not take much of an imagination to envision a
political community, with an open and inclusive democratic process, determining that a wife’s
ability to “be subservient to her husband” is of the utmost importance to that community, or that
a government’s ability to repress independent thought is laudable. These “capabilities” clearly
fly in the face of almost any account of justice and equality. This is, in fact, one of the
philosophical approach’s strongest arguments and has been raised by many key researchers:
“What primarily matters, on the outcome-oriented conception, is whether the outcome of a
decision-making procedure may be said to be just. This, in turn, requires us to theoretically
establish what is just before it can be offered for democratic consideration” (Byskov, 2015, p. 9).
This raises another paradox that must be reconciled by determining and valuing capabilities:
does a political community have real freedom (in a capability approach sense) if a list of
capabilities is created with the specific intent of stopping unjust outcomes from occurring? This
question leads to some of the major concerns and critiques of this approach.
This question prompts some scholars’ major concerns with the philosophical approach to
capability determination and valuation. One is that no determination is legitimate unless made
through a process of public reasoning or democratic deliberation, what Byskov calls “objection
from democratic legitimacy” (Byskov, 2015, p. 5). The philosophical approach is strongly rooted
in a Rawlsian conception of justice, yet Rawls argues that reasonable citizens do not impose their
beliefs on others but instead gain legitimacy through a shared understanding of freedom,
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equality, and fairness. Another major critique is that a philosopher cannot truly know what is
most important for a group of people, independent from said group, called “objection from
epistemology” (Byskov, 2015, p. 5). Both of these concerns raise enough objections to give
additional credence to the Senian method of determination and valuation. The two objections are
interwoven enough to address them simultaneously.
Philosophers argue that their lists and rankings of capabilities come from a highly
sophisticated and developed method of reasoning. The rankings are not simply “made up” but
devised through a rigorous and systematic process with special attention paid to justice (Byskov,
2015). Philosophers understand the limitation of generating a theory of justice with a list of
capabilities: “The philosopher–citizen still creates her list of relevant capabilities independently
of public concerns because there are epistemological limits to what the philosopher can know
about which capabilities matter to the citizens” (Claassen, 2011, p. 504). However, Byskov and
others from the democratic position take issue with this. First, it assumes that the philosopher is
superior in selecting and valuing capabilities to the affected political community. Byskov argues
that not only is there no evidence for this, but taking this approach seems to be a completely
arbitrary endeavor (Byskov, 2015). This does not mean that the philosopher has no place in the
process of capability determination. Their unique skills and experiences as philosophers of
justice and capabilities should play a role (not the role) in “enabling the public to democratically
make a normative selection of capabilities themselves” (Byskov, 2015, p. 7). Despite these
critiques, one of the most influential scholars of the capability approach, Martha Nussbaum, still
advocates for her list of ten essential capabilities.
Nussbaum argues that she can avoid these objections by creating a list that should both be
enshrined in a state’s constitution yet open for reform through a democratic process (Nussbaum,
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2003). This has not stopped critiques from pointing out flaws in this logic: “this approach retains
the view that (minimal) justice can be established independently of and prior to democratic
deliberation (and then, secondarily, gain legitimacy by being endorsed by it)” (Byskov, 2015, p.
8). Beyond this assessment, others have raised concerns of this approach being based on westernliberal-centric and paternalism (Stewart, Book Review: Women and Human Development: The
Capabilities Approach, 2001), the potential for abuse in local practices (Clark, 2002),
undemocratic (Peter, 2007), and potentially lacking legitimacy (Robeyns, 2003). One cannot
argue that a predetermined list of capabilities is worthy enough to be guaranteed, on the one
hand, and yet open to debate and reform, on the other. If they truly are open to debate and
reform, then they are not guaranteed in the first place. Others have tried to take a step back from
a fixed list of capabilities to more general ideas of what should be valued. In Displacement by
Development, the authors create seven important “values” (rather than capabilities) that
constitute a “development ethics framework” (Penz, Drydyk, & Bose, 2011, p. 11). The seven
values “widely understood to define ethically responsible development” are: human well-being
and human security; equitable development; empowerment; cultural freedom (including the
rights of indigenous peoples); environmental sustainability; human rights; and integrity with
regard to corruption (Penz, Drydyk, & Bose, 2011, pp. 60-61). Although less specific than
Nussbaum’s ten necessary capabilities, this approach still raises the question as to how these
“values” were determined and why they were chosen.
A set list of necessary capabilities or values as a basis for justice and development is
extremely useful for policy creation and implementation. Starting this process with a
predetermined list of what to develop can dramatically lower the time it would have taken to
engage in democratic deliberation. Yet, avoiding the above critiques in the name of efficiency is
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akin to the ends justifying the means. This paradox undercuts many claims to justice by the
philosophical stance. The Senian or democratic approach avoids many of these pitfalls but has its
shortcomings as well. By addressing both, I can eventually synthesize the two approaches into a
new possible route for the capability approach.

Sen and the Democratic Position
Sen declared, “My scepticism is about fixing a cemented list of capabilities that is seen as
being absolutely complete (nothing could be added to it) and totally fixed (it could not respond to
public reasoning and to the formation of social values) … pure theory cannot ‘freeze’ a list of
capabilities for all societies for all time to come, irrespective of what the citizens come to
understand and value. That would not only be a denial of the reach of democracy, but also a
misunderstanding of what pure theory can do, completely divorced from the particular social
reality that any particular society faces” (Amartya Sen, Presidential Address to the Human
Development and Capability Association, University of Pavia, September 2004; Sen, 2005, p.
158). At a minimum, Sen is concerned with the inclusion of a political community in the process
of determining and valuing capabilities. Although the philosophical position does leave room for
reform and change through deliberation, the original determination and valuation process occurs
mostly apart from the deliberative space. Although not “frozen,” any list of capabilities created
this way raises concerns from the democratic approach (here also referred to as “democrats”) as
to the particular reality that the community faces. Sen and other democrats, on the other hand,
argue that each political community should take the lead in the process of determining which
capabilities are to be valued and developed from the start. This approach makes sense for a
theory that emphasizes the importance of individual agency and the ability of people to choose
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the kind of life they value (Sen, 1999). Through the democratic process, the people of a political
community can each bring to the table their subjective values and determine as a group which
capabilities are most important to them as a society. Any attempt to create lists, a priori, is
inherently taking away an individual’s choice in this process. Sen and other capability scholars
from the democratic position stress that the natural complexities and pluralistic societies that
exist require deliberation and debate. To this end, Sen outlines three main reasons why
democracy is so important to the capability approach and development.
First, the ability to shape one’s own life is itself expanding an individual’s capability.
This intrinsic value of democracy for the development of capabilities is reiterated by democrats
many times over (Crocker D. A., 2006; Sen, 1999; Deneulin, 2005). Second, the instrumental
value of democracy is greater than alternative forms of governance. The desire for a more direct,
participatory democracy is apparent but even in a representative democracy, leaders (from the
local to national) have a greater incentive to care about what the people of a community want
and have reason to value. Even this thin notion of democracy elicits the need for those with
power to be concerned with who receives which capabilities. A “thicker” definition (i.e.
deliberative democracy) folds those concerns into the procedure by bringing in all relevant
stakeholders.
Finally, Sen claims that “democratic governance has constructive value as it provides
information, institutions, and processes in which people can learn from each other and ‘construct'
or decide on the values and priorities of the society in a way that is influenced by the diverse
values and needs of different groups of people” (Pellissery & Bergh, 2007, p. 284). Thus, the
democratic process can even assist in the creation and valuing of what a “just society” may be by
incorporating the views of the people affected by policy decisions (Srinivasan, 2007). Here we
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see the foundations of both Habermas and Rawls, with their emphasis on collective agreement
and overlapping consensus (respectively). This emphasis on democracy does not, according to
democrats, impose one ideal of “the good life” but rather creates the opportunities for individuals
to determine said life: “The capability approach does not…seek to impose one substantive
conception of the good for everyone; rather, it focuses upon each individual’s actual substantive
freedom to choose and achieve her own conception of the good” (Srinivasan, 2007, p. 460).
Much like Rawls’ conception of a reasonable citizen not imposing their beliefs on others, the
legitimacy of this approach lies in the Habermasian idea of public autonomy, that is, individuals
legitimizing “the good life” by feelings of inclusion in the political process.
Few, including those from the philosopher’s position, would argue against these points in
support of democracy. However, this position does generate the question—without having a
predetermined list of which capabilities constitute a just society, how can one guarantee that a
democratic process creates just outcomes? As Nussbaum eloquently states, “one cannot have a
conception of social justice that says, simply, ‘all citizen are entitled to freedom understood as
capability’” (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 46). How do Sen and other democrats address this issue of not
needing a complete theory of justice a priori any democratic process?
On one level, the argument here mimics the critiques of the philosopher’s position
(above). An idea of justice for a community cannot be decided for a community, but rather by the
community: “Sen’s ‘silence’ on the substantive content of an account of justice is due in large
measure to his stringent emphasis on plurality, agency, and choice; he turns to democratic
processes that allow for public reasoning and social choice to attend to judgements about justice”
(Srinivasan, 2007, p. 457). Despite this “silence,” Sen admits that the real “bite” of any theory of
social justice lies in what is included (or excluded) from its informational basis (Sen, 1999, p.
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57). Succeeding in just outcomes without creating specific goals or outcomes for all political
communities to strive for is the fundamental obstacle of this approach. Is it possible to create a
set of preconditions for a just democratic deliberation without also creating a list of necessary
capabilities to achieve? I soon attempt to answer this key question.
Again, in a nod to Rawlsian conceptions of ideal vs. non-ideal theories, democrats argue
that one need not have a complete or full conception of justice to evaluate whether a process or
outcome is just: “In The Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen (2009) argues that we do not need ideal
theory or comprehensive lists, whether of principles or capabilities, to make judgments about
what is just or unjust, or to evaluate the fairness of institutions, or to articulate what can be done
to improve or change them. For Sen, the bulk of the evaluative work rests on the crucial role
played by participation and deliberation” (Koggel, 2014, p. 146). Public reasoning and rational
arguments between varied individuals can determine whether something is just or unjust. This
determination need not be based on full consensus or be set in stone to create an expansion of
capabilities (Sen, 2006). The advantage of the democratic approach lies in its emphasis on
pluralism and adaptation. Conceptions of justice are not timeless or unchanging. Like Habermas’
argument about ethical discourse, these too can be rooted in the history and culture of a
particular community. However, it should be noted that the democratic process itself may be
unjust in some form. This is, in fact, one of the major dilemmas facing the democratic position.
How does one create a fair and just system of democratic participation, without determining and
valuing true democratic participation as a prerequisite for the process to occur?
This critique of the democratic position, and Sen in particular, is also the most easily
addressed. Although Sen alludes to a participatory form of democracy in his writings on
capability determination and valuation, he never explicitly moves beyond the traditional,
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procedural definition of “democracy”. Capability scholars critique Sen for supporting a
democratic position without clearly defining what constitutes a democracy or how it works with
capabilities. This lack of clarity presents a roadblock in the operationalization of capabilities and
the democratic process (Srinivasan, 2007; Robeyns, 2003). Thus, in the past two decades,
scholars of deliberative democracy have worked to merge their understanding of a participatory
method of democracy with the capability approach (Crocker D. A., 2006; Deneulin, 2005;
Drydyk, 2013). This does not mean the democratic position is still without critique in
contemporary literature.
The capability approach from the democratic position “faces a tension between concerns
for what is subjectively valuable (and potentially unjust) and what is just according to normative
theory (but potentially undemocratic)” (Byskov, 2015, p. 12). The most scathing critique of the
democratic position is that it lacks any conception of justice before the democratic process
begins, creating the possibility for an unjust process or outcome. What if actors involved in the
process enter a democratic deliberation in an unjust setting (i.e. women are excluded)? What if
the preconditions and setting are just, but through the deliberative process, unjust outcomes are
decided? Without a prior notion of what is just (or what is unjust), these two scenarios are
entirely plausible: “The absence of normative specification of a standard of justice, or clear
procedures for identifying different standards, impedes a justified set of priorities for evaluation
and enforcement. The capability approach’s strength as a strong philosophical foundation is thus
weakened at the practical level” (Srinivasan, 2007, p. 460).
Byskov (2015) reveals two possible routes for the democratic position but claims both are
unacceptable. He states they can either rely on a “theory of justice at the fundamental level or to
reject equality of democratic capabilities as part of their democratic theory” (Byskov, 2015, p. 4).
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He claims the first is circular and the second is contradictory; thus, neither solves the democratic
position’s dilemma. The first relies on the democratic process to create a theory of democratic
justice. The second is conflicting because if one rejects equality of democratic capabilities, then
one cannot call it a necessary part of the democratic process.
Instead, those coming from the democratic position have responded by arguing that a call
for a just process is not the same as creating a definitive list of capabilities. They state that the
commitment to democracy is flexible enough to not be considered a theory of justice created a
priori: “Making this normative commitment on a theoretical level is quite different from the
actual process of selecting relevant capabilities that can be used for the evaluation and design of
policies and institutions. A selection of method need not commit democrats to a pre-democratic
list of capabilities” (Byskov, 2015, p. 11). This argument, a focus on a just process, will be key
to reconciling the two approaches with determining and valuing capabilities in the next section.
Ultimately, as is the case with many competing theories, neither is without flaw. And yet,
not only does deliberative democracy mesh better with the capability approach because of its
emphasis on choice, but it is the less “flawed” approach between the philosopher and democrat.
Removing most of an individual’s ability to influence the decision on what capabilities are
important for a valuable life inherently limits their capability set. Regardless of how scientific or
well-intentioned an a priori list of capabilities may be, the mere fact of creating a said list for a
community (or humankind) is intrinsically problematic in the eyes of the capability approach.
This is not to say that the democratic approach is without defect. Rather, the shortcomings of this
perspective pose issues after the fact. How can one guarantee that the democratic process is just?
How can one guarantee that the outcomes of a process are just? These questions and others will
be addressed through the lens of the capability approach itself. By examining the commonalities
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between these two major approaches, harkening back to the foundational ideas of Habermas and
Rawls, and incorporating a new conception of power, I present a new way forward in capability
approach theory.

Reconciling the Philosophical and Democratic Positions
It is wrong to assume that these two approaches are a dichotomy; there exists space
between the two theories for some form of reconciliation and a new path forward. In the vein of
previous urban planning researchers, this new theoretical approach is more practical than a
thought experiment. Though a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” is unique and groundbreaking on
many levels, its practical applications in the world of democratic deliberation are limited.
Citizens, elected officials, and stakeholders cannot unlearn their biases and current knowledge;
thus, they need an approach that helps to create more democratic outcomes and more equitable
starting points. Before outlining how these two major approaches to valuing and determining
capabilities can be reconciled, it is worth acknowledging that both have inherent flaws that may
never be overcome.
The philosophical approach often fails to recognize the position of power that
“philosophers” (or technocrats or even elected officials) have over the determination and
valuation process. Their power is usually vastly disproportional to that of an average citizen.
Thus, any comprehensive lists of capabilities will always be suspect and ripe for critique from
those on the democratic side. One cannot simply unlearn or ignore the existing knowledge of
lists and their subsequent influence on any discourse about capabilities. Indeed, many lists of
important capabilities already do exist! As Flyvbjerg argues, this power then creates a new
rationality (Flyvbjerg, 1998); these lists are embedded in the discourse from the beginning and
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frame any conversations about determining and valuing capabilities. To ignore that these lists
exist or that they already hold sway over democratic societies is to turn a blind eye to an
important variable in this conversation. While this may never be “solved,” understanding this
reality can play a role in holding on to some of its key precepts while supplementing it with
strengths from the democratic position.
The democratic position, on the other hand, is often quixotic in its pursuit of a truly
deliberative process. In reality, almost all of the one hundred or so current democracies in the
world are representative in nature, not direct or deliberative. There will always be an inherent
disconnect between the average citizens of a democratic society and the elected officials or
“philosophers” of that society. Again, recognizing this fact does not mean that one needs to
throw out the democratic position entirely. The arguments for a more inclusive, participatory,
and deliberative process already exist in many representative democracies. Many representative
democracies embed legal mechanisms for open forums, public feedback, citizens reviews, and
more. By understanding the strengths and limits of both theories, a new theoretical path forward
may be possible in determining and valuing capabilities, which I label the Reflexive Position or
reflexive approach.
Referring back to the theoretical foundations of Rawls and Habermas, several key
arguments they make are important to this conversation of merging the two theories of
determining and valuing capabilities. Although slightly different in their approach and
substantive claims, both Rawls and Habermas stress the concepts of consensus and equity as
integral to any democratic process. More modern scholars on deliberative democracy have
alluded to a necessity for some type of self-correction in deliberation, or reflexivity. If the goal is
to create a consensus of outcomes or justice, a goal that is desirable but potentially near
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impossible to reach, how then should societies (and theories) proceed? Manin et al. (1987) has
argued that, in fact, “To make room simultaneously for the indeterminacy of justice and the
necessity for decision, those in power and their idea of the common good must be questioned, if
not constantly, then at regular intervals” (Manin, Stein, & Mansbridge, 1987, p. 362). Using
these concepts, the philosophical and democratic approaches can be combined to create a new,
reflexive theory of practical use for stakeholders in a democratic policy-making process.
Both Habermas and Rawls argue that acceptance of the democratic process is
fundamental to its stability. To do so, both claim that consensus can help to solidify the stability
and validity of a society’s democratic process and social order. Whereas Rawls envisions this as
a general “overlapping consensus” among a diverse populace, Habermas outlines a more
deliberative process by which citizens reach said consensus. Both scenarios require the citizens
of a society to have at least some deliberation about issues of policy and procedures or questions
of the good life. This ideal takes on a new meaning in a representative democracy, where elected
officials often sit in a different position of power than that of an average citizen. How can a
representative democracy truly reach a consensus on a determination or valuation of a
capability? Some modern theorists have attempted to expand on Habermas to answer questions
similar to this. Cohen and Arato (1992) argue that a new civil society is emerging, one which
emphasizes public dialogue that prizes solidarity and recognition of each individual in the
deliberative process. Their argument is expanded with a discussion of “the good” and supports
Sen’s view that these goals will always be contextual and historical based on the particular
community or “lifeworld” (in their and Habermas’ terms). Beyond this, the status of each
stakeholder in a democratic process is also important to address in this reflexive approach.
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Equity is the key to closing this theoretical circle and finalizing my theory for capability
determination and valuation. Again, from slightly different perspectives, Rawls and Habermas
outline a process by which all people in a society are equal on some level. Rawls’ First Principle
and Habermas’ four presumptions outline what this process may look like.
Rawls’ First Principle: Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of
liberties for all.
Habermas: Discourse principle argues that all affected by the outcome of a process
should have the ability to participate in said process.
Building on this, Srinivasan outlines a political equitable, consensus-based approach to the
democratic process without necessarily creating a predetermined list of specific capabilities to
develop and is worth quoting at length:
A criterion of political equality for specific deliberations is not necessarily applicable in
the same way to normative objectives of justice. A justice criterion may usefully identify
what is guaranteed (here, equality of substantive political freedoms to participate in
public deliberations and influence social arrangements), why (according to what justified
normative objective, here advancement of freedom for all individuals in a liberal and
plural society that promotes individual agency) and how (according to what equitable
criteria, such as minimally protecting against ‘political poverty’ or aspiring towards
equality of attainment shortfall), without necessarily specifying a priori exactly what will
amount to political equality ‘on the ground’ in each and every situation. (Srinivasan,
2007, p. 474).
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Essentially, a particular type of democratic process should ideally occur in the determination and
valuation of capabilities. Without creating a list of specific capabilities that are necessary for all
societies to have, my reflexive position reconciles the philosophical and democratic positions by
focusing on just one: the capability of democratic participation. The people of a society must
have equal ability to meaningfully influence the process of determining and valuing a capability
during the democratic process. This one capability creates a broad outline that can both satisfy
the core desires of the philosophical and democratic position. It does this by doing what the three
major theorists (Habermas, Rawls, and Sen) have admitted at one time: even if there may be an
ideal democratic process or society, the process to get there is ongoing and we need not have a
perfect theory to start the work that needs to be done to achieve it.
The reflexive position attempts to satisfy these opposing forces by simply calling for a
self-referent process that most likely will never end. To explain this theory, I will use a simple
example. A small town of five hundred people wants to decide how to use a large federal grant it
received. Intending to achieve the one instrumental capability, the capability of democratic
participation, the town calls an open forum for elected officials and citizens to discuss options for
spending the grant money. After a deliberative process occurs, the policy-making process
follows as is the norm in most representative democracies: the idea that gains the most support is
chosen and representatives do the work of following through with the chosen policy. It is
important here to remember that a universal consensus need not be reached. Habermas argued
that a lower expectation of consensus is valid for a real-world democratic discourse, but this
reflexive approach takes one more step to continually improve.
The reflexive position argues that a separate but more important process must occur after
the normal deliberative process. Elected officials and citizens must continue the deliberative
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process but instead of focusing on the grant money and policy, it should reflect on the
deliberative process itself. Was the process truly open to all who wanted to participate? Did all
citizens have an equal ability to meaningfully influence the process? With this information in
hand, the society can then make changes to its processes to be more equitable in the future. The
theoretical underpinnings of the Capability Approach and my theory already exist both within
the work of Rawls and Habermas. Rawls’ Second Principle argues that offices and positions are
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and that policies must have the
greatest benefit for the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle). (Rawls, A
Theory of Justice, 1971, pp. 42-43). Habermas’ four presumptions argue a similar vein: (1) no
one capable of making a relevant contribution has been excluded, 2) participants have an equal
voice, 3) they are internally free to speak their honest opinion without deception or selfdeception, and 4) there are no sources of coercion built into the process and procedures of
discourse (Habermas, 1992, p. 82). Though these concepts are ideal in nature and may not be
entirely achievable, they give us the framework and guide for the reflexive process to occur.
A simple yet critical question exists concerning this new reflexive approach; how will
this reflexive process work toward a more equitable system and not simply reinforce existing
inequalities of political power? In other words, what specifically should stakeholders examine
during their reflexive discourse? To achieve this reflexive goal, stakeholders should be guided by
the capability approach’s focus on the conversion of resources, the choice of stakeholders, and
the influence of power over the two. Continuing with the above example, if through this
reflexive process it was found that some members of the community were unable to
meaningfully participate due to a lack of transportation to and from the open forums (an issue of
resources and conversion), then this would need to be addressed before the next determination or
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valuation of a capability. In this scenario, some within a community may have more power to
convert resources into this small goal of attending an open forum. For example, if only one
forum occurred in a geographic location away from population centers, then either more
locations would need to be created for the next process or transit accommodations made for
those unable to travel. With regards to the final choice of policy outcome, stakeholders should be
asked about their choice and how and why they came to them. For example, an anonymous poll
might determine that many citizens felt threatened by other groups if they publicly supported
Choice A over Choice B (an issue of individual choice and agency). This too would give the
society more information and a new goal of creating a more inclusive and equitable process.
As this is a novel sub-theory within capability approach literature, there are several
shortcomings and some obvious critiques that I will now try to address. Mainly, if this is a
reconciliation between the two approaches, how does this theory handle the critiques of both the
philosophical and democratic viewpoints? Does it create new issues that need to be discussed? I
will attempt to address some of these concerns before moving into the related methodology
centered around power in Chapter Three.
The major critique of the philosophical position is that it creates a predetermined list,
making it vulnerable to critiques about a lack of participation from the community that is
supposed to benefit from the said list as well as issues of an overtly top-down, possibly “we
know better” approach. Is the reflexive position, with its goal of increased deliberation and
participation, simply delcaring one capability that is then open to the same critiques? Not
entirely. First, the original framework for any conversation is centered around a democratic
process. I am not arguing for an authoritarian system or even just a better government, but
specifically a better democracy. Participation is a necessary component to any democracy and
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thus a qualification for it to even exist. Secondly, while many other problems of resources and
conversion factors may impact this ability to participate, specifically avoiding a lengthier list of
“rights” or capabilities, it allows each community the ability to determine which is most needed
in their specific circumstances. But what are the critiques of the democratic position?
One of the major critiques of the democratic position is that it allows for unjust outcomes.
Without a predetermined list of rights or capabilities to anchor a political system, it is possible
that a community could create unjust outcomes and thus undermine the entire process. The
reflexive position partially avoids this issue, though admittedly not entirely. Since its focus is on
the democratic process and not, say, development itself, the reflexive position sidesteps most of
the conversation about what constitutes unjust outcomes. A policy that may be morally wrong,
politically unjust, or not based on any rational evidence is not directly addressed by this
approach. Instead, it harkens back to many of the arguments that Rawls and Habermas made
about consensus and Sen about a theory of justice. On the one hand, it is much more difficult
(though not impossible) for a society that reaches an overlapping consensus (Rawls) to then
implement unjust outcomes. If society saw the outcome as truly unjust and they had the
capability to effectively participate in the deliberative process, how then did it get implemented
in the first place? Sen also argued that we do not necessarily need a perfect theory of justice to
begin the work of trying to achieve a more just world.
Thus, we reach the crux of this sub-theory of the capability approach: it is not trying to
address every possible barrier to democratic participation with a universal solution. Instead, it is
meant to be a practical yet broad goal for all democratic societies to strive toward in their own
way. From a researcher’s standpoint, examining a democratic process through the lens of the
reflexive approach follows much of the same patterns of other political science theories and
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methodology. Focusing on stakeholders and their power during the democratic process is the
beginning, but because of the intricate nature of modern representative democracies, a more
comprehensive understanding of “power” needs to be fleshed out before any methodology can be
presented. Using Bent Flyvbjerg’s phronetic methodology, I examine his understanding of power
and its relations to the capability approach in the next chapter.
This new reflexive approach still has major critiques to overcome in the argument for
capability determination and valuation. To frame and help solve this puzzle, I will demonstrate
how the major problems and critiques of democratic deliberation line up with the key stages of
the capability approach: resources, conversion factors, choice, and functionings. At each stage
lies an issue that the reflexive approach must address to constitute a solid theory for capability
determination/valuation and overcome the major critiques. Not all critiques can be addressed and
not all can be rebutted as easily as others, but I hope that this original undertaking will help to fill
some gaps in the deliberative democracy literature written by capability approach scholars.
Ultimately, they are concerned with expanding a person’s capabilities or a person’s ability to
effectively choose the functionings (outcomes) they desire. A deliberative democracy is
interested in a person’s ability to participate in and effectively shape the deliberative process in a
meaningful way.
To understand how the reflexive process may occur and what a given community should
focus on to improve, I will discuss three major points of the capability approach’s process. My
ultimate concern is that of power and its influence on those involved in the democratic process.
First, however, I will outline how inequality in resources (income, education, etc.) relates to any
discussion of power. Then, I will show examining power relations outlined by Bent Flyvbjerg
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can help to solve the democratic dilemma by applying it to the Conversion Factors and Choice
nodes of the capability approach process (See Figure 3).
Power

Figure 3. Power, Conversion Factors, and Choice (Verd & Lopez, The Rewards of a
Qualitative Approach to Life-Course Research. The Example of the Effects of Social
Protection Policies on Career Paths, 2011). Power category added by author.
Inequality of Resources
The first point of the capability approach (CA) that must be addressed in this new
reflexive position is that of inequality. I will first look at the inequality of resources and then
focus more specifically on the inequality of conversion factors. What unites both is that they
affect an individual’s ability to participate in the democratic process and any reflexive process
that may occur. As stated in the previous section, the democratic position does not seek to create
a list of necessary capabilities that must be guaranteed a priori any democratic process, so these
inequalities can be troublesome for scholars of this approach to tackle.
In the process of the capability approach, resources constitute what Rawls might call
“primary goods” that everyone has or possesses. They may include tangible resources like food,
shelter, or clothing, or they may be intangibles like the right to vote or freedom of speech. Both
are items that can be measured between and among individuals. A person may have more or less
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food than another. A person may have more or less freedom of speech than another. If the
democratic position (and by turn, my reflexive position) does not demand a certain level of
equality of resources, how does it address this issue?
First, it is important to note that not all inequality is relevant to the deliberative space.
What I and other scholars are concerned with are two specific types of inequality. Joshua Cohen
(2001) outlines one of these as a type of equality that should be achieved: citizens should be
“formally equal in the sense that the rules of the ideal procedure must not choose the individuals
for any advantage or disadvantage; everyone who possesses the deliberative capacity has the
same status in each stage of the deliberative process” (Cohen J. , 2000, p. 245). The second type
strives to end inequality “so the existing distribution of powers and resources does not affect
their chances of contribution to deliberation processes and that distribution does not give them
decisive faculties” (Cohen J. , 2000, p. 245). I shall call these a) procedural equality and b)
instrumental equality (respectively). Both types of equality relate to the discussion on reconciling
the philosophical and the democratic positions of capability determination and valuation.
As previously outlined, the emphasis of the democratic position on participation and
deliberation may be squared with the philosopher’s position by guaranteeing just one key
capability: the ability to effectively participate in the democratic process. Rather than a capability
that must be met before any democratic deliberation can occur, this capability should be seen as
a reflexive journey, with a particular community continually reevaluating the position of its
citizens and adjusting both its democratic process and/or distribution of resources if need be, to
create a more equitable process. Concerning deliberative democracy, Garcia Valverde (2009)
identifies three specific “resource” inequalities that have a direct impact on a person’s ability to
participate in the democratic process: “limited access to the public sphere that derives from the
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asymmetries of economic and social power, communicative inequalities which affect the
capability to participate efficiently in deliberative spheres and political poverty, under which the
citizens and groups are effectively excluded but cannot avoid their legal inclusion by others”
(Valverde, 2009, p. 2). All three types of resource inequality here can lead to a direct inequality
in a person’s ability to participate in the deliberative process. Inequalities in resources can
potentially lead to unequal capabilities in the democratic realm: “Deliberative democracy should
not reward those groups who simply are better situated to get what they want by public and
discursive means” (Bohman, 1997, p. 332). Inequality in wealth, communicative ability, and
political power can limit a person’s ability to influence the democratic process and its outcome.
It is easy to see how scholars can be bogged down in the particulars over which resource
inequalities need to be addressed.
Here, I fall back on Sen to guide us to a possible solution. In “The Idea of Justice,” he
affirms that one does not necessarily need a fully worked out theory of justice to address issues
of inequality and injustice. Rather, we need a theory that can help guide us to make comparisons
of injustice and to form a less unjust society (Sen, 2009). Similar to Srinivasan’s argument
presented at the beginning of this section, rather than attempt to create a predetermined list of
necessary resources or issues of inequality, scholars should consider the implications of
inequality of resources, particularly for deliberative outcomes. One need not have a bar that will
constitute political equality to begin examining the “what,” “how,” and “why” of a deliberative
process.
The issues of resource inequality are only truly concerning to scholars of the democratic
position because of their instrumental repercussions. I by no means imply that issues of
inequality should not be addressed for their intrinsic injustice, but the deliberative standpoint is
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concerned with how it impacts a person’s ability to participate. This is because even if equality is
achieved for some of these, problems relevant to the democratic process may persist. As James
Bohman stated, “Even if persons are equal in some particular way (such as income, rights,
entitlements, or opportunities) and thus comparable in a particular ‘evaluative space,’ they are
not necessarily equal in other, more politically significant respects” (Bohman, 1997, p. 328). The
implications for this are profound. Inequalities of resources, such as education and wealth, can
lead to privileging a particular socioeconomic group within a political community and undermine
the democratic process (Bohman, 1997, p. 325). Several capability scholars argue that this
inequality of resources can potentially influence a person’s political power (Bohman, 1997;
Byskov, 2015; Pellissery, 2007). Yet the problems remain: if scholars of the democratic position
attempt to right these inequalities a priori the deliberative process, they fall victim to the
critiques they hold of the philosopher’s position. By moving further along the capability
approach, one can move to issues of conversion factors and potentially overcome this obstacle.
Part of the reason that focusing on the inequality of resources fails to create equality
within the deliberative sphere involves conversion factors. Between members of a society who
share equality of a particular resource (i.e. education, income, social standing, language, etc.), it
does not necessarily mean this will overcome the disadvantages of those who were unequal when
they enter into the democratic process (Bohman, 1997, p. 329). Capability scholars are more
concerned with people’s ability to influence the deliberative process. What it depends on is a
person’s political power, irrelevant to the resources needed to wield that power. This points to
conversion factors as the key aspect of a person’s capability to influence the deliberative process.
Creating equal grounds for participation is less important than participation. As Valverde states,
“So we could ask what is really important in terms of the social bases of self-respect?: having the
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opportunity to participate? Or having the opportunity to participate in a meaningful way?”
(Author’s original emphasis) (Valverde, 2009, p. 6). To fully understand the implications of this,
I will take a closer look at these two points: conversion and choice.

Inequality of Power: Conversion and Choice
Political power rests at the crux of almost all discussions of a more just and equitable
democratic process. The reflexive position I have outlined is uniquely concerned with political
power because it has a direct impact on reconciling the philosophical and democratic positions
while also fleshing out just how this reflexive process may progress. Inequality between
individuals’ power is the central issue with deliberative democracy and the capability approach.
This concept of power, often lacking in Sen’s writing on the capability approach, allows one to
simultaneously address issues of conversion factors and choice. Focusing on this point in the
capability approach allows one to avoid the philosopher’s trap of lists while still promoting an
equal deliberative process. Adhering to the common literature of breaking the two points into
separate stages of the capability approach, I will address each from a perspective of power.
How a person converts resources into capabilities can sometimes be a purely individual
experience. A pregnant mother may require more resources since her conversion of food into the
ability to be well fed is different from a similar non-pregnant female. These issues of human
diversity are important but not addressed here. Many of these flow from more natural sciencebased issues, such as biology and chemistry. Instead, I focus on external limitations to a person’s
ability to convert resources into capabilities. In political science, this often boils down to matters
of power. Does a person have the power to take a resource (say, freedom of speech) and convert
that into reality (speaking their mind in a political setting)? Because of the lack of data and
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operationalization of capabilities, most capability scholars use functionings (outcomes) as
measurements for capabilities. Understanding development as expanding capabilities usually
entails checking outcomes, such as levels of participation (meeting attendance, voter turnout,
other quantifiable variables). Or, one can look at Sen’s focus, which is often on eliminating
structural social barriers to participation. This could include alleviating poverty, raising
education, or creating a more inclusive democratic process (higher up on all those typologies and
spectrums). But none of these directly address inequality in power.
If those of the philosopher’s stance argue for a more effective and parsimonious approach
of creating a list of necessary capabilities needed for a just deliberative process, why bother
complicating matters with complex discussions of power? One concern of not fully
understanding the influence of power relations in a democratic process is that one may fail to see
how the democratic process perpetuates inequality. Groups in a society with more political and
economic power are often able to have greater control over the deliberative democratic process.
Therefore, focusing on power and power relations to reform the current system is fundamental to
any study of capabilities and deliberative democracy. As Pellissery and Bergh state, “Indeed,
participation without a change in power relations may simply add a more ‘democratic’ face to
the status quo” (Pellissery & Bergh, 2007, p. 287).
Sen hints at the influence of power on capabilities and freedoms but does not expand on
this at all. Instead, he discusses the impact of “values” on the deliberative process and their
effects on democracy. He writes, “the exercise of freedom is mediated by values, but the values,
in turn, are influenced by public discussions and social interactions, which are themselves
influenced by participatory freedoms” (Sen, 1999, p. 462). The critiques of Sen’s vagueness
concerning power in the democratic process are many and harsh (Koggel, 2014; Hill, 2003;
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Stewart & Deneulin, 2002). The primary concern is that Sen sees the democratic process from a
strongly procedural standpoint, with little regard to other variables:“democratic discussions are
not so easy to have and democratic understandings even more problematic…Sen’s concept of
democracy seems an idealistic one where political power, political economy and struggle are
absent” (Stewart & Deneulin, 2002, pp. 63-64).
The lack of consideration of power in the deliberative process means that Sen fails to
consider its influence on procedural democracy and individual capabilities. Despite this
weakness, some scholars have incorporated conceptions of power into their discussions of
deliberation (Drydyk, 2013; Eyben, 2004; Frediani, 2010). These authors often reduce their
discussion of power into simple dichotomies: elites versus the public (masses) and having power
versus not having power. This dichotomous framing of deliberative democracy works in some
ways for practical purposes of development but often fails to recognize the diversity of power
relations. If one does not properly understand how power works, then one cannot adequately
address how to eliminate the inequalities of power that exist. This is where Flyvbjerg’s notion of
power, specifically using his conception of phronesis (Flyvbjerg, 2001) as a model can help
deliberative democracy solve this puzzle.
Political science is inherently focused on issues of power and power relations. One of the
most common conceptualizations of this is through an actor “having” or “wielding” power over
or through another: “Power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that
shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate” (Barnett & Duvall,
2005).. Barnett and Duvall’s conceptualization of power is similar to the definition used by many
political scientists. Beyond the simple realist understanding, power can be compulsory,
institutional, structural, or productive in nature. Though this definition does allow for a more
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robust understanding of power, allowing for multiple forms being applied by multiple actors, it
still varies from a phronetic understanding of power. Bent Flyvbjerg’s phronetic social science is
based on the philosophical traditions of Machiavelli, Nietcheze, and Foucault. His understanding
of what power is (and is not) can be summarized in key points from his 2001 book Making
Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again. First, “power is
seen as productive and positive and not only as restrictive and negative” (Flyvbjerg, Making
Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again, 2001, p. 131).
When studying democracy, power often takes on a deleterious connotation. The adage “power
corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely” is the unspoken and uncited assumption by
many political scientists. However, the reverse is true, and more grassroots, bottom-up
approaches to democracy recognize this through the positive effects of empowering citizens.
Second, “power is viewed as a dense net of omnipresent relations and not only as localized in
‘centers’ and institutions, or as an entity on can ‘possess’ (Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science
Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again, 2001, p. 131). Democracy
scholars often compare competing groups by way of power relations; some (elites, rich,
government) have it, others (masses, poor, citizens) do not. Flyvbjerg’s notion of power is not so
easily boxed into categorical monoliths. Rather, power is ubiquitous and ever-present between
social actors in our world. In other words, power is “the name that one attributes to a complex
strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault & Hurley, 1990, p. 92). Third, “the concept
of power is seen as ultradynamic; power is not only something one appropriates, but also
something one reappropriates and exercises in a constant back-and-forth movement in relations
of strength, tactics, and strategies” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 131). Here, Flyvbjerg stresses that power
is not something one has or lacks; instead, it is constantly in flux. An individual actor may be
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gaining relative power toward another actor in one sense at one moment, yet simultaneously be
losing power in relation to another. The back and forth he mentions, or the process by which this
constant state of fluctuations occurs, is important to understanding power and, as I will show,
deliberative democratic processes.
In democratic research, the basis of rational thought is often assumed. Whether a
“reasonable” citizen in a Rawlsian perspective or simply a rational human, the argument is often
rationality is the basis for political power. Flyvbjerg expands on this by pointing out that
“knowledge and power, truth and power, rationality and power are analytically inseparable from
each other; power produces knowledge, and knowledge produces power” (Flyvbjerg, Making
Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again, 2001, p. 131). In
terms of deliberation and the democratic process, the focus should be on those wielding power to
create a new rationality, knowledge, or framework from which others then see as legitimate.
Finally, concentrating on power means not just the who but also the how: “the central question is
how power is exercised, and not only who has power, and why they have it; the focus is on
process in addition to structure” (Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry
fails and how it can succeed again, 2001, p. 131). Following the reflexive position, it is equally
important to evaluate the stakeholders involved in a democratic process as well as how they
influenced said process through their political power.
How does this more cohesive (admittedly complex) definition of power help to
understand the practical problems of the reflexive position? As I discussed above, if we are to
take the democrats’ approach to the problem of valuation/determination of capabilities, we must
fully take into consideration power relations between actors. With Flyvbjerg’s fundamentals of
power, we can begin to understand how a particular process occurs. From here, one can see how
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power can influence the conversion factors in a person’s ability to influence a deliberative
process.
Focusing on individual inequalities (i.e. income, education, etc.) leads to the trap of
creating a list of which inequalities are most detrimental to the deliberative process.
Concentrating on a comprehensive definition of power helps to sidestep that trap. At its core, this
concept of power is rooted in the Foucauldian notion that power is inherently social, ubiquitous,
and ever-present. To know power and its influence on the deliberative process is to study the
connections and interactions between different actors: “power is often exercised through takenfor-granted everyday interactions, through embodied ‘regimes of practice’…they suggest the
need to think about the linkages between government, authority, politics, and questions of self,
identity and person” (Cleaver, 2007, p. 228). Inequality of power with relation to conversion
factors can limit a person’s ability to participate, let alone influence, a deliberative process.
Bohman (1997) indicates that this inequality can lead to two major negative consequences:
public exclusion, and political inclusion:
On the one hand, politically impoverished groups cannot avoid public exclusion; they
cannot successfully initiate the joint activity of public deliberation. On the other hand,
such groups cannot avoid political inclusion either, since they are the legal addresses of
the deliberative agreements over which they have no real control or influence. Because
they cannot initiate deliberation, their silence is turned into consent by the more powerful
deliberators who are able to ignore them. Asymmetrical exclusion and inclusion succeed
by constantly shifting considerable political burdens on the worst off, who lack the
resources, capabilities, and social recognition to mount a challenge to the conditions
which govern institutionalized deliberation. (Bohman, 1997, p. 333)
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Power inequalities can lead to a variety of limitations in a person’s ability to convert resources
into desirable functionings (outcomes). Yet, at the same time, these power inequalities can also
restrict a person’s ability to choose from many possible outcomes. This issue is one of agency, or
as I will later describe, empowerment. Agency is closely tied to the concept of conversion factors
because the ability to choose an outcome one desires is often hindered or facilitated by
conversion factors (structural issues). Freedom to choose a life one has reason to value is central
to Sen’s vision of the capability approach. His approach is unique from many theories of
development because of its emphasis on freedom (realizing capabilities) and choice. The process
of the reflexive position works in unison with this idea quite well. Yet both are open to criticisms
from opposing paradigms, particularly those concerned with outcomes. What if a life one has
reason to value includes limiting the rights or freedoms of another? If the capability approach is a
partial theory of justice as well as a theory of development, would this not be considered counter
to its goal? Here, I draw on the literature of agency and choice to explain how power, justice, and
agency are inherently linked.
Besides conversion factors, the other point along the capability approach that is relevant
to my reflexive position is choice and the role that power plays in an individual’s choice during
the ability to meaningfully participate in the democratic process. Inequality in power relations
can have a direct negative impact on a person's agency, or their ability to influence the
deliberative process: “powerful groups do so by limiting the extent of social freedom—for all
those involved—by limiting the available options for deliberation for the whole polity”
(Bohman, 1997, p. 339). Although this power inequality may be overt and easily detectable as
one individual or group exerting power over another, that basic understanding of power excludes
other possibilities. Returning to the Flyvbjerg notion of power, agency can be helped or hindered
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by power relations in often subtle or unexpected ways. According to Cleaver, “The working of
power through plural institutional settings shapes the effects of agency, the ability of individuals
to effect significant difference in their lives. Power may be exercised and accepted both
consciously and unconsciously; the ‘self-disciplining’ of agents; their acceptance of relations of
inequality, may ensure the reproduction of power through everyday acts and relationships”
(Cleaver, 2007, p. 230). One must realize that power and the reproduction of power are
inherently dialogical. People’s social history, identities, and perceptions influence their power
and thus their ability to influence a deliberative process. Cleaver continues, “The agency of
individuals is clearly exercised in relation to the perception by others of them” (Cleaver, 2007, p.
233). As I or others use the reflexive position to understand the determination and valuation of
capabilities, particularly in a case study involving a representative democracy, understanding
stakeholders’ perceptions of each other is key to revealing their political power within that
process.
Despite these arguments, agency is often cited as too narrow a concept for “choice” in the
capability approach process. The ability to make a choice of one’s own free will is too vague of a
definition and leaves much room for debate. What if a person is unable to make a decision they
have reason to value because it conflicts with another’s decision? Cleaver finds that “Agency is
commonly conceptualized as relational; it does not exist in a vacuum but is exercised in a social
world in which structure shapes the opportunities and resources available to individuals, in which
appropriate ways of being and behaving are not simply a matter of individual choice” (Cleaver,
2007, p. 226). Again, we return to issues of power and power relations between actors. Rather
than agency, Drydyk has coined and championed the term “empowerment,” which is a more
multidimensional approach to choice. Here, he argues that empowerment is a combination of
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agency, well-being freedom, and power. First, Drydyk has been clear in his recent work to select
“empowerment” and to distinguish it from concepts such as “agency” or “participation”: “Good
development connects people with power in ways that, through their own agency and decisionmaking, they can improve their lives, and, on the contrary, development that disempowers
people is maldevelopment” (Koggel, 2014, p. 148). This argument for a stronger focus on power,
rather than simply agency, is critical. The relationship between power and agency is not a simple
or straightforward one; indeed, “Positions of relative power do not imply unfettered ability to
exercise agency” (Cleaver, 2007, p. 234). This too aligns with my (and Flyvbjerg’s) general
understanding of power, that it is not simply an act of one agent wielding it over another.
It is worth mentioning that this approach to agency/choice also incorporates a key part of
Sen’s CA, adaptive preferences. Sen argues that individuals often adaptive their ideals of a life
worth living, based on the situation they currently exist in. For example, a person who has lived
their entire life under an oppressive regime will lower their expectations of what deliberative
participation they see as “worth having”.” In a representative democracy and relevant to this
discussion of the reflexive position, how does one determine if a stakeholder cannot participate
versus that stakeholder choosing not to participate? More specifically, if a stakeholder became
accustomed to not participating and thus lowered their expectations of being included in the
democratic process, does that matter to the reflexive position?
To solve the issue of adaptive preferences, the capability approach (and in turn my
reflexive position) makes an important distinction between achievements and freedom to
achieve. Sen’s most popular example of this is comparing two people who are not eating. By
focusing on the difference between achievements and freedom to achieve, one can see that
Individual A is starving from lack of food while Individual B is choosing to fast for religious

59

reasons. The second individual is exercising agency, or freedom to achieve a life they deem
worth living. Relating this to my discussion on deliberative democracy, the focus is on
participation. Measuring participation as an outcome (or function) and not a capability can lead
to a miscategorization of an individual. There are and should be distinctions made between a
person who cannot participate and a person who chooses not to. But one cannot simply know if a
person chooses not to participate unless a deliberative process is used by which any and all who
want to participate, can. A theory that both examines outcomes and resources, with a focus on
power and more specifically empowerment, can capture these differences in a way that is useful
for social science research.
Koggell makes the best argument for this type of power-oriented approach to studying
deliberative democracy:
This account can be said to be relational in that it highlights the interactive and dynamic
nature of relationships and the ways in which this very interaction can transform the
debates, the discourse, and the relationships themselves (Koggel 2012). A framework that
focuses on relationships in all their complexity, interconnectedness, and context
specificity has the virtue of being able to identify relationships of power that prevent
some from being able to participate in the debates and deliberation about the detrimental
effects of development. Moreover, the use of such a framework makes the concept of
empowerment central to the analysis of development theory and policy because it pays
attention to those aspects of power at all levels of the personal and public that hinder
one’s capacity to be in control of one’s life or to remove barriers in the way of
opportunities for enhancing well-being. (Koggel, 2014, p. 146)
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Having examined the connections between power, conversion factors, and choice, I will now
move to the final step in the capability approach: functionings or outcomes.

Functionings/Outcomes: Are They Just?
The final critique against the democratic position and salient to my reflexive position is
that despite all these considerations, power, agency, empowerment, resources, inequality, etc.,
there remains a chance that a reflexive, deliberative process can produce unjust outcomes. What
if a group, through a democratic process, decides to create policies that directly or indirectly
hinder the capabilities of another group?
For capability research, unjust outcomes or functionings are highly relevant to any
discussion of development. As was the case with resources (the beginning of the capability
approach flow), functionings are less important to the reflexive position and do not need to be
fully addressed as they are outside of the scope of what it is trying to achieve. This approach is
focused solely on the ability of stakeholders to meaningfully participate in the democratic
process and for a community to continually reevaluate their process to work towards this goal
through policy reforms. Thus, the one “unjust” outcome would be a situation where stakeholders
who wanted to meaningfully participate could not. If this were to occur, then according to the
reflexive position, the community must then take actions to address the barriers to participation,
whether they be through issues of conversion or of choice (with a focus on power).
On a final note, an apparent critique of this reflexive position is that it does not outline a
given plan to specifically address these unjust or unequal outcomes. Here, this approach leans
more toward the side of the democratic position in that is seen as a strength and not a weakness.
Creating a plan or goal of just outcomes brings one back down the path of predetermined lists
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that the philosophical position advocates for. Instead, how a particular community chooses to
address its shortcomings regarding the capability of political participation is up to that
community. What policies, institutions, or laws need to be reformed to do better may be unique
to each community and as long as they are continually striving towards the ultimate goal of a
more just and equitable democratic process, how they go about it should truly be a deliberative
process. With this novel theory of determination and valuation of capabilities outlined, I will
now turn to how I performed my research and explain its relevance to the reflexive position.
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Chapter Three: Phronetic Capabilities Methodology
“Communicative and deliberative approaches work well as ideals and evaluative yardsticks for
decision making, but they are quite defenceless in the face of power” (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, &
Rothengatter, 2003).
Introduction
Too often, theory and methods stand at an impractical distance from each other. Scholars
working on deliberative democracy theory faced problems of defining and understanding power.
To a political scientist, power is often the key factor to any research question. The case is no
different in deliberative democracy. However, as one can see from the previous section, applying
the concept of power and values (in particular, defining and valuing capabilities) to deliberative
democracy exposes a variety of cracks. Bent Flyvbjerg and phronetic social science (phronesis)
can help to fill these cracks and create a useable merger of theory and method for understanding
deliberative democracy, valuing capabilities, and the process by which they play out in the real
world. In this chapter, I show how the theoretical framework for deliberative democracy can be
combined with Bent Flyvbjerg’s understanding of phronesis to create a method for social science
research, coined phronetic capabilities methodology or PCM. This methodology stems from the
ongoing Perestroika debate within political science.
For nearly two decades, the Perestroika movement poked holes in the hegemonic power
of quantitative, causally driven research methods in political science. The dominant narrative,
that single case studies are useful purely for theory testing but not theory building, remains a
strong critique against attempts to envision the single case study as a legitimate qualitative
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method. The methodology used for my
research, PCM, is rooted in a critique not
just of quantitative methods, but of the
tradition of political science’s attempts to
create comparative, generalizable, and
falsifiable, conclusions about the social
world. Flyvbjerg and others (Flyvbjerg,

Figure 4. The pyramid of research knowledge:
ranking the quality of evidence (Medicine, 2020)

2001; Schram S. F., 2017) seek to flip
what is conventionally seen as the hierarchy of scientific knowledge (Fig. 3). Schram argues that
traditional social science methods have “failed to examine: the ways people narrated their lives
were constitutive of those very same lives and the ways they made meaning of their lived
experiences influenced what lived experiences people ended up experiencing” (Schram S. F.,
2017, p. 261). When I speak of “traditional” social science, I refer to the positivist assumptions
that are routinely agreed upon which support social science research. These are:
1. Social science exists to help promote understanding of the truth about the “facts of
social life”;
2. Social science research contributes to this quest by adding to the accumulation of an
expanding base of objective knowledge about society;
3. Growth of this knowledge base is contingent upon the building of theory that offers
explanations of social relations;
4. Building of theory is dependent on the development of universal generalizations
regarding the behavior of social actors;
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5. Development of a growing body of generalizations occurs by testing falsifiable, causal
hypotheses that demonstrate their success in making predictions;
6. Accumulation of a growing body of predictions about social behavior comes from the
study of variation in samples involving large numbers of cases; and
7. A growing body of objective, causal knowledge can be put in service of society,
particularly by influencing public policy-makers and the stewards of the state. (Schram S.
, 2012)
These assumptions form the core of “the myth of ‘pure social science’” and “inform the
pyramids of knowledge and perpetuates the conceit that social science when conducted in a
proper scientific way produces objective, universally generalizable, causal knowledge that
contributes to increasing our understanding of the truth of the social world” (Schram S. F., 2017,
p. 267). This raises the question of the future of social science methodology: “Should the social
sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences by adopting methods that promise explanation
and prediction (most notably large-n statistical studies and formal modeling), or are interpretive
methods traditionally employed by the humanities more appropriate to the unique subject matter
of the social (or human) sciences?” (Gimbel, The Golden Mean and the Golden Hammer:
Phronesis and Method in Contemporary Political Science, 2014). It is from this critique of
generalizable, falsifiable social science methods that I turn to Bent Flyvbjerg and phronesis.
Bent Flyvbjerg’s phronetic social science serves as both a critique of this quantitativedriven model and a vision for a possible way forward. He believes there should be three
fundamental changes to social sciences and for his field, urban planning, as well. First,
rationalism and the idea that utopian urban planning exists should be forfeited in favor of an
analysis of these “truths” and a better understanding of power relations. Second, rather than let
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theory drive research, research should aim to tackle problems that matter to local, national, and
global communities. Finally, research and its results should be communicated effectively with
the affected communities to create a sort of dialogue (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 284). Similar to the
capability approach, Flyvbjerg engages in explicitly normative theories. Sen and Nussbaum both
make arguments that their process of determining and valuing capabilities envision a uniquely
better future, whether through deliberation or a guarantee of specific capabilities. This vision
sees a better democratic process, with the goal of sustainable human development. They strongly
critique the established literature on development and traditional democratic situations.
Flyvbjerg’s phronesis envisions a better way of doing political science research, with a strong
critique of social science’s establishment and focus on positive methodology. Furthermore,
phronesis methodology places an emphasis on power dynamics between stakeholders. My theory
building from the previous chapter, the reflexive position, also focuses on the political
interactions and power relations between a wide array of stakeholders during a democratic
process. With a concentration on situational ethics, problem-driven methods, and Focaulidan
power relations, phronetic social science is the methodology that most clearly “fits” the problem
of my use of the capability approach theory and my research on the democratic process that
occurred in Hillsborough County.
In this chapter, I will first outline the history of phronesis and its distinction from other
Aristotelian types of knowledge. Then, I will discuss Bent Flyvbjerg’s Making Social Science
Matter (here on MSSM) and how he has combined more contemporary philosophers of a
phronetic paradigm to create a new way of approaching social science research. I will expand on
exactly what phronetic social science is and is not, followed by a discussion of the major
critiques. These critiques, both with phronetic social science and the case study (essential to
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phronesis), will aid in explaining why this methodology is best suited for the problem at hand.
Finally, I will expand slightly on Flyvbjerg’s phronetic social science to incorporate ideas of
deliberative democracy. Bringing in ideas and concepts from the previous chapter, I will show
how this minor addition will adjust the phronetic social science method enough to account for
the peculiar circumstances of researching democratic processes.
History of Phronesis
Critiques against political science’s positivist turn are not new. Since the behavioralist
revolution of the 1950s, many scholars lamented to turn away from a more interpretative,
qualitative-based social science methodology. However, most critiques and debates centered
around this methodological issue and not the underlying matter of knowledge. One of the
foundational and key assumptions of the positivist/behavioralists trends in political science has
been that universal truths exist as they do in the natural world (i.e. physics, chemistry, etc.). But
is the knowledge of the social world the same, in this regard, as the natural world? Bent
Flyvbjerg’s Making Social Science Matter answers this with a resounding “no” and does so with
the help of many pre-positivist scholars.

Aristotle and the three types of knowledge
First and foremost, Flyvbjerg argues that to equate knowledge of the social world and
knowledge of the natural world is flawed. He maintains that the distinction between different
types of knowledge, and thus different types of science, dates back to Aristotle. Aristotle
indicated that three different types of knowledge exist: episteme, techne, and phronesis. Before I
can make the case for the phronetic social science method, it is worth exploring why this is a true
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break from current qualitative/quantitative arguments of the Perestroika debate. Doing that
requires an understanding of Aristotle’s three types of knowledge.
The first type of knowledge that Aristotle says exists is episteme. Episteme is what
modern scholars would most closely associate with the natural sciences, such as chemistry,
biology, and physics. It is a knowledge where universal, objective truths exist and thus
generalizable theories about causality can be discovered. Because this type of knowledge exists,
scientists can use the scientific method and test hypotheses with the intent of creating universal
truth claims about how and why the universe works: “Episteme concerns universals and the
production of knowledge that is invariable in time and space and achieved with the aid of
analytical rationality. Episteme corresponds to the modern scientific ideal as expressed in natural
science” (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 285).
Flyvbjerg’s main critique of modern social science is that since the Enlightenment and
this push for universal truths, social sciences have attempted to emulate this process. But in fact,
there is a fundamental difference between the two: “it is not in their role as episteme that one can
argue for the value of the social sciences. In the domain where the natural sciences have been the
strongest-production of theories that can explain and predict accurately-the social sciences have
been the weakest” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 61). This is not to say that the social sciences cannot be
“scientific.” Gimbel, a critic of Flyvbjerg and phronetic social science, agrees with Flyvbjerg on
this point. He writes, “Flyvbjerg’s point is convincing: the social sciences are poorly understood
if our metric for science is episteme. To allow this point is not to denigrate the social sciences
qua science. Rather, it is to acknowledge that science comes in a variety of flavors, if you will;
and episteme, while (arguably) appropriate as a standard for the natural sciences, is patently
inappropriate as a standard for the social sciences” (Gimbel, The Golden Mean and the Golden
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Hammer: Phronesis and Method in Contemporary Political Science, 2014, p. 280). This is the
crucial difference between the natural sciences and social sciences: one deals in absolutes and the
other in things that can change. According to Gimbel, “Both phronesis and techne are concerned
with things that could be otherwise-with choice and decision. This puts both in stark contrast to
episteme with its emphasis on absolutes and the necessary” (Gimbel, The Golden Mean and the
Golden Hammer: Phronesis and Method in Contemporary Political Science, 2014, p. 280). One
way of understanding social-based knowledge is techne.
Techne is Aristotle’s classification for knowledge of creation. Technical know-how or the
ability to create something is different from universal episteme knowledge because it is applied
knowledge. Engineers knowing how the physics of steel work to hold up a bridge is episteme¸
while the actual knowledge of how to build said bridge is techne. For Flyvbjerb, “Techne is thus
craft and art, and as an activity it is concrete, variable, and context-dependent. The objective of
techne is application of technical knowledge and skills according to a pragmatic instrumental
rationality, what Foucault calls ‘a practical rationality governed by a conscious goal’ (Foucault,
1984, p. 255)” (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 286). While this type of knowledge is undoubtedly useful at
times in urban planning, it is not relevant to the matters at hand in this dissertation or to political
science. Instead, Aristotle defines one last type of knowledge that Flyvbjerg says is the root of
social science: phronesis.
Phronesis is defined by Aristotle as practical or value-based knowledge. Aristotle says
that because humans interpret the world continuously and make judgments about what is good or
bad, there is a separate sphere of knowledge about said issues. In practical terms, it is the
difference between knowing “how” a revolution occurs and “why” a revolution occurs.
Furthermore, phronesis is rooted in value judgments so it also asks if said revolution is good or
69

bad. Flyvbjerb notes, “Aristotle was explicit in his regard of phronesis as the most important of
the three intellectual virtues: episteme, techne, and phronesis. Phronesis is most important
because it is that activity by which instrumental rationality is balanced by value-rationality”
(Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 285). According to Stefanazzi and Eikeland (as cited in Jackson, 2016),
“Aristotle’s approach (384-322 BC) to the philosophical doctrine of Phronesis is ethically
constructed through advocacy of careful and reason deliberation, based on how people live life,
not to the detriment of community/society.”
On some level, phronesis and techne may be too similar to be worthy of separate spheres
of knowledge. Gimbel clarifies this by making a clear distinction between techne and phronesis
(technical knowledge and moral knowledge): “The ends of a technical pursuit are both particular
and distinct from the means employed in their realization” (Gimbel, The Golden Mean and the
Golden Hammer: Phronesis and Method in Contemporary Political Science, 2014, p. 284). This
separation does not exist in phronesis. According to Gimbel, “One becomes courageous by
performing courageous acts; one ‘becomes’ a phronemos by acting with phronesis. Means and
end are inextricably linked” (Gimbel, The Golden Mean and the Golden Hammer: Phronesis and
Method in Contemporary Political Science, 2014, p. 285). This is particularly relevant to my
research, as phronesis is inherently about the value-laden issue of how to develop particular
capabilities in a given community. From a sustainability perspective, one must make a value
judgment about what capabilities are most important for a sustainable future. Phronesis is “a
‘political’ doctrine considered as the highest level of practical science, much more about the
organization of communities for the best, particularly so in the sustainable utilization of
resources” (Jackson, 2016, p. 3).
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The philosophical arguments for phronesis as a separate type of knowledge than both
episteme and techne are well documented from Aristotle, but more modern scholars have
attempted to apply these ideas to matters of power and the social world.

Flyvbjerg and “Making Social Science Matter”
In 2001, Flyvbjerg published his seminal methodological work Making Social Science
Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again. The book was his attempt to
combine his critique of conventional social science methodology and clearly outline his
understanding of phronesis, in particular how it can be used to create a guide for more successful
social science methods. Ultimately, he envisions a phronetic social science methodology (though
not a set method) which “goes beyond both analytical, scientific knowledge (episteme) and
technical knowledge or know-how (techne) and involves judgments and decisions made in the
manner of a virtuoso social and political actor” (Flyvbjerg, 2002).

Phronetic Social Science in Modern Political Science
Much of the research around sustainable urban development and light rail projects
originate from the discipline of urban planning. This area of research is rooted in a methodology
and theories that have ignored the importance of power. Although some urban planners are
already heading in the phronetic direction (Forester, 1993 and 1999, and Throgmorton, 1996),
most other urban planning research belongs to a “communicative, Habermasian tradition” which
led them “to remain strongly normative and procedural without the substantive understanding of
Realpolitik and real rationality that characterizes studies of power” (Flyvbjerg, 2002, p. 2).
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Flyvbjerg specifically wrote many of his articles attempting to “fix” this oversight by his
discipline. Power, however, is the raison de existence of political science. The issue of studying
urban projects and light rail projects from a political science perspective has been one of
methodology. It, like urban planning, attempted to achieve the same status as the natural sciences
in their attempts to create universal truths and axioms. This has led to what Schram states is a
focus on rational-based, best practices approach and less on a value-laden, normative one. In
other words, “social sciences needs less top-down or ‘what works’ agenda to a more bottom-up
or ‘what’s right’ agenda” (Schram S. F., 2017, p. 261). Incorporating Flyvbjerg’s phronetic
social science, his understanding of power, a more rigorous methodology can be envisioned for
both urban planning and political science.

What is phronesis and phronetic social science?
Flyvbjerg uses this understanding of phronesis as the underpinning for his guidelines of
phronetic social science. It should be noted that he avoids detailing a set list of rules or methods
to be followed exactly. Instead, he emphasizes the fact that research should be inherently
context-specific and problem-driven, with the specific methods used fitting the research
question/problem at hand. That said, he does offer four guiding questions that phronetic social
scientists should attempt to address in their research: (1) Where are we going? (2) Who gains and
who loses, and by which mechanisms of power? (3) Is this development desirable? (4) What
should be done? (Flyvbjerg, 2001). These guiding questions of power are what complete the
theory/method connection.
Flyvbjerg’s four questions can help in outlining a theory/method conjuncture that
effectively guides research, policy, and actions toward a truly sustainable human development
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future. First, he asks “where are we going?” This is the driving force behind the phronetic
method; find out who has power but more importantly, what are they trying to DO with that
power? The most obvious, yet minimally satisfying, answer is simply survival. At the very least,
the hope is that humanity will continue for many generations to come. However, this same
question should be applied to specific research questions and concerns of sustainable
capabilities. For my research, I am concerned with where sustainable transportation and mobility
are headed in American cities, specifically Tampa, Florida. Here, to answer Flyvbjerg’s question,
we are currently going in an unsustainable direction with a reliance on more roads and carbonproducing cars.
This leads to his second guiding question, “who gains and who loses, and by which
mechanisms of power?” Again, changing the course of human actions depends on understanding
power relations between actors. It is important to note here that examining a deliberative process
(like light rail development) reveals an interplay between the rationality of urban planning and
the power relations of stakeholders. While researching the Aalborg project in Denmark,
Flyvbjerg noted that “the Realpolitik for the Aalborg Project was shaped by these interests in
classic Machiavellian style, while the formal politics in democratically elected bodies like the
City Council have had an only minor impact on the project. Rational, deliberative democracy
gave way to pre-modern, tribalistic rule-by-the-strongest. Distorted relations of power produced
a distorted project” (Flyvbjerg, 2002, p. 14). This evinces why even those that normatively
support deliberative democracy need to be aware of the influence of power on stakeholders and
the democratic process. What is rational is not always obvious or the actual outcome of a
political process. Those with power may have undue influence over the definition of rationality
and thus the outcome of the process. Flyvbjerb attests, “while power produces rationality and
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rationality produces power, their relationship is asymmetrical. Power has a clear tendency to
dominate rationality in the dynamic and overlapping relationship between the two” (Flyvbjerg,
2002, p. 14). I will return to this crucial point throughout later chapters. Rational arguments
about how a light rail system in Tampa should be planned and implemented were undoubtedly
overshadowed by power-laden interests during said process. The formal, rational process may
appear one way, but the reality of power can be something completely different. In a process
contingent on the public making the final decision, the outcome can be disastrous.
The phronetic definition of power can be used to show who is gaining or losing power
and, more importantly, why and how. This is key to understanding the valuation of specific
capabilities through the democratic process, as the goal of phronetic research should be
“primarily about helping people better understand the issues that troubled their consciousness
(even if unconsciously), what was preventing them from realizing what was in their best interest
and what needed to be done about that in order to better realize those best interests” (Schram S.
F., 2017, p. 262). In my research on valuing and determining capabilities, recognizing how
individuals view their position in the democratic process is paramount to understanding the
outcomes.
Continuing with the transportation example, a researcher may reveal that in a certain
community, specific industries are benefiting economically because of a dedication to road
construction. In the same region, poor urban citizens may be losing the ability to easily get to and
from work and school if they are unable to afford a car to use said roads. Local policy may have
been decided through a democratic process but at the same time influenced by more powerful
stakeholders, diverting resources to increase economic production in the area. Phronetic
methodology would ask: is this good or bad?
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This leads to the third question: is this development desirable? The skeptic may
immediately question the term “desirable,” but this is less of a roadblock to research than it may
appear. We are not concerned here with whether this development desirable to specific
individuals, but rather, to the goal of sustainability. When judged by this standard, the answer
becomes less relative and more objective. It may not be a simple yes or no solution, yet this
should not dissuade researchers from asking this normative question. However, one must be
aware again of the influence that power can have on what might seem desirable at first glance.
Flyvbherg cautions researchers to remember that power can inform and create rationality and
thus skew what might be the actual desired outcome. He declares, “power is knowledge… It [his
research on the Aalborg Project] shows how power defines what gets to count as knowledge. It
shows, furthermore, how power defines not only a certain conception of reality. It is not just the
social construction of rationality, which is at issue here, it is also the fact that power defines
physical, economic, social and environmental reality itself” (Flyvbjerg, 2002, p. 15). For the
context of this research, the question is, what was the original goal and intent of a light rail
system, and did the process/outcome follow this?
This leads to the fourth and final question: what, if anything, should we do about it? Here
Flyvbjerg discusses the “so what” question that plagues social science research. To overcome
this issue, he maintains that phronetic research should situate itself within a policy problem, not
attempting to sit objectively outside of it:
I would conduct phronetic research in ways that would make it relevant to practical
politics, planning, and administration. I tried to secure such relevance by adopting two
basic criteria. First, I would choose to work with problems that are considered problems,
not only in the academy, but also in the rest of society. Second, I would deliberately and
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actively feed the results of my research back into the political, administrative, and social
processes that I studied. (Flyvbjerg, 2002, p. 16)
The idea here is one’s research becomes part of the active dialectic of the issue and solution. As
a matter of practicality, the second half of Flyvbjerg’s statement is less relevant to my research.
An ongoing dialogue with those still currently involved in the social problem I am studying
(light rail and public transportation in general) is beyond the scope of this research. This case
under examination concluded in 2010, yet the fact remains that this is a problem that both the
local community, society at large, and academia consider to be worth addressing. What should
be done, specifically, to address this problem is equally important. In political science and urban
planning, stakeholders can often become frustrated with the lack of change and progress.
Phronetic research can help to overcome this to lead toward an eventual answer to the “what
should be done?” question by going beyond what is thought possible. Often what is thought of as
possible solutions are, in reality, ideas maintained and created by those with power, creating the
rationality of those few solutions: “The aim of exposing dubious social and political practices
through phronetic research is, in Foucault’s (1981 as quoted in Miller 1993, 235) words,
precisely to bring it about that practitioners no longer know what to do, ‘so that the acts,
gestures, discourses that up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic,
difficult, dangerous’” (Flyvbjerg, 2002, p. 19). Building from Foucault, the idea of this method is
to question long-standing mechanisms and processes. This can only help the democratic process
and expose previously hidden power structures.
This is where some researchers may feel at odds with their desire to remain separate from
their work. The term “we” need not include the researcher but in the case of sustainable human
development, the hope is that it will. The “we” should include any actors concerned or affected
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by the development. The “what” in this question is something that should be determined by that
political community. We come full circle with Sen’s understanding of determining and valuing
capabilities and the method of deliberative democracy. With the ultimate goal being
sustainability, the community facing the transportation and mobility issues would address and
solve their unsustainability through a deliberative process that unites all stakeholders.
Flyvbjerg stretches the philosophical limits of phronetic social science, as he argues it is
not a scientific methodology per se, yet wants to create fairly strong guidelines for what
phronetic science should look like. To this end, he outlines several basic statements to guide a
new phronetic scholar (such as myself) in how one should proceed in their research. I will briefly
explain each of these ideas and how they tie into my research on light rail in Tampa, as they
(along with the four questions) will be the foundation of my methodology in chapters four and
five.
1)

Focus on values

2)

Place power at the core of analysis

3)

Get close to reality

4)

Emphasize “little things”

5)

Look at practice before discourse

6)

Study cases and context

7)

Ask “How?”, do narrative

8)

Move beyond agency and structure

9)

Do dialog with a polyphony of voices
Flybjerg’s first guiding principle for phronetic social science is “Focus on values.” Here,

he tried to explain how phronetic research strikes a balance between relativism and universalism
or what he calls relativism versus foundationalism: “the view that there are central values that
can be rationally and universally grounded, versus the view that one set of values is as good as
another. Phronetic planning researchers reject both of these ‘isms’ and replace them with
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contextualism, or situational ethics. Distancing themselves from foundationalism does not leave
phronetic planning researchers ‘normless’ however. They take their point of departure in their
attitude to the situation in the context under study” (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 291). He says that the
values emphasized should be based on the community under study. Considering his four valuerational questions that stand at the core of phronetic planning research, Flyvbjerg makes a case
for a relativistic way of doing social science. This fits into the previous chapter’s discussion of
Sen and not creating a priori lists of what is important to a society. Flyvbjerb states, “This
attitude [of the researcher] is not based on idiosyncratic moral or personal preferences but on a
context-dependent common world view and interests among a reference group, well aware that
different groups typically have different world views and different interests, and that there exists
no general principle by which all differences can be resolved” (Flyvbjerg, 2002, p. 6). For my
research, I attempted to follow these suggestions by dedicating a chapter to framing the current
conversation about transportation and light rail in Hillsborough County. Hillsborough is similar
to some other counties in the American south but has a unique demographic makeup, history of
transportation issues, and local political circumstances that create a particular context which
needs to be understood before examining why a political event may have occurred.
The second principle is “Place power at the core of analysis.” As an urban planner,
Flyvbjerg had major concerns with the state of urban planning as a discipline. Particularly, he
was concerned that the Habermasian tradition of urban planning relied too heavily on
assumptions about rationality and was less concerned with issues of power. To him, rationality
without power spells irrelevance (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Research should not just examine the “truth”
of processes but by what power relationships those truths are realized. To put it in a political
science perspective, “the main question is not only the Weberian: ‘Who governs?’ posed by
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Robert Dahl and most other students of power (Dahl, 1961). It is also the Nietzschean question:
What ‘governmental rationalities’ are at work when those who govern, govern? (Foucault,
1979)” (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 293). As a political scientist, power is at the core of the analysis.
When examining a deliberative democratic process, as is the case with this research, the analysis
of power relationships will be between the varied stakeholders involved in the process. To
explore these power relations, I specifically worded several interview questions to explore these
themes and to highlight any instances of stakeholders’ actions possibly being influenced by their
positions of power (or lack thereof).
The third principle is “Get close to reality.” Here, Flyvbjerg argues for researchers to step
down from their ivory towers and examine their research problem at ground level. This argument
is tied strongly to Flyvbherg’s influence by Nietzche and his case for studying the minutiae.
Phronesis is not knowledge revealed by a simple formula or statistical analysis. Rather, it is
gained by studying everyday actions and events. My research takes two approaches to this. First,
I have reviewed thousands of pages of public documents (meeting minutes, newspaper articles,
etc.) to create a dense narrative of what happened and how it happened. Secondly, I have
interviewed a wide sample of stakeholders who were involved in the efforts to bring light rail to
Tampa. To create the most accurate picture possible, a researcher must not only examine those at
the “bottom” or “top” of the phenomena under investigation, but both. Phronetic social science
“can be both top-down and bottom-up reflecting the views of both those who are trying to
manage the problem and those who are being managed by those interventions” (Schram S. F.,
2017, p. 265). Just as those at the “top” have the power and ability to frame an event in a
particular way, so too do those are the “bottom”; thus, they should be treated with equal respect
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when engaging in phronetic research. They all know how to flesh out any details lacking from
just a hermeneutic or discourse analysis approach.
Here, Flyvbjerg suggests that following the phronetic research guidelines will
automatically solve the question of “so what?” that plagues social science research. By
embedding one’s work in the community and questions that matter, the research will inherently
be of importance: “For historical studies, phronetic planning researchers conduct much of their
work in those locales where the relevant historical materials are placed, and they typically probe
deeply into archives, annals, and individual documents. To the attentive researcher, archives will
reveal a knowledge whose visible body ‘is neither theoretical or scientific discourse nor
literature, but a regular, daily practice’ (Foucault, 1969, pp. 4-5) as cited in (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p.
294). This is my research.
The fourth and fifth principles are “Emphasize the little things and look at practice before
discourse.” Getting close to the object/issue under study is not enough for a phronetic researcher,
however. To create what Flyvbjerg and others call a “dense case study,” one must focus on the
minutiae while maintaining a focus on what is done rather than what is said. Flyvbjerg argues
that by focusing on the minutiae and “little things,” a researcher can create what some call a
“thick description,” which is the most accurate understanding of reality. Rather than focusing on
‘big questions,’ small questions often lead to significant answers. Which “little things” should a
researcher be focusing on? Flyvbjerg notes that while what is said can be important (from a
social constructivist view), more critical to understanding practical knowledge is what is actually
done (actions). If there were to be a motto for phronetic planning research, it would be
Foucault’s concept that discourse is not life; regular, daily practice is life. In part, this area of the
methodology was difficult for me to follow as the case under research occurred ten years before
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my interviews and investigation. That said, I attempted to focus on as many individual actors as I
could and on specific events as much as I did specific words or publications.
The sixth and seventh principles are “study cases and context” and “Ask “‘How?’, do
narrative.” As with Flyvbjerg’s emphasis on values, I frame this particular case study within the
context (both historical and contemporary) of the local political atmosphere as well as the
national movements at the time. From there, I endeavored to create a narrative with as much
focus on detail as possible—in essence, painting the most comprehensive picture I could based
on those who were actively involved in the process. Flyvbjerg argues “narrative inquiries into
planning do not, indeed cannot, start from explicit theoretical assumptions. Instead they being
with an interest in a particular phenomenon in planning that is best understood narratively.
Narrative inquiries then develop descriptions and interpretations of the phenomenon from the
perspective of participants, stakeholders, researchers, and others” (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 299).
The eighth and ninth principles are “Move beyond agency and structure” and “Do dialog
with a polyphony of voices.” In Flyvbjerb’s words, “planning’s actors and their practices are
analyzed in relation to the structures of the organizations, institutions, and societies of which
they are a part. Structures are analyzed in terms of agency, not for the two to stand in a dualistic,
external relationship, but so structures may be seen as part of and internalized in actors, and
actors as part of and internalized in structures” (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 299). Within my research of
the 2010 referendum and the preceding actions, I attempt to both analyze the stakeholders
involved in the process as well as the institutions and structures that influenced the progress (or
lack thereof) of the referendum. At times, these two (individual stakeholders and structural
factors) strongly overlap, while at times they completely diverge. Finally, I cast a wide “net”
with my qualitative research by adding in as many different types of stakeholders as I could.
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Here, Flyvbjerg encourages a researcher to embed their work into the society/community under
study. Research should influence and be influenced by the people under study through constant
dialogue. By doing so, a better “objective truth” can be reached. “Phronetic planning research
thus explicitly sees itself as not having a privileged position from which the final truth can be
told and further discussion arrested. We cannot think of an ‘eye turned in no particular direction’,
as Nietzsche indicates. There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; and the
more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to
observe one thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity’, be.
Hence, ‘objectivity’ in phronetic planning research is not ‘contemplation without interest’ but
employment of “a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of
knowledge” (Flyvbjerg, 2001). I interviewed stakeholders who were only tangentially involved
in the 2010 referendum process, those only involved from an economic marketing perspective, to
those who were politically on the front lines in an attempt to bring in as many unique
perspectives as possible. It was only after hearing interviewees repeat the same refrains as
previous ones that I felt I had “closed” the hermeneutic circle of qualitative research and felt
enough voices were heard to move on with my research.
With the driving four questions and these guidelines in mind, a phronetic researcher can
apply this “methodology” (I use quotations to emphasize the fact that it is less a concrete
methodology and more guiding principles) to examine a social science problem. Before I turn
my specific problem, the democratic process to achieve light rail in Tampa, it is worth noting the
criticisms of Flyvbjerg’s concept of phonesis and his phronetic social science method. To be
diligent in the understanding of this method, I will briefly discuss the major critiques and offer
rebuttals based on my understanding and Flyvbjerg’s writings.
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Common Critiques and Responses
As with any attempt to upend the current paradigm of social science research and
methodology, critiques of phronetic social science abound. From the Perestroikan side, some
argue Flyvbjerg does not go far enough in his critique of positivism and should push even more
for a completely new way of approaching social science (Neumann, 2015). Others simply
dismiss it as yet another attempt at a Perestroikan-apologist offering a not-truly-worthy
alternative to a positivist, natural-science emulating approach. The most poignant critiques come
from those who agree with the intent and spirit of phronetic social science but raise concerns
with some of the underlying assumptions or overlooked issues.
Gimbel offers one of the most coherent and concise arguments against embracing
Flyvbjerg’s understanding of phronesis and the phronetic social science method. His key
objection is that despite Flyvbjerg’s best efforts, he is simply offering yet another methodology
to add to the already long list of qualitative, interpretative grounded methods.
Gimbel is doubtful that the solutions put for in Flyvbjerg’s book will adequately address
the issues facing social sciences (Gimbel, 2013; Gimbel, 2014). He argues that the contributors
of phronetic social science are not united around a clear definition of phronesis but more by a
“commitment to its expression in praxis” (Gimbel, 2013, p. 1139). He is doubtful because he
sees social scientists adopting phronetic social science as a tool and applying it straightforwardly
as one would any other method, be it case study research, narratives, grounded research, etc.
According to Gimbel, “the danger apparent in Flyvbjerg’s approach-a danger to which Flyvbjerg
himself seems to be sensitive- is that phronesis may be embraced by contemporary social
scientists in much the same way as romantic hermeneutics were embraced by Dilthey. That is to
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say, phronesis may be reduced to nothing more than a method among methods” (Gimbel, The
Golden Mean and the Golden Hammer: Phronesis and Method in Contemporary Political
Science, 2014, p. 287). Gimbel points to some underlying issues with the way Flyvbjerg
approaches and uses phronesis by showing alternative interpretations to phronesis, particularly
by Hans-Georg Gadamer.
One of Gimbel’s arguments against using phronesis as a simple method is that Gadamer
understands phronesis is explicitly NOT techne (something that can be learned and forgotten).
Gimbel writes, “Gadamer notes that in Aristotle’s ethics phronesis, unlike techne, cannot be
learned or forgotten. And yet to reduce phronesis to a method among methods presumes to make
phronesis precisely such a thing as can be learned and forgotten: an additional bit of kit in the
toolbox of the social sciences acquired as a part of graduate training and utilized as needed when
suitable problems arise” (Gimbel, The Golden Mean and the Golden Hammer: Phronesis and
Method in Contemporary Political Science, 2014, p. 288). Flyvbjerg treats phronesis in a way
that crosses the already blurry line between techne and phronesis and by doing so, makes less a
new understanding of knowledge and simply another praxis.
Gimbel ignores that Flyvbjerg has addressed this directly in several of his publications,
including Making Social Science Matter. In it, Flyvbjerg specifically outlines his understanding
of phronesis as guidelines for future research, not a playbook by which a researcher can follow
verbatim. These guidelines will be outlined in detail later in this chapter, as they form the
underlying intent of my dissertation methodology. For now, it is important to note the overlap
between these methods and the debates occurring within the capability research (from Chapter
2). Within the scholarship on the determination and valuation of capabilities, creating welldemarcated lists of capabilities (philosopher’s position) versus more open-ended approaches
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(democratic position) follow similar debates here. Methods should have a solid foundation upon
which to base one’s research, but they need not be a checklist of processes that must be followed
to do “good” research. In the end, though, phronesis is not so much a detailed methodology but a
fundamental critique of how we do social science (attempting to achieve natural science-like
stature), with the solution being general guidelines and a problem-driven approach. One does not
need to create a “perfect” new methodology to “end” the Perestroika debate.
Gimbel’s second major critique relates to Flyvbjerg’s emphasis on problem-driven, not
method-driven, research. He argues that a distinction between method-driven and problemdriven social science is not so neatly created. Techne is the conception that allows for this, but if
we understand the social world as phronesis, means and ends are inextricably linked. For
Gimbel, “A full appreciation of the mutual implication between means and ends challenges any
neat division between methods, on the one hand, and problems in the social sciences, on the
other” (Gimbel, The Golden Mean and the Golden Hammer: Phronesis and Method in
Contemporary Political Science, 2014, p. 290). Furthermore, Gimbel states that the same
argument Flyvbjerg and others use against methods-based social science can actually be applied
to themselves. He argues that problem-based researchers face the “contrapositive problem.”
Gimbel envisions a situation where “researchers find themselves without the professional
competencies necessary to effectively research the problems at hand. In short, rather than
hammers looking for nails, researchers may find themselves confronted with a nail, but without
the capacity to effectively wield a hammer” (Gimbel, The Golden Mean and the Golden
Hammer: Phronesis and Method in Contemporary Political Science, 2014, p. 291). Instead,
Gimbel pushes for social scientists to look more closely at methods or new approaches to
research: “the notion of phronesis prompts us to ask a question that seems to be of little concern
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to advocates of both method-based and problem-based research: What precisely are all these
hammers and nails building? In more Aristotelian language, has concern over the means of
problem-identification and method-acquisition foreclosed or at least neglected the equally
fundamental question of the ends pursued by social inquiry?” (P. 291) Gimbel raises an excellent
point here, one that I think Flyvbjerg makes, but less bluntly.
Finally, Gimbel believes that a turn toward phronetic social science, as Flyvbjerg has
envisioned, may ignore a more fundamental question that still looms. According to Gimbel, “the
notion of phronesis prompts us to ask a question that seems to be of little concern to advocates of
both method-based and problem-based research: What precisely are all these hammers and nails
building? In more Aristotelian language, has concern over the means of problem-identification
and method-acquisition foreclosed or at least neglected the equally fundamental question of the
ends pursued by social inquiry?” (Gimbel, The Golden Mean and the Golden Hammer: Phronesis
and Method in Contemporary Political Science, 2014, p. 291). Here, Gimbel raises an issue that
others have too. What are the underlying values that phronesis embraces? Scholars such as
Haugaard have voiced concern that phronetic social science is in fact what he calls “cryptonormative,” or that “it implicitly presupposes unacknowledged liberal normative premises”
(Clegg, Flyvbjerg, & Haugaard, 2014, p. 275). Gimbel and Haugaard raise an excellent point
here, one that I think Flyvbjerg makes, but less directly. Phronesis is and should be about value,
moral decisions, and more specifically their outcomes. This is where I think Gimbel forgets
about one of Flyvbjerg’s questions, “where are we going?”. This question matters because it
directs the researcher to contemplate the normative questions of their research, the ends as well
as the means. Gimbel believes that a Gadamerian perspective helps us return to this (what are we
building) but Flyvjberg has already adequately addressed it with his four directing questions: (1)
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Where are we going? (2) Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power? (3) Is
this development desirable? (4) What should be done? (Flyvbjerg, 2001).

Case Studies are not Valuable to Political Science
The most vulnerable aspect of Flyvbjerg’s phronesis is his argument that individual,
situational case studies are some of the “best” methods social science has to offer. Traditional in
social sciences, including political science, is that individual case studies are only good for
theory creation but not much else. They do not work for theory development, cannot be used to
create generalizable claims about reality, or build on the body of knowledge within a discipline
(Schram S. F., 2017). Phronetic social science inherently values the contextual case and for good
reason: “It…privileges engagement with real-world problems in specific settings and contexts
over perfecting abstract theories and methods to explain things independent of contingent
contexts. Yet the emphasis on context is given much greater weight. The result is that case
studies become a preferred form of research” (Schram S. F., 2017, p. 265). Flyvbjerg dedicated a
significant amount of research to defending the case study as a fundamental method to phronetic
researchers and social science in general.
Flyvbjerg has argued at great length for the efficacy of case studies (Flyvbjerg, 2001;
Flyvbjerg, 2006). He often uses the term from Peattie called “dense data case studies,” which
means that “the case story…can neither be briefly recounted nor summarized in a few main
results. The story is itself the result. It is a ‘virtual reality’, so to speak, of planning at work. Not
the only reality, to be sure, and a reality to be interpreted differently by different readers”
(Flyvbjerg, 2002, p. 5). However, the general population of social science researchers remains
skeptical of the value of individual case studies. Flyvbjerg argues that these researchers overlook
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the important role that the case study can play in knowledge and that they often have unfounded
confusions about what a case study can and cannot “do”. Specifically, he claims that there are
several grave misunderstandings about case-study research that have hindered its use in social
science research. Without reiterating his entire claims, the summary of his five
misunderstandings are: (1) Theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge; (2)
One cannot generalize from a single case, therefore the single case study cannot contribute to
scientific development; (3) The case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, while other
methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building; (4) The case study
contains a bias toward verification; and (5) It is often difficult to summarize specific case studies
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). The major conclusion that can be drawn from this, which is useful for my
subsequent methodology, is that an individual case can and should be a focus of research by
social science scholars. Furthermore, case studies that both immerse the researcher in the web of
power relations and the official narrative of a deliberative process will allow for a new, counterhistorical narrative.

Phronesis and the Capability Approach: Phronetic Capability Methods (PCM)
Following the thought that theory and method are often interwoven aspects of social
science research can lead to a fresh understanding of power relations in a deliberative democratic
process. It can help capability scholars to ascertain how capabilities are valued and determined
by a political community, one of the weaknesses of Sen’s original theory. David Crocker states,
“It is important that development ethicists in general and those working within the capability
orientation, in particular, pursue new directions. Without weakening the shared commitment to
the theory and practice of poverty alleviation, development, and capability ethicists should take
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up new topics (as well as revisit old ones), experiment with new methods, seek new theoretical
and institutional alliances, and subject their work to both fresh theoretical and practical criticism”
(Crocker D. , 2008, pp. 21-22). Following Flyvbjerg’s phronetic social science methodology, I
hope to push capability research of determining and valuing capabilities into a fresh theoretical
and methodological realm.
Flyvbjerg’s value-oriented social science is outlined by six key points: 1) getting close to
the people being studied, 2) focusing on particular practices, 3) using case studies, 4) using
historical and narrative analysis, 5) proceeding dialogically, and 6) securing feedback from those
under study (Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can
succeed again, 2001, pp. 63-72). Here I will explain how Flyvbjerg’s understanding of power
and his methods can be combined to create a method for understanding deliberative democracy,
one I coin phronetic capability methodology (PCM). PCM is the research methodology of
understanding deliberative processes through a lens of power relations outlined by Bent
Flyvbjerg. This unique approach offers a more appropriate understanding of how power
permeates, exists, and influences the democratic process through individual actors. In effect, it is
an important addition to Sen’s vague support for the democratic position in capability
determination and valuation.
First, in any deliberative process, individual actors influence the course of the
conversation and eventual outcome. This issue of agency or empowerment was discussed at
length in the previous section. The focus of PCM is on the ever-present, ubiquitous nature of
power. Assuming that Individual A has a particular level of power and uses it to influence
Individual B in a deliberative process is a too simplistic view of power. To truly understand the
variations in power, types of power expressed, and social interactions of power between actors, a
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researcher must do what she can do not reduce individuals to simplistic categories. From a
qualitative perspective, this means immersing oneself in the deliberative process to see power “in
action.” Even Foucault argues that power has a unique “ability” to hide its mechanisms, and its
success in influencing people is often proportional to its ability to hide (Foucault & Hurley,
1990, p. 86). A researcher using PCM should delve into the details and specifics of a deliberative
event to truly understand how and why power played a part. This leads to the second component,
focusing on specific practices.
When studying a deliberative process, Flyvbjerg continues with the Foucauldian notion
that power is not enforced through laws but normalization. This normalization occurs from
repeated, seemingly mundane actions, but with profound effects on social interactions. Thus,
researchers using PCM should pay particular attention to social interactions between individuals
and groups during any deliberative process. Unique behaviors and practices (whether formally
enshrined through rules or informally through protocol) will emerge that can help the researcher
piece together the power relations between different actors. A word of caution, however: power
and practice are closely linked in that power can alter the practices one can achieve (agency).
Cleaver cautions this point about combining individuals into homogeneous groups for study:
“This assumption of equality of interest of agents is underpinned by the myth that people
following similar practices (in relation to natural resource use and management) may be equally
placed to shape these practices” (Cleaver, 2007, p. 234) Even with this in mind, one person
cannot possibly be present at or study every intimacy of every deliberative event under study.
This is where steps three and four of the PCM method helps.
The fourth part of the PCM method, following the Flyvbjerg model, uses historical and
narrative analysis. Although power is “not something that is acquired, seized or shared,
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something that one holds on to or allows to slip away” (Foucault & Hurley, 1990, p. 94) as
Foucault argues, the power/knowledge nexus is important in that power can help to shape and
create knowledge. Official narratives and histories are created by monopolizing these
power/knowledge practices. Although simplistic and cliché, the adage “history is written by the
victors” is not far from the truth. By following the first three steps of this PCM method, a
researcher can understand yet move beyond the official narrative of a particular case study.
The official narrative of an event or case study should not be dismissed, but rather
understood as just one perspective of said event. A counter-history, revealed by the researcher,
brings to the forefront a new narrative that was previously silenced. According to Foucault, “The
history of some is not the history of others….It will be learned that one man’s victory is another
man’s defeat. What looks like right, law, or obligation from the point of view of power looks like
the abuse of power, violence, and exaction when it is seen from the viewpoint of the new
discourse” (Foucault M. , 2003, pp. 69-70). Juxtaposing the official narrative and the counternarrative revealed by the researcher helps to illuminate the true processes and effects of power in
a particular case. This can help lead to greater phronetic knowledge, useful to society for
practical and policy reasons. Speeches, meeting notes, videos, transcripts, and firsthand accounts
can all help to create a fuller picture of a particular case and its narratives.
The next step in the PCM method, proceeding dialogically, is more practical for a
researcher. Dialogical analysis extends beyond discourse analysis in several ways. Most
importantly, it focuses not just on what people say but how people speak and the meaning behind
the said speech. It emphasizes the contextual, social, and unfinished nature of meaning in
communication between people. Again, following Flyvbjerg’s arguments in favor of an in-depth
case study, a researcher may be able to “tease out” many of these issues through detailed analysis
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of utterances, or spoken and written phrases. It also allows the researcher to incorporate the
socio-historical factors that may influence the social interactions between people. In a
deliberative democracy process, how something is said and the conditions under which it is said
may be just as relevant (if not more) than simply what is said.
Finally, coming from a more sociological and anthropological methodology background,
the PCM method states that a researcher should get feedback from the participants under study.
Actively avoided by some social science methods, feedback from actors involved in a
deliberative process is truly the key to this method. A researcher, no matter how enlightened or
objective they claim to be, brings to their research their own power, bias, and narrative. Once a
counter-historical narrative begins, receiving feedback from those who are part of this narrative
can help to clarify instances where the researcher may have misinterpreted or misunderstood a
particular event, action, or utterance. If power interactions and the meanings behind them are
important to understanding how a deliberative process played out, a researcher can only gain by
directly inquiring to those involved about their interpretation of an event.
This type of interaction between researcher and subject ties directly to the capability
approach and my reflexive position of determination and valuation of capabilities. Those
approaches require strong connections between the study of situational power dynamics and
understanding the process of determining/valuing capabilities within a community. As argued in
the previous chapter, political scientists should not be attempting to create lists of which
capabilities are important to a community a priori. Instead, a single capability, the ability to
meaingfully participate in the democratic process, should be the primary focus. Then, the
specifics should be fleshed out by the community through a reflexive, deliberative democratic
process.
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From a methodological standpoint, this means that a researcher (in this case, me) should
be attempting to understand who was involved in the deliberative process, what their interests
and values were, and their power in relation to the other actors. Rather than a strict
methodological formula, phronetic social science instead asks us to be problem driven, not
methods driven. In doing so, questions need to be addressed (to the best ability of the researcher)
as detailed as possible. Ultimately, since phronetic social science is intended to be socially
relevant and problem driven, the major (non-academic) question of this dissertation is
straightforward: Why, in an era of heightened awareness of sustainability, did the decade-long
process to create a light rail project fail in the city of Tampa in 2009? This question drives the
methodology because it is still relevant to Tampanians today. In fact, twelve years later, activists
and citizens are still attempting to push (though to a much smaller scale) the creation of a light
rail system. This approach grounds my work’s relevance and guides the academic hypothesis that
is rooted in the capability approach theory.

Conclusion
“For social science to produce knowledge appropriate to its subject matter, it must invert
the pyramid knowledge and privilege contextual understandings of social relations as experience
in particular settings” (Schram S. F., 2017, p. 267). To understand what happened to light rail
plans in Tampa, conventional social science methods must be replaced with ones that take into
consideration not only the unique circumstances of Tampa but also the unique circumstances of
doing social science research that focuses on power relations. Power to a political scientist is like
flour to a baker. It is the key ingredient in almost every “recipe” one examines. Although the
precise definition of power and how it is used in particular contexts changes, the argument
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remains that power plays a central role in almost every major social issue today. Also, the
problem facing Tampa is clear: climate change needs to be addressed at the local level, and
shifting commuters away from cars to mass transit lays at the heart of any policies that hope to
address this in an urban setting. However, the political issues facing such an outcome are
daunting: a variety of stakeholders with different interests, limited resources and funding, public
opinion for or against mass transit, and the bureaucratic system that may help or hinder any
attempts to address urban transportation issues. From a researcher’s perspective, Tampa offers a
crucial case of understanding how power influences a community’s ability to work through a
deliberative process to create more sustainable-valued capabilities.
Rooting my research in the capability approach and its perspective on democratic
deliberation, then using the methods and guidelines outlined by Bent Flyvbjerg in his phronetic
social science seems to be the best approach to solving this problem. The hope is that a situated
knowledge of Tampa’s decision to not fund a light rail system in 2010 will both enlighten this
researcher as to just what went wrong and offer insight for stakeholders in future attempts to
develop a light rail system in Tampa. To achieve this goal, I attempted to follow Flyvbjerg’s
advice and explore the minutiae of this crucial case. To paint as comprehensive of a picture as I
could, I examined thousands of pages of documents from public meetings held by both the
Hillsborough County Commissioners and the Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority.
Furthermore, I interviewed fourteen different key stakeholders who were involved in the
democratic process leading up to the 2010 vote. These interviewees held a variety of positions;
some were public officials, some worked for transit agencies, others as consultants, and finally a
few community organizers. One of the challenges of qualitative research is knowing when one
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has collected enough data and can move on to examining and reporting. To this end, I attempted
to follow Dr. Bernd Reiter’s concept of closing the hermeneutic circle.
Reiter’s concept of qualitative research coincides with Flyvbjerg’s idea of working with
tiny details and big picture concepts to gain a deeper understanding of a case under study:
“Concretely, the researcher must engage in a process of moving back and forth between
any single piece of information received and the context into which this piece is embedded”
(Reiter, 2006). Combined with this, Reiter’s concept also works well with the idea that a case
need not necesarily be generalizable to a wider set of cases. Rather, “this is how I understand it
now,” and “my understanding is the most complete understanding possible” are the two
statements that any researcher should aspire to (Reiter, 2006). In the end, Reiter argues that
“the hermeneutic circle closes when all the gathered pieces of information complement each
other, forming a closed whole or, in the words of Gadamer when the specific and the general
complement each other and form a heuristic whole….In practical terms, interviewers will reach a
point where all the new information they receive confirms the insights and explanations already
achieved” (Reiter, 2006). After reviewing the interviews that I conducted and the data gathered
from public records and news articles, I saw that the circle had closed. I felt that I understood the
case as best I could and that any further data collection would be redundant.
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Chapter Four: The 2010 Hillsborough County Light Rail Referendum

Background and Stakeholders
This is a story about transportation and democracy, about missed opportunities and a
failure that may bring enlightenment for future success. Case studies often focus on the events
and happenings of the social world. Whether subjectively seen as good or bad, case studies
examine what happened and attempt to generalize that event into a broader case of examples.
Failure to achieve something, such as a light rail plan, can be just as enlightening as
accomplishing the said plan.
In my chapter on determining and valuing capabilities, I discussed two opposing
arguments. The underlying question is, “How should a community go about determining which
capabilities are most valued?” More importantly, “who should be making this determination?”
On one side, capability approach scholars argue that a predetermined list of capabilities should
be decided by an “enlightened” group from that community. This philosophical position
essentially means that a select group from within a community makes a value judgment and
determines that a particular capability should be developed in a top-down manner. A separate
group argues that the community affected by the development should be involved in the
determination and valuing process. This democratic position argues that individuals should be
involved, through a deliberative democratic process, in capability valuation and determination—
in a more common language, similar to a traditional bottom-up approach.
In the political world, power between stakeholders does not often occur in an easily
defined flow of “bottom-up” or “top-down.” It is entirely possible to have some measure of
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apparent deliberation in an otherwise elite-driven (philosophical) approach. That is what I argue
happened in the process leading up to the eventual failure of the 2010 referendum to fund a light
rail system in Hillsborough County. A select group of actors, often far removed from the 1.2
million people of the county, dominated the valuation process, which led to its ultimate demise. I
am not arguing that this small group of individuals and organizations met in secret, decided that
a specific capability needed to be addressed, then made it a reality without any public
deliberation. Instead, a specific functioning in need of development was determined by the
community at large, including those “in power.” Well-functioning transportation options, for
business or pleasure, are sorely underdeveloped in Hillsborough County and the city of Tampa.
A majority of the residents agreed that this needed to be addressed, but how and when would the
process occur? These questions were then handled in a more philosophical, top-down approach
with very little deliberation. This lack of deliberation and public involvement led to the failure of
the 2010 referendum.
The history of transportation concerns in the Tampa Bay area goes back decades. Urban
planners and local politicians discussed the growing traffic, urban sprawl, and lack of public
transportation decades before the 2010 referendum. To truly understand the events leading up to
and culminating in the failure of the 2010 referendum, I will attempt to tell a story, so to speak.
Driven by my deliberative democratic theory and Flyvbjerg’s concept of phronesis, this story
will offer a case study focused on power. Although this case may be generalizable to other
attempts at voter supported light rail plans, that is not its intent. Tampa itself has such a long and
convoluted history with transportation and urban planning that a case study generalizable to just
Tampa is still very meaningful both academically and practically for local leaders.
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Hillsborough County and Its Transit History
Hillsborough County is broken up into several political and geographical subgroups. The
county at large has its Board of County Commissions, primarily concerned with the more
suburban and rural areas of Hillsborough County. Yet at the same time, it shares overlapping
(and sometimes conflicting) governance with three local cities: Tampa, Plant City, and Temple
Terrace, each with its own council and/or mayor. While each city and region have unique
characteristics, issues, and indeed culture, ask any Hillsborough County resident about their
“hometown,” and they have a lot to be proud of. Yet, ask those same residents what needs
improvement in their county or hometown and the number one response is traffic (Metropolitan
Planning Organization, 2011). Transportation issues in Hillsborough County are among the
worst in the state and nation, based both on factual evidence and subjective perception.
Thus, there is a strong logical underpinning for creating a better transit system in
Hillsborough County. Light rail is just one of the many options that have been presented over the
last four decades, but it is often the most controversial. The history of light rail in Tampa and
Hillsborough County stretches as far back as the late 1970s. Since then, an almost cyclical
pattern emerged as subsequent leaders attempted to bring this transit goal to fruition. Briefly, the
process would appear as such: prompted by an internal or external factor, local high-level
stakeholders begin a call for an improved transit system in the county. The stakeholders acquire
funding to administer research, polling on public approval of transit and/or possible lines of
transit with cost estimates. The plan is then introduced to some level of the complex transit
authority. Somewhere along this political process, the plan inevitably fails to get a public vote.
The stakeholders in support of light rail retreat, reassess, and then another external or internal
factor pushes them (or a slightly revised group) to begin the process anew. Briefly, I will outline
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the history of Hillsborough County, its major stakeholders in transit issues, and how they factor
into the political process. I will then discuss the specific case of the 2010 referendum.
Over the past decade, the Tampa Bay Metro area was consistently one of the fastestgrowing areas in the country (United States Census Bureau, 2019). This demographic shift
started decades ago, and the need for a comprehensive public transportation plan was never
greater than leading up to the 2010 vote. Historically, Tampa is no stranger to the use of rail to
transport people. Tampa created its first electric streetcar system in 1892 and by 1926, it
consisted of eleven routes and one hundred and ninety streetcars, transporting roughly twentyfour million passengers a year (Tampa Electric Company, 2020). By the 1950s, almost all of the
streetcar lines were shut down, paved over, and only 2.7 miles remained. In its stead, motor
vehicles became the new norm of commuting and traveling around the Tampa Bay area.
The need for a comprehensive public transit system is in the numbers. As of 2015, 80%
of Hillsborough County residents commuted to work in a single-occupied vehicle (Florida
Department of Transportation, 2015). With such a high vehicle usage, combined with other
factors, Hillsborough County often ranks high in the nation for traffic and pedestrian fatalities
(Hillsborough County Metropolitan Planning Organization, 2018). Public opinion polls, news
reports, and local interviews all reveal that Hillsborough County residents consistently see traffic
congestion as one of the most pressing issues for the area (Zink, Transit Tax Finds Support,
2010).

Stakeholders and Actors
Within Hillsborough County, there are several major and a fewer minor political entities
contributing to the transit process. The major stakeholders in this case are the Tampa city mayor,
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the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), the Hillsborough County Board of
Commissioners, the local media (here the St. Petersburg Times or SPT, now known as the
Tampa Bay Times), the Hillsborough Area Transit Authority (HART), and the public. Of lesser
importance but still mentioned in this research are the Florida Department of Transportation, the
Hillsborough County City-County Planning Commission (HCPLC), and the Tampa Bay Area
Regional Transit Authority (TBARTA). Although not specifically addressed in this research, it is
worth briefly mentioning the federal and state governments’ roles in influencing local
transportation projects. The United States federal government passed laws in the 20th century that
mandates each state department of transportation to create a transportation plan with a minimum
of a 20-year projection. The Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) is the entity in
Florida that makes and carries out this plan under the name “Florida Transportation Plan” (FTP).

Tampa City Mayor Pam Iorio
Although light rail has been part of transportation discussions for decades, most of the
actors involved in the 2010 referendum cite Mayor Pam Iorio as the main motivation for a light
rail plan. Iorio was a former County Commissioner (1985-1993) for the Democratic Party, the
youngest ever elected to the commission at 26. Afterward, she served as the county’s Supervisor
of Elections, overseeing the county’s recount during the 2000 Presidential Election fiasco.
During this time, she earned a reputation as a fair, reliable public figure. Mayoral elections in
Tampa are non-partisan, meaning candidates do not publicly declare their political party.
Building on her reputation and prestige as Supervisor of Elections, she ran a successful campaign
for mayor in 2003. Fran Davin (a former commissioner herself) was her political mentor
campaign manager at the time. According to her, Iorio’s success could be attributed to her bi-
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partisan support and clean political career. Davin stated, “She was very well regarded by both
Republicans and Democrats…and never any scandals, never any partisan garbage. Stood for
some very good progressive things. And people really liked her, trusted her” (Davin, 2016). Her
three-month grassroots campaign on cleaning up housing issues in Tampa succeeded. This was
her initial issue, but secondarily, Davin was tasked with gathering research and information
during that first term to start the process that would eventually be a transit referendum.
Pam Iorio herself often remarks that transit has always been one of her main issues, and
her early support for a rail system put her in the minority of elected representatives: “From the
very beginning of my political life I was really immersed in transportation issues. I would say
looking back over the three decades there was always a minority of public officials who wanted
to think beyond the bus system” (Iorio, 2021). This early support for a light rail system in
Hillsborough County would form the basis for her strong push in the 2010 referendum during her
final term as mayor.

Metropolitan Planning Organization
Besides the national government, state government, and Tampa City mayor, another key
actor in these early stages of the planning process was the Hillsborough County Metropolitan
Planning Organization, or MPO. MPOs are federally mandated and funded organizations that
exist across the United States in regional urban areas of more than 50,000 people. The purpose is
to bring together local authorities and representatives to coordinate a regional transportation
plan. Created in 1962 by the Federal-Aid Highway Act, the Hillsborough MPO “is responsible
for establishing priorities to meet short-term (next 5 years) and long-term (20+ years) multimodal transportation needs for Tampa, Temple Terrace, Plant City, and unincorporated
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Hillsborough County” (Hillsborough County Metropolitan Planning Organization, 2020). The
organization includes sixteen local elected officials and representatives from transportation
authorities.
Although the MPO is intended to be a supportive organization, doing research and
publishing short- and long-term transportation plans, it maintains political power in the local
transportation planning process. Whereas individual elected officials and leaders of
transportation authorities have primarily short-term concerns (re-election, citizens’ needs,
business issues, etc.), the MPO creates a lasting force to move transportation planning and action
in a specific direction. The MPO is statutorily empowered to approve any plans and they can
stop anything (Polzin, 2016). They can stop FDOT’s influence and plans if they choose to. One
of the primary ways they do this is through their Long-Range Transportation Plans (LRTP). One
of the main objectives of a LRTP is to frame the area’s long-term goals for transportation and
guide how federal funding should be spent. The LRTPs are required by the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) to have minimum 20-year horizons and are reviewed/updated every
five years. Although the MPO does not have direct control of projects, their research,
publications, and data help to drive conversations in ways that few other individuals or
organizations can.
It cannot be understated how influential this LRTP was for light rail and continues to be
today. The plan prioritizes which projects will get federal funding, and since most county-level
projects receive at least some federal funding, the plan can have a significant impact on shaping
the narrative of transportation projects. The light rail project appeared on multiple LRTPs in the
past few decades. The 2020 LRTP, created in 1999, outlined a goal for creating a light rail
system that operated nine corridors, forty-four stations, and included eighty-six miles of track.
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Figure 4. MPO Transit Improvement Plan 1 (Metropolitan Planning Organization, 2009)

It also outlined the routes and even forecasted ridership (Metropolitan Planning Organization,
1999). By 2009, the LRTP included a region-wide transit plan which included high-speed rail
between Tampa-Orlando and express busses combined with light-rail to connect the Tampa Bay
Area (see Figure 4).

Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority (Hartline/HART)
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Another political actor involved in transportation planning in Hillsborough County is the
Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority or HART. This agency coordinates and runs the
public transportation system within Hillsborough County. HART is often brought into the
discussion on any plans that involve the use of buses, streetcars, or creation of a light rail. It has
three major leadership structures: a Board of local elected officials, an Executive Leadership
team, and an Independent Oversight Committee.
Although HART is the chosen operator of transportation in Hillsborough County, they
are limited in significant ways, partially because of funding caps and partially because of
political crossover from leadership on other transportation organizations. According to Polzin,
There is a lot of political turf as well. You know that you got a transit agency that
normally you would think of as being both the leader and the owner of plans in the future.
But their revenue authority is capped. They’re at the maxim revenue that they can collect,
absent amending their agreements with the city or the County voting for a sales tax that
goes to them. So they’re kind of eliminated from being leaders other than advocates and
their board composition includes four [county] commissioners. Well, four is a majority of
the seven-person commission. So they have an awful lot of control there. (Polzin, 2016)

Hillsborough County Commission
This stakeholder is often referred to as the “gatekeeper” of the transportation planning
process: the Hillsborough County Commission. Although just one actor in a wide variety of
stakeholders who have political influence in transportation issues, the commission is the primary
means to achieve local funding for any transportation project via a referendum. Traditionally,
outside funding (state and federal) provides only partial funding for major transit projects, and a
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local source must be approved before any of this higher-level funding is granted. The authority to
raise taxes lies with the county commission or the voters through a direct ballot initiative. Former
MPO board member Ray Chiaramonte explains:
[T]he Hillsborough County Commission has control over the ballot language and in
Florida…there's a transportation surtax, which is what we were trying to do here
[Hillsborough County]. That tax could be up to a penny, it could be a lesser amount, and
that includes operating costs. So the legislature gives certain counties in the State of
Florida the ability to raise a tax like that. To do that you have to have a majority vote of
the County Commission to put it on the ballot. My argument would be for any type of rail
transit, the way it stands now, it's the County Commission that controls the
funding……and the voters. (Chiaramonte, 2016)

Minor Stakeholders
St. Petersburg Times (now the Tampa Bay Times or TBT)
The Tampa Bay Times was one of two major newspapers in the Tampa Bay area during
the time of this study, the Tampa Tribune being the other. The TBT can trace its origins back to
the West Hillsborough Times, which began in 1884. During the time of my research, the TBT
was an award-winning newspaper with dedicated reporting on transportation issues in the Tampa
Bay area. The editorial board published numerous pieces on this broad issue as well as the 2010
referendum itself. Though generally supportive of expanding transportation options in
Hillsborough County and of the 2010 referendum itself, the editorial board did become more
critical of the movement as it neared the vote in November of 2010.
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Hillsborough County City-County Planning Commission (HCPLC)
Working in collaboration with the MPO and other transportation organizations is the
Hillsborough County City-County Planning Commission (HCPLC). The HCPLC works with
officials “to promote and coordinate the involvement of all people in comprehensive long-range
planning, growth management, transportation, and environmental protection” (Hillsborough
County Florida, 2020). Working with the MPO, the HCPLC makes recommendations to the local
leadership of the County (commissioners) and its three cities: Tampa, Temple Terrace, and Plant
City. One key aspect of the HCPLC is that its twelve members are appointed for four-year terms,
not elected.
The state of Florida requires that all cities and counties have a comprehensive
development plan. The purpose is to manage economic and physical growth amidst variety of
issues, transportation being one key component. The comprehensive plans have a 20-year
horizon and are intended to be updated every seven to ten years. The three major cities of
Hillsborough County (Tampa, Plant City, and Temple Terrace) each have their plan as well as
the rest of the county, labeled “Unincorporated Hillsborough County.”
This complex array of stakeholders in transportation demonstrates a near-perfect example
of what Foucault and Flyvbjerg call a “dispersion of power.” The effects of this dispersion can
lead directly to a transportation plan succeeding or failing. Commenting on this dispersion, Dr.
Steve Polzin, director of the Center for Urban Transportation Research, states, “this slowed
down, complicated the decision-making…and this is kind of a lot of transportation suffers from
this now is…almost any stakeholder has in effect, veto power. Or at least the ability because
there is no…there’s no real kind of tool or ability to kind of define relative importance. People
can you know can pick one virtue of a project” (Polzin, 2016).
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All of these actors were involved in previous attempts to create a county-wide light rail
plan. What then made the 2010 referendum and its buildup any different? Though it sounds
paradoxical, this case was the one failure that was successful—in that it marked the only time the
direct option of funding a light rail transit system was put before the citizens of Hillsborough
County for a vote. Yet, it ultimately failed because the public overwhelmingly opposed it, 58%
voting against and 42% for. On the one hand, this case could be chalked up as simply another
failure in the decades-long cycle of light rail attempts in Hillsborough. However, a closer
examination reveals that this case was exceptional in that it demonstrated many instances of both
top-down, bottom-up, and reflexive characteristics, a unique opportunity to see the competing
capability approach theories (including mine) in action. Here, we have a political community,
Hillsborough County, experiencing a transportation problem. From a capability perspective, we
can measure a lack of functioning by the citizens, or, in other words, difficulty traveling around
the community. Essentially, everyone understands that it is a problem, and the first and simplest
question is, “how do we address this problem?”
Many possible solutions exist to address this issue, so the true question is, “how do we go
about the process of determining and valuing which is the best solution?” Per the literature
review, two major approaches exist to answer this question. The democratic position argues for a
more generally “bottom-up” approach, involving the direct participation of citizens in the
process, from start to finish. The philosophical stance maintains that the best method is, in
essence, to let the “philosophers” craft the solution: in more practical terms, allow the local elites
and technocrats to use their expertise to solve the problem. My reflexive approach calls for a
continuous evaluation of the process, to create an equitable democratic procedure. Hillsborough
County, like most counties in America, follows the traditional representative democratic system.
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Local officials are elected at the ballot box and they are supposed to represent their constituents’
interests, with voters having the ability to reelect or “kick out” officials in regular intervals.
As I stated in my literature review, my reflexive position is an arguably better approach
to solving the valuation and determination issue. Whether they were aware of it or not, the
political process leading up to the 2010 referendum was a mix of top-down, bottom-up, and
reflexive actions, with the top-down (philosophical) being the most dominant. What follows is a
critique of the philosophical stance and how this method undermines the success of a muchneeded solution and an argument for a more reflexive approach to the valuation and
determination of capabilities. To craft this case study, I followed phronetic methodology and
examined the minutiae as much as possible, while attempting to situate these details in the larger
context. I interviewed individuals from all the major stakeholders, requested and examined
public records such as meeting minutes, watched recordings of public hearings, analyzed public
opinion polling, and read hundreds of newspaper articles (both objective and opinion pieces).
Adhering to Reiter’s concept of closing the “hermeneutic circle,” I continued my research until I
felt that the new information I gathered did not add to either the specific or general picture I had
cultivated. In the end, what follows is a case study of a capability determination process that may
or may not be generalizable to the wider literature on democratic processes. It is, however, useful
for local actors and stakeholders in the continuing efforts (as of 2020) to create a better transit
system in Hillsborough County and Tampa.

Foundational Events
The story of the 2010 light rail referendum begins decades ago. As far back as the 1980s,
Tampa and Hillsborough County worked on developing their public transit system. Regarding
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former Mayor Pam Iorio, “during her tenure on the county commission from 1985-92, there was
more discussion and support for light rail than there is now” (NEED FOR RAIL SYSTEM
DOC). In 1990, a Tampa Bay Commuter Rail Authority proposed a plan to use the existing CSX
tracks to connect five Tampa Bay area counties. That plan eventually died, but by 1994, County
Commissioner Ed Turanchik proposed a similar plan using CSX but more specific to
Hillsborough County. The plan linked downtown, West Shore, and the airport to Plant City,
Brandon, Town ’N Country, Lutz, South Tampa and USF. A year later, the Metropolitan
Planning Organization incorporated Turanchik’s plan into their own, yet it faced a similar fate
when the County Commissioners rejected plans to call for a referendum to fund the plan with a
sales tax increase.
Discussions around the possibility of a light rail system have come and gone every five to
ten years like clockwork. For the failure of the 2010 referendum, the story begins over ten years
earlier with the “Committee of 99.” A coalition of community business and business leaders, this
committee came together to propose a thirty-year plan for transportation in Hillsborough County.
Per their recommendation, a new push for a light rail system began in the early 2000s.
Hillsborough County and HARTline (now simply called HART) hired consultants to create a
study of possible routes and costs. After roughly $14 million worth of work, transit advocates
thought they had a sure-fire plan to bring Hillsborough’s transportation needs into the 21st
century. The 20-mile, $1.4 billion rail plan to connect the University of South Florida, downtown
Tampa, and the West Shore business district was pushed into the county political process. In
2004, the Federal Transit Administration approved the HARTline plan’s first phase, making it
eligible for $700 million. Yet, just like many of the previous attempts, the plan died when county
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commissioners once again refused to seek a sales tax increase for funding and federal support
was withdrawn. Reflecting on this committee, Steve Polzin of CUTR remarks,
I was on “The Committee of 99.” …it was in 1999 and it was 99 people that were
appointed by the Commissioners. And it was a…you know, so many, each commissioner
got, so many were from different groups. And I forget what I represented. I was on the
board of directors of the civic association at the time. And then we and that committee
spent probably a year going through a series of forums and discussions and experts and
synthesizing and coming back to the commission with recommendations on what to do.
And there was 10 people that were selected to lead that I was in the ten and they were
three that were selected to present. I was one of the three we gave them a list of action
items and nothing came of it to speak of. (Polzin, 2016)
The recommendations made by the Committee of 99 worked their way through the political and
bureaucratic process but ultimately failed to survive the second to last hurdle: the Hillsborough
County Commission. The commissioners have the final say on whether to put a proposal on the
ballot for citizens to vote on. When commissioners realized that any mass transit plan would
require additional funding and thus a new tax, they voted it down in 2004.
This is where the failure of 2010 ultimately begins and the main roadblock to light rail in
Hillsborough County and Tampa is revealed: funding. It cannot be understated how pivotal this
barrier is to the realization of a transit system (of any kind) in the area. Every previous attempt at
light rail planning and construction reached some level of support from the public, government
officials, and local business leaders. Earlier attempts spent millions on researching and planning
possible routes of a light rail system. Yet, when the question of “how will we pay for it?” arose,
the county and the city fell short. This is key to the conversation about the power relations and
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the philosophical position versus the democratic and reflexive: even though, institutionally, a
smaller group of elites has more power in this process than the general public, it is ultimately up
to the public to decide on the fate of any proposal funding. This means that a strong bottom-up or
top-down approach would inherently have serious barriers to overcome, whereas a more
cooperative, back and forth between all stakeholders has a higher chance of long-term success.
The idea of a better mass transit system in Tampa and Hillsborough County did not end
with the vote against a funding referendum in 2004. As part of their required public hearings, the
Metropolitan Planning Organization invited citizens to discuss their views about rail and other
mass transit even after the plan fizzled. This, combined with pleas from the MPOs own Citizen’s
Advisory Committee (CAC), kept the idea of mass transit and light rail in the conversation,
albeit on the fringes after the 2004 failure.
These fringe conversations moved slowly toward the more mainstream conversations in
May 2005, when the Federal Department of Transportation declared it intended to buy rail lines
from the rail company CSX to develop a commuter rail line between Tampa and Orlando. The
MPO’s Citizens Action Committee began further research by gathering rail proposals from the
previous twenty years and started more public conversations about possible routes. Beth Alden,
Assistant Executive Director of the MPO explained the purpose at the time: “What we’re hoping
to do is to engage in a lot of public conversation, with staff at local governments, the public,
citizen groups, chambers of commerce, and others. And we're looking not just at the population
now but at projections in the future. How many people will be here in the future? How many
jobs will be here? Where are those jobs going to be? We're looking at the big picture” (Shopes,
2006). Despite the previous setbacks, within a few years of these conversations, a new group of
light rail advocates began the process again, led by the Mayor of Tampa.
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Setting the Stage: 2007-2009
Now that I have briefly described the foundational events of light rail in the Tampa area,
I will narrow my focus on the build-up to the 2010 light rail tax referendum. As outlined in my
theoretical chapter, the process of determining and valuing capabilities can be at least partially
reconciled between the philosophical and democratic positions with a more reflexive approach.
By this, I mean that elites may indeed initiate the policy-making process, as is often the case in a
representative democracy. Yet, there are opportunities for deep deliberation between all relevant
stakeholders—wherein stakeholders can reflect on the process up to that point and attempt to
correct any inequality in political participation. In this section, I show how the political process
leading up to the 2010 referendum vote tended to follow more patterns of the philosophical
position, though several major events occurred that were either reflexive in nature or could have
offered an opportunity for a more deliberative process. Based on Flyvbjerg’s phronetical
methodology, I will work through each major year leading up to the referendum chronologically.
I will attempt to put the events of this case in their proper context, focusing on the macro level
events and environment of the time. Within each year, I will also focus on specific actions and
events, with an emphasis on moments for reflexivity. Through interviews I conducted with key
political actors, public records of meetings, and published reports on the process, I will create a
picture that shows that the elite stakeholders involved in this process missed several key times of
reflection, excluded any strong deliberation with the voters, and may have ignored these for
individual political purposes. In the final section of this chapter, I will explain how this all led to
the failure of the 2010 light rail tax referendum.
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The political process leading up to the 2010 referendum was not a smooth and orderly
one. As I have shown in the previous section, much of the foundational work and narrative was
built from previous attempts at a light rail plan. 2010 was unique in several ways, not least of
which was that it was the only tax referendum attempt to reach a public vote in Hillsborough
County’s history. The famous saying is “history repeats itself,” and one might argue that this
case is simply that. Yet, circumstances and environment leading up to 2010 were exceptional. In
reality, history never truly repeats itself. The same actors, the same environment, and the same
circumstances can never actually be aligned in the same way. So, while it may be easy to write
off 2010 as another failed attempt at a light rail plan for Hillsborough County, many factors
made this case an illustrative one. To show this, I will first briefly outline the build-up to the
2010 referendum and the political process that occurred. This time frame spans roughly from
Mayor Iorio’s reelection in 2007 until the Hillsborough County Commission took up the formal
decision of whether to place the referendum on the ballot. Once the County Commission
officially took up the referendum as part of its agenda, the most serious phase of the political
process began and thus entitles it to a separate subsection.
Although the mayor only has political authority within the city of Tampa (not the
encompassing Hillsborough County), the position of Mayor often has political clout and a local
version of the presidential “bully pulpit.” While a single County Commissioner may not have the
ability to sway policy as an individual, it is well within their realm of power that a mayor of
Tampa can alter the course of a policy, even outside the city limits. The year before her reelection in 2007, Mayor Iorio used this power and shifted her policy focus towards transportation
and transit. Although Iorio claims that she has long been an advocate for light rail and transit in
Hillsborough County (Iorio, 2021), even before her tenure as mayor, this shift seemed abrupt and
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possibly motivated by personal/political ambitions to some in the transportation community. Ray
Chiaramonte, former Executive Director of the Tampa Bay Area Regional Transit Authority,
worked at the Hillsborough County Planning Commission and the Hillsborough County
Metropolitan Planning Organization at the time. He recalls, “then in 2006, I can remember this
very well. Mayor Iorio suddenly felt…I don't know if she visited somewhere that had light rail…
‘nobody was doing anything and we needed to get going’. At the time I was assistant director at
the Planning Commission. So, we kind of decided…that we needed to take the ball and run with
it. So, we had a meeting to restart talking about rail transit” (Chiaramonte, 2016). Others I
interviewed, including two transit consultants and advocates Kevin Thurman and Brian Willis,
corroborated this general sentiment: “The people who were running this wanted to build a rail
system. That was their goal” (Thurman, 2019). Current County Commissioner Pat Kemp was an
activist at the time and verified the same story (Kemp, 2019). Willis was even more descriptive
in who was involved in this new push for light rail:
The story I was told and story I was always told is that it was…2010 referendum came
about because then Mayor Pam Iorio, Jim Davis [former Congressman], Chuck Sykes
[local business leader] get in a room and say ‘we’re going to do a transit referendum.’
And they kind of just sketch it out and come up with a concept. They decide to be the
creating force behind the 2010 referendum. They were heavily cooperative with the
Tampa Bay Partnership. So, the organization that they ‘stand up’ is essentially a
combination of the Tampa Chamber and Tampa Partnership. It’s this very business,
establishment, old guard heavy, organization. (Willis, 2017)
Others, like Steve Polzin director of CUTR and Sharon Calvert of the Tea Party Movement, were
blunter when they stated that the light rail referendum was about “you know, satisfying the
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mayor’s ego” (Polzin, 2016) or “the triumvirate that thought they knew better” (Calvert, 2018).
Regardless of her intent, Iorio published a white paper in 2006 and sent it to local community
leaders, arguing that “It is time for this region to focus on a real investment in mass transit. At
issue is how we want our city and our region to grow over the coming decades” (Varian, Rail
Plan Still Taking Shape, 2010). When asked about her support for light rail, former Mayor Iorio
remarked that she had been an “early proponent of it [light rail]…When I became mayor it was
high on my agenda because it was needed. For several years I would bring in speakers from
throughout the country and community leaders to talk about what other communities had done”
(Iorio, 2021). Light rail had now taken center stage of policy issues in Hillsborough County, with
the backing of one of the most powerful elected officials in the area.
This process of large-scale urban plans being spearheaded by local elect officials is not
out of the ordinary. To navigate local politics, any movement or plan needs the support and
political will of local elected officials. Yet, this evidence is illuminating in that it shows this
recent push for the development of a light rail system came less from the general citizenry of
Hillsborough County and more from a small group of elites, with Mayor Iorio at its lead. From
the philosophical approach’s view, this is in line with how the process should work. The
stakeholders involved up to this point are “experts” in their field, with the knowledge that
surpasses the general public on mass transit, funding, and the political process. Iorio, from her
position as Mayor of Tampa, continued to push this narrative of a need for a light rail system.
With her reelection looming in March of 2007, Iorio talked transit to anyone who would
listen. At the time, no concrete plans were made but all options were on the table. Their ideas
went as large as a regionally integrated rail system with surrounding counties to as small as
extending the local streetcar in Ybor City. Again, the question of funding came up, and ideas
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such as an increase in the gas tax or sales tax were raised. But Mayor Iorio was hesitant to hitch
the wagon to any specific funding source at such an early stage in the process: “Once we have
our plan solidified and there's been plenty of public input, it would be very sensible for our
community to look at a funding mechanism to present to voters” (Gedalius, 2006). Elected
officials are often cautious to push too hard on an issue leading up to an election year, and this
was no different.
But the purpose was clear. As an elected official with high popularity and strong
credentials in renovating the downtown areas of Tampa, Iorio had the political power to begin
framing the narrative around light rail well before it became a major public issue again in the
Hillsborough County and Tampa area. As Flyvbjerg and others note, power is not often wielded
as a hammer or sword to be used to force others into action or inaction. Instead, power can be
highly influential yet subtle in guiding others to the eventuality the one who wields the power
desires.
A year later, Mayor Iorio faced reelection in March of 2007, when she easily defeated
two opponents by earning nearly 80% of the vote. During her victory speech, she declared that a
plan for light rail, including a timetable and funding, was to be one of her top priorities. The fact
that mayors in Tampa are term-limited at two terms now gave Mayor Iorio the political cover she
needed. Term limits present a sort of double-edged sword for elected officials. On the one hand,
it forces the reality that their time in office is finite and questions of legacy and impact inevitably
follow. How will the community remember someone as an elected representative? Conversely,
term limits give an official the ability to pursue more controversial or risky policy endeavors. If a
representative does not face the challenge of re-election, what they fail or succeed to do may
have much less of a long-lasting impact on their career, as their political position will soon end.
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A successful campaign to create a local or regional transit system is the type of project
that has a lasting impression on a community, fulfilling that legacy. To be able to overcome
decades of failure around such an important issue to the citizens in the area would undoubtedly
enshrine Iorio in the political annuals. Conversely, were this push to ultimately fail as many
others had, she would not have to face reelection in the face of such a disappointment. The stage
was set for the Mayor of Tampa to begin using her political clout to make a strong push to finally
succeed where so many others had not. A St. Petersburg Times article argued this point in
November 2008:
If Hillsborough County voters get the tax choice and actually approve it, regional mass
transit could be Iorio's legacy as mayor, far eclipsing her downtown park and new water
pipes. “If it's successful and it happens, that's a huge feather in her cap. There’s no
question,” says political consultant April Schiff. If Iorio chooses to run for another office,
she would likely be attacked as a tax-and-spender, Schiff said. But her popularity and role
in addressing a significant regional problem would minimize damage, she said. “She can
weather the storm,” Schiff said. And if the measure fails altogether, Iorio can argue she
gave it her best effort. "From her position there's no downside really,” Schiff said. “It's
win-win.” (Zink, Iorio makes headway on mass transit, 2008)
Still, local government is not governed by the will of one person, and a plan as complex as a
multimillion-dollar light rail system requires the input of many powerful stakeholders and a
process as complex as it is important.
Precisely who is involved in this process forms the crux of the democratic dilemma. The
philosophical stance states that elites and technocrats should drive the process from start to
finish. The democratic position argues that the general public should be heavily involved
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throughout. It was clear from its inception that the 2010 referendum leaned more heavily toward
a philosophical approach, with a few key stakeholders crafting the plan and pushing for its
success. After her re-election in 2007, Mayor Iorio gathered two close allies and “philosophers”
to spearhead the new push for a light rail system: Commissioner Mark Sharpe and local business
leader Stuart Roggell. These three elites began to craft the narrative around which a conversation
on light rail would soon occur.
Throughout the entire process, these stakeholders had many opportunities to include more
deliberation from the public and other stakeholders. This early in the process, no organic
meetings were called to gather citizen input or ideas and no serious institutionally required
meetings were held. Eventually, when these meetings were held, these reflexive attempts were
often ineffectual or simply acts of “going through the motions.” This group of elites understood
that the hurdle they would eventually have to overcome was funding. Once again, more studies
were commissioned to decide the best source of revenue for a rail system. In the end, a sales tax
came out on top. But why a sales tax over any other tax increase? Polzin explains,
almost every city that does this, brings in a consultant and looks at all the options. And
they whittle them all down and end up with the sales tax…it’s kind of the gold standard.
It grows with population and inflation and those are the two keys. And it's significant
enough that you can raise real money. Gas tax, which you think is complimentary and
that it discourages driving, but it’s just the magnitudes aren’t enough. (Polzin, 2016)
The city of Tampa is not legally able to institute a local sales tax per Florida law. Hillsborough
County, however, has this authority. Federal funds are occasionally available for such large
projects, and local members of Congress began pressuring the area to address transportation and
transit issues. They argued that the time was ripe for a mass transit plan in Hillsborough County.
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A booming economy and a change in government to a Democratic-controlled White House and
Congress seemed the perfect environment for U.S Rep. John Mica, a Republican Congressman
from Winter Park. At a meeting with local officials, he told Hillsborough County leaders, “It’s
almost embarrassing to have parts of Florida without modern transportation systems. What I
need is everybody on the same page, everybody coming forward with their proposals” (Zink,
Iorio makes headway on mass transit, 2008).
In response, Iorio’s group approached the County Commission with plans to put a
referendum on the 2008 ballot to fund a light rail system. The effort made little headway,
however, and was never approved for the ballot Iorio knew this was a major hurdle that had to be
overcome: “No matter how many meetings, and seminars, and conferences we held on it, we
ultimately had to have the county commission pass an ordinance that would place the penny
sales tax on the ballot. This was an uphill battle” (Iorio, 2021). It is important to note that even at
this point, almost three years before the referendum and following the same path as all previous
rail referendum failures, supporters knew the final hurdle for funding was a vote by Hillsborough
County citizens. Any plan to create a light rail system would have to be supported by a majority
of voters. This environment was ideal for a reflexive approach—elites working with a diverse
group of stakeholders to craft a plan that ultimately gains the most support through back-andforth conversations and debate. Much like Habermas’ emphasis on reciprocity and Rawls’
overlapping consensus, the reflexive position advocates for strong deliberation between all
stakeholders to create the most effective (and legitimate) outcome. Despite occurring well before
the 2010 vote, many events of 2008 were instrumental in the referendum making it on to the
2010 ballot.
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Unable to get a light rail referendum on the 2008 ballot, supporters continued their push
into 2009. However, one major event in late 2008 shook up the political environment in
Hillsborough County and provided the catalyst for the eventual “success” in 2010. National
politics influenced local races. The popular political science statement “all politics is local” is
true in many regards. Yet events happening nationally can have a profound impact on the
narrative and electoral politics in local environments. This was true in 2008 and would be true
again in 2010. Barack Obama became the first black president in American history, and riding
his coattails were progressive candidates across the country. Younger voters and voters of color
came out in record numbers, and this turnout had a dramatic impact on local elections. In
Hillsborough County, Kevin Beckner (D) became the first openly gay county commissioner,
shifting the partisan balance of the board to one more favorable to mass transit. Iorio and rail
supporters saw possibly their last opportunity to get a referendum on a ballot before the mayor’s
term ended in 2011. The trick would be to ride the progressive political wave for a full two years
until the 2010 midterm elections.
Several powerful actors made headway on the organizational side of a light rail
referendum in 2008. Created in 2007, the Tampa Bay Area Regional Transit Authority
(TBARTA) has the power to condemn land, borrow money and operate a bay area train system.
It used its regional perspective and power to create a large-scale conversation about transit
improvements. Understanding that traffic and transit concerns are not merely Tampa city issues,
talks between Pinellas and Hillsborough counties about a sales tax for transit occurred in early
2008. The hope was to schedule a referendum at the same time: one regional campaign with two
separate votes. During these meetings, several options were on the table. The consensus among
elected officials and TBARTA representatives was a half-cent sales tax would be preferable.
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Indeed, to make it more palatable to voters, they needed a serious marketing campaign and
maybe even tax changes, such as swapping the new sales tax for current property taxes (where
transit historically found its funding). The hope was to make it onto the 2008 ballot, but
realistically most knew that 2010 was more practical. Part of the concern was the ever-present
issue of funding. A great deal of federal money was up for grabs for commuter rail but required
matching local funds and a solid plan. TBARTA was created the year before (2007) partially to
help organize such a plan, then pitch it to both the public and federal transit authorities.
Here again, we see a stronger top-down approach to this process. Furthermore, we see an
example of Flybjerg’s stress on power creating rationality. Many higher ups at TBARTA were
also officials sitting on other high profile political positions like the MPO and HART. By using
political power through a variety of institutions, a few individuals were able to craft a narrative
and rationality around the idea that a light rail plan could be created and then pitched to the
citizen of Hillsborough County in a way to garner support. With the backing of a state mandate
and millions of dollars in funding, the balance of power shifted more heavily toward a
philosophical position. This is further supported by the early actions of the newly created
organization.
This early in the planning stage, TBARTA used its funding to commission a poll of
Tampa Bay area voters and perform outreach meetings to gather public sentiment on transit
(TBARTA, 2010). Although these measures are partially deliberative on the surface, in the end,
they did little more than simply check boxes required by law. The commissioned poll of the
seven counties that TBARTA covered returned views similar to all previous polls: 87 percent
said traffic congestion is a serious problem; 68 percent wantede commuter rail; 75 percent
supported more regional bus service; 66 percent wanted to expand highways; 20 percent
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identified high taxes as the number one local issue. However, 68 percent believed improving
transportation is a “good use” of taxpayer dollars (Brassfield, Locals want better transit, more
options, poll shows, 2008). Close to the people, TBARTA held over 90 community meetings in 7
counties by mid-2008. However, St. Petersburg Times reports many of these meetings are not
well attended due to a variety of possible factors, most having to do with their timing. Often
these meetings would be scheduled when the elite stakeholders (who ran the meetings) were
working, Monday through Friday, 9am-5pm. These times made it difficult for the public to
attend, many of whom also worked 9am-5pm jobs. Later weekday meetings, those held after
5pm, were not necessarily easier to attend due to workers’ competing demands and time
constraints. An advocate for the philosophical approach would argue that the elites in this
scenario had done their due diligence in creating these spaces for more citizens and stakeholders
to participate. Yet, they were ineffectual. Following the reflexive position, the elites would have
realized the failure of these deliberative attempts and circled back around to do better, before
moving on to the next phase of the process. Instead, they moved full steam ahead.
TBARTA still needed a full plan by December 2008 to meet their timeline for a 2010
referendum, so officials moved on to their last task. One of the final boxes they wanted to check
before crafting their regional transit plan was to tour metropolitan areas that successfully created
such a system. TBARTA board members traveled to Denver, Dallas, and Charlotte to tour rail
projects and gather information. Though each of these cities succeeded in creating a light rail
system in unique ways, all were at least partially funded through countywide votes, sometimes
including multiple cities.
These trips are key to the 2010 referendum for how instructive they were to those who
went and how easily those lessons were forgotten once they returned home. The reason that these
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three cities were successful are 1) large public input, 2) a concrete plan to present to the public,
and 3) a strong campaign to persuade voters to increase sales taxes on themselves. In a strong bit
of foreshadowing, the St. Petersburg Times ran a report on these trips that revealed areas local
officials would eventually falter over:
Denver and Dallas leaders have repeatedly given Tampa Bay officials this advice: To
persuade voters to tax themselves for trains - even a half-penny tax - show them exactly
what they’d get. Get their opinions and create a polished plan showing routes, stations,
links to shuttles. Run TV ads paid for by the business sector. Pass out pamphlets with
maps and schedules. “At the end of the day, what won the election was the map,” said
Cal Marsella, transit director in Denver, where residents raised their sales tax in 2004 to
lay down another 119 miles of rail. Two previous referendums went down in flames at
the ballot box. “People want to know what they’re going to get, when they’re going to get
it, what it’s going to cost,” he said. (Brassfield, Hitting the road to study rails, 2008)
On top of this, local leaders were also reminded that many of these cities attempted multiple
referendums before voters finally agreed to increase taxes. The key was to not stop if one vote
failed.
Returning from these trips, TBARTA received $2 million in funding to hire a full-time
CEO and began drafting its regional transit plan. By November, TBARTA public meetings were
not about gathering input or opinions from the citizens but about showing how their finalized
plan works. Despite this, attendance remained low. Regardless of the low public input or
participation, one TBARTA board member continued to push the message of light rail from her
“bully pulpit” as mayor of Tampa: Pam Iorio.
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By end of 2008, Iorio spoke to anyone and everyone about rail. With no worries of a
reelection campaign in her future, Mayor Iorio spent her political capital to gather as many
supporters to her light rail cause as possible: “Mayor Iorio is the first mayor that has been
expending a lot of political capital on this and made it a priority. You can’t pass this thing
without the leadership of the mayor” (Zink, Iorio makes headway on mass transit, 2008). It is
enlightening to hear that the mayor herself settled on a 2010 referendum date this early and was
already focusing her efforts on pitching her plan to the public: “I say it to every group. It doesn’t
matter who the group is, all across the political spectrum. They all hear the same thing from me.
I spend most of my time on this issue now. Often I say to audiences, I'll be back in 2010 and talk
to you about a 1-cent sales tax and why that's going to be a good thing for Hillsborough County.
I hope that we give the voters a chance to express their opinion on this” (Zink, Iorio makes
headway on mass transit, 2008). During her state of the city address in March of that year, signs
of the Great Recession were beginning to emerge. Tax revenue was down, and the city needed to
cut $17 million from the $760 million budget. Despite the financial troubles, Iorio pushed on
with her messaging of transit as the solution. “‘That’s not the answer [roads] to our long-term
needs,’ she said, pointing out that a newly-created regional transportation group she serves on is
laying the groundwork for better transit. ‘I am convinced that one day we will have a light rail
system that will be an alternative to our congested highways’” (Zink, Iorio's Talk: Good, Bad,
and the Budget, 2008).

Despite its early part in the process, the narrative that rail supporters pitched was bold.
The system mapped by the MPO’s LRTP was more than $6 billion to build and $90 million a
year to operate a light rail system in Hillsborough County. With that price tag, Iorio and

124

supporters like Commissioner Mark Sharpe touted the potential economic benefits: “That's
[movement of people] obviously very important. But the primary purpose of what we’re trying to
do is create new jobs, transit-oriented development, business opportunities. That’s a completely
different way of thinking about mobility” (Zink, Wanted: Railway Marketing, 2009).
In July of that year, another high-level stakeholder began their serious involvement in the
process. The Hillsborough Area Transit Authority (HART) looked to hire a marketing firm with
experience in rail campaigns. HART officials felt they needed an experienced firm, as a new
state law declared government agencies could not try to sway voters, only educate. That was a
fine line to walk, but with a specific rail line already in mind, spokesman Ed Crawford thought a
concrete plan with strong outreach was critical: “People need to understand what this is about. If
you're going to vote for something, the government, us, Hillsborough County, whatever, owes
you the ability to know what you’re voting for. That’s not the same as asking you to vote for it”
(Zink, Wanted: Railway Marketing, 2009). At the time, HART did not have a specific rail plan.
A key aspect of the phronetic understanding of power is “how power is exercised, and not
only who has power, and why they have it; the focus is on process in addition to structure”
(Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed
again, 2001, p. 131). This case study is not just an examination of power dynamics between the
“elites” and “everyone else” but also between said “elites.” Examples during this time include
power dynamics between leaders of major transit-related organizations. Outside of TBARTA and
the mayor, two other key stakeholders had their leadership shaken up in 2008. This changing of
key officials shifted the balance of power for supporters of a light rail plan. At the MPO,
Executive Director Lucie Ayer came under fire from Republican commissioner and light rail
advocate Mark Sharpe in April of that year. Sharpe proposed a motion to oust Ayer from her
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position in hopes of replacing her with someone more supportive of light rail. Although he was
criticized by his fellow commissioners, Ayer stepped down two weeks later and was replaced by
interim executive and light rail advocate Ray Chiaramonte. Chiaramonte was eventually named
the official executive director and remained so until 2020.
The Hillsborough County Commission was another important organization that saw
outside political power put pressure on it to change course on the transit plans. Up until this point
in 2008, the County Commission partisan split was such that any attempts at putting a light rail
referendum on the ballot were defeated by an anti-LRT, anti-tax majority. Despite the political
divisions, in August 2008 the commission voted to approve a study required to obtain any federal
funding for a transit project. Although only the first small step in a long process, the mounting
pressure from outside actors like Congressman Mica played a part in pushing the commission to
approve this $2.5 million study, which updated the 2003 HART rail plan. In November 2008, the
balance shifted even more dramatically. Two Republicans, Ken Hagan and Mark Sharpe, joined
newly elected Democrat Kevin Beckner (flipping a previously held Republican and anti-rail seat)
and longtime supporter Kevin White to give rail supporters the majority they need on the county
commission.
By the end of 2008, the US saw a historic presidential election and the Tampa Bay area’s
focus on light rail and transit hit full swing. Yet, not everyone was optimistic, and their concerns
grew into rail skepticism and a full anti-rail movement by 2009. Professor Steve Polzin (on the
HART Executive Board at the time) maintained the area was not ready for light rail. He argued
that ridership for current buses needed to be improved from 1% use to 2% use before a rail
system would be cost-effective. Interim executive director Ray Chiaramonte understood that the
area was overdue for a better transit system but cautioned about that being the sole focus of a
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referendum and tax increase: “If you're going to do a referendum, then you’ve got to have
something for everybody” (Coatsalexandra Zayas, 2008). This idea of something for everyone
became truly poignant as residents of Florida also faced the worst economic downturn in almost
one hundred years: the Great Recession.
The macro level narrative around light rail in 2009 was marked by two major issues: first,
a growing power struggle over who would be involved in the planning process and how to
convince the public the time was right to increase taxes for such a project. It is important to note
that these conversations and public debates raged along with the backdrop of the Great
Recession. By 2009, unemployment in Florida had jumped from 6.3% in 2008 to a high of
10.4%. Tax revenues waned, with state and local governments struggling to slash budgets across
the board. The question of who would be involved in the light rail campaign and which
stakeholder would take a leadership role was key during this time. In the end, no strong
movement or consensus emerged due to struggles over political power and messaging.
In early 2009, Mayor Iorio and supporters of the light rail referendum seemed to solidify
their political power among key stakeholders. The still-young organization, TBARTA, voted
unanimously to support the plan for a light rail line and its corresponding referendum for an
increase in sales tax. Though this vote was largely symbolic in nature, two points are worth
noting. First, this was a regional authority organization created by the state government with
strong political clout. Second, two of the TBARTA board members who were part of this
unanimous vote were County Commissioner Ken Hagan and Mayor Pam Iorio. Supporters even
existed in the oversight and taskforce committees of both the county commission and TBARTA.
Scott Jones, a supporter of light rail and the vice president for development business Newland,
sat on both the Hillsborough County Transportation Task Force and the Citizens Advisory
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Committee of the Tampa Bay Area Regional Transit Authority. With an overlap of government
agencies helmed by overlapping officials, the ability to push the narrative and policy becomes
that much easier. This is a prime example of how Flyvbjerg describes the inseparable link
between rationality and power: “power produces knowledge, and knowledge produces power”
(Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 131). The power of these organizations, coupled with the overlapping power
of stakeholders sitting in positions of authority, aided in their ability to craft the rationality (or
narrative) around transit.
With a growing consensus among stakeholders in leadership positions within Tampa and
Hillsborough County, these same leaders moved to solidify their support at the state level. Mayor
Iorio continued to make her pitch to state officials, including Governor Crist. In February 2009,
Commissioner Mark Sharpe and Mayor Iorio met with Governor Crist as well as Secretary of
State Kurt Browning and Chief Financial Officer Alex Sink to outline their vision for light rail in
Hillsborough County (St. Petersburg Times, 2009).
That said, 2009 also saw a power struggle and setbacks among this seemingly
insurmountable light rail support. In previous attempts at creating a light rail system in
Hillsborough County, the county commission was often the final roadblock. As was the case in
the failed attempt in 2005, the county commission appeared to have the sole political power to
put a referendum on the ballot and historically used that power to stop any referendum for light
rail. With this new iteration of a light rail plan several years in the works, the county commission
argued that it had been left out of the process up until this point. At an unrelated county
commission meeting, Commissioner Sharpe raised the topic of a light rail referendum, and a
debate ensued. Several commissioners used the time to raise concerns about “secret meetings”
taking place. Commissioner Jim Norman saw it as a small group just trying to convince the
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public to pay for a project. Commissioner Rose Ferlita joined him, stating, “You guys have been
meeting for two years, and now you’re coming to us?” (Varian, County Seeks Light Rail Role,
2009). The issue was partially resolved, as the county commission voted unanimously in April to
have their attorney begin drafting official language for a ballot referendum. Though it was the
first small official step toward a November 2010 vote, it is worth discussing the sentiments of
being “left out” of the conversation.
Later that year, in November, the county commission voted again on a legally required
resolution concerning a referendum. This resolution simply stated their intent to, in the future,
vote on putting a referendum on the ballot. The vote here was more contentious, with
commissioners Jim Norman and Al Higganbotham voting against. What occurred in those six
months to change their minds? In part, a lack of strong leadership and messaging on the light rail
supporters’ side and the reality of the actual tax pushed these two elected officials to be more
vocal about their opposition.
Although supporters of light rail had backers in government and private entities, strong
vocal approval was mostly regulated to three individuals: Mayor Iorio, Commissioner Sharpe,
and Tampa Bay Partnership leader Stuart Rogel. In mid-2009 the TBART CEO Shelton Quarles,
former Tampa Bay Buccaneer and supporter of light rail, resigned. His resignation left a political
vacuum and brought questions about the organization’s survivability and dedication to light rail.
Along with these issues, the public voiced concerns about an increase in sales tax during a
recession. Journalist Robert Trigaux at the St. Petersburg Times reached out to readers for their
opinions and the feedback was anything but united in their support. A sample of their responses
follows:
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“Tampa is perfect for a combination of light rail, high-speed rail, and regional trains
connected by buses. Go to Europe and see how a city like Vienna is linked by
trams/trolleys that stop every half mile or so.” - Robert T. Grimste, lieutenant colonel,
U.S. SOCOM, Tampa (Trigaux, 2009).
“A quick look at cities that have such rail systems will convince you that traffic hasn't
been helped at all. It's gotten worse, and to take advantage of this inflexible transportation
system you must move to an apartment near a station and have a job near a station.”
- James Klapper, Oldsmar (Trigaux, 2009).
During my interview with Tea Party leader Sharon Calvert, she expressed similar concerns: “The
timing was no compassionate. They [elected officials] are so out of touch with the reality of
people’s lives” (Calvert, 2018).
At this point, there was little outspoken opposition from the general public or a strong
Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) movement. Any plans presented to the public outlined light rail
lines going through mostly industrial and commercial areas. Yet the foundation for the
opposition was there, with the two commissioners and an unlikely academic source. Remember
that “power is seen as productive and positive and not only as restrictive and negative”
(Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed
again, 2001, p. 131). Whereas Mayor Iorio and other LTR supporters had their web of power
relations among varied organizations, so too did the opposition. Though not as well organized or
expansive as their pro-LTR counterparts, there were once again examples of elites sitting in
multiple positions of power able to exert influence over this process. Lending credence to the
opposition, the Center for Urban Transportation Research (CUTR) seemed in many ways against
a light rail plan. Located at the University of South Florida, the agency was and still is led by
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Professor Steve Polzin, who was also a board member of HART and the transportation task force
created by commissioner Hagan. Although a university-based think tank, CUTR had the
spotlight shone on its funding and research in the run-up to the 2010 light rail referendum. A
scathing St. Petersburg Times report showed where CUTR seemed to favor roads and Bus Rapid
Transit (BRT) over light rail. In the 119 published reports by CUTR that mention light rail, they
were three times more likely to have negative than positive comments about it (Van Sickler,
2009). With most of their funding coming from the largest road-building entity, FDOT, the
newspaper argued that the research center was anything but objective when it came to light rail.
With the clout of a university-based think tank, this opposition had the potential to significantly
hurt the chances of the 2010 referendum.
Dr. Polzin objected to these accusations at the time and in my interview with him. He
argued that the Times and others were overly obsessed with light rail and out of touch with the
latest research:
I still remember how, extremely…partisan it is and in this community …The Times
[Tampa Bay Times] has rabid strong feelings. And if you look through their writings over
the last decade or two, I mean, they literally can’t go two weeks without having some
story, some allusion to you know, how come we didn't do this that or the other thing. And
I mean, they’re just literally obsessed with it. And in my opinion to the point of no longer
being constructive because they’re you know, they’re so far out of sync with what the
public will is right now...that they’re only polarizing it. I mean if you scan they are they
are…just. Completely. Obsessed. They are…they can’t talk about anything about me.
And they don’t like the ferry because it might compete with the need for a train. I mean
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they’re that they’re that…extreme in some of their thinking. (S. Polzin, personal
communication, September 1, 2016)
In my interview with him, Dr. Polzin argued that those across Tampa Bay in positions of power
hold some authority over the narrative and even people’s academic positions. He alluded to
faculty being dismissed or not hired if they were critical of urban planning projects. Ray
Chiaramonte echoed this critique of the Tampa Bay Times and thinks it “does not have a good
understanding of reality” (Chiaramonte, 2016). These conversations and examples shine a light
on the omnipresent and ultradynamic power relations that exist, even within one “simple”
process like this. Stakeholders I examined and interviewed would at times downplay their ability
to influence this process or at other times tout just the opposite. Interestingly, the same would
occasionally happen when they spoke of other stakeholders involved in the process. From a base
understanding, power being a thing to possess or not by single entities or institutions, this back
and forth seems confusing and contradictory. This is a crucial example of phronetic power and
phronetic capability methodology in action: stakeholders having ever-shifting abilities to
influence the course or narrative of a political process.
By the end of 2009, it was obvious that light rail supporters were losing ground on the
public narrative campaign. Up to this time, the main talking points around the creation of a light
rail system centered on making Tampa a 21st century city and broad development goals. Without
a message that resonated with voters or their direct involvement in the process at any point,
supporters would need to retool their campaign or face certain defeat in 2010.
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2010: Year of the Referendum
Initially, Iorio and supporters of the rail referendum hoped to dedicate the entire sales tax
revenue from the one-cent increase to fund their plan, which included expanded bus service and
a light rail. However, pushback from other stakeholders and the loss of ground in the public
narrative forced a compromise. Commissioner Ken Hagan and his transportation task force
(created in 2006) urged Iorio to incorporate road upgrades into the referendum plan (Zink, Penny
Would Improve Roads, 2010; Hagan, 2019). Politically, this might make the tax increase more
palatable for the unincorporated areas (outside the city of Tampa) by giving a little “something
for everyone.” The question was how much would be dedicated toward transit and how much
toward roads?
After months of debate, the Hillsborough County Commissioners zeroed in on specific
wording for the tax increase referendum. This debate grew heated on how to split the potential
revenue from a sales tax increase. Should the money be left open for the county to use how it
wanted? Should there be a mandate on where and how it should be spent? On the table was an
idea to split the revenue; 25 percent of the money raised would go toward light-rail and the other
75 percent toward roads and other transit projects. A deal was eventually reached, but not before
a bit of controversy. The state of Florida has laws governing public officials’ behavior and
documentation, dubbed the Sunshine Laws. Part of these laws requires all communications
concerning public work (like conversations around a tax referendum) be made available for
public request. During the final weeks of the wording debate, an activist working to stop the
referendum filed a complaint against the Hillsborough County attorney for violating said law.
Not every commissioner was comfortable with this idea of limiting where the money
could go. The attorney in question, Renee Lee, sent a private email to some county
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commissioners about the wording. The event eventually blew up into a wider investigation of the
lawyer’s behavior and pay raises but did not derail the debate of the referendum. By the middle
of March, county commissioners approved wording for the referendum, 5-2. Jim Norman and Al
Higginbotham voted no with Chairman Ken Hagan, Rosa Ferlita, Mark Sharpe, Les Miller, and
Kevin Beckner voting yes. The final ballot language read:
Shall transportation improvements throughout Hillsborough County, Tampa, Temple
Terrace, and Plant City be funded by levying a one percent transportation sales surtax
from January 1, 2011 until repealed, deposited into a dedicated trust fund, all spending
reviewer by an independent oversight committee of citizens and experts, with 75% spend
on transit, including local rail and an expanded bus system for express, local and
neighborhood service, and 25% spent on improving roads and other transportation
projects?
Explaining her yes vote, Commissioner Ferlita showed that distrust in government
existed even within the government itself. The argument for creating a specific split on the
money came from Commissioner Ferlita. Ferlita stated, “the wording was necessary to assure
voters that future politicians won’t try to change the split without seeking their approval”
(Varian, Ballot Wording for Transit Tax is Approved, 2010). The concern was that future county
commissions might try to reprioritize roads over public transit, thus jeopardizing the plan’s entire
goal. In the end, not everyone was happy with the final language. During my interview with Pam
Iorio, she revealed that the process itself left room for elected officials who were against the
referendum to influence the ballot language. Some commissioners, who were against the
referendum and had no intention of supporting it at all, were able to adjust its language. While
the original referendum language had been carefully vetted by transit organizations and
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supporters, what was approved did not bear much resemblance to what they started with (Iorio,
2021).
Outside the Board of County Commissioners, support for the referendum grew among the
local elites. Even before an official campaign launched, professional groups organized around
the issue and a referendum. Gary Sasso, chairman of the Tampa Bay Partnership, created a
political action committee dedicated to supporting the passage of the referendum called “Moving
Hillsborough Forward” (MHF). MFH was the local economic elite’s attempt to ensure the
referendum efforts had the political and financial backing it would need to win at the ballot box.
As this vote would take place during a mid-term election year with no presidential election to
boost turnout, much of the support would come from residents already inclined to vote. Rather
than spend the resources and effort to spread outreach to unlikely voters, this organization
distributed its message through local professionals. Their work was an instance of elite
stakeholders moving “laterally” so to speak, spreading their efforts across to other elites, rather
than “down” towards middle and working-class residents.
One of my interviewees, Brian Seel, a local construction manager, helped create a young
professionals branch of the MHF to educate and unify that specific group of local elites. Their
meetings consisted primarily of informational sessions and happy hours, yet managed to create a
board of about twelve people and an email list of 1200 local young professionals (Seel, 2017).
Beyond this, his group worked with Transportation for American (part of Smart Growth
America) to commission local surveys, collect national data, and cohost local events with the
Urban Land Institute. Seel argued that young professionals had the potential to play a pivotal role
in the referendum campaign. I asked him if there was significant opposition from his
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demographic group, being that higher-income professionals tend to be more conservative. He
responded,
not a lot of pushback in the professional community. Maybe a conversation here or there
from a fiscally conservative young professional. Most people understood the value of fix
rail transit. I think it’s a generational thing. Traditionally young people are less likely to
pay attention to political issues and vote. But young professionals were really in favor of
it. We were not making the value argument for light rail. It was more of a political
engagement (Seel, 2017).
The financial message resonated strongly among citizens who were keen on Tampa and
Hillsborough developing economically. Chariman Sasso himself believed the interests of the
group were almost purely economic: “We can no longer afford to do nothing. We need this
comprehensive transportation plan to attract new businesses to Hillsborough to keep and
multiply jobs” (Varian, Ballot Wording for Transit Tax is Approved, 2010). According to
phronetic capability methodology, the question of “who gains and who loses” is answered by
pointing to the potential economic benefits of a light rail system. The argument is that everyone
throughout the county will benefit because new business and more jobs are inherently positive.
Unfortunately for the MHF, as I will show, this message did not resonate with many voters,
particularly those residing outside of the city limits.
At this point in the process, the citizens of Hillsborough County voiced their support or
opposition through indirect means only. The previously mentioned public hearings did little to
change the course or the outcome. The county commission saw its position at this point as less of
a delegate role of elected representation and more of a trustee role. That is, the commissioners’
job was to inform the public about that decision and convince them it was the best one. Lest they
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be accused of trying to sneak a tax increase past the voters, the wording that was agreed to
clearly indicates an increase in the first line. Commissioner Ferlita insisted, “People need to
know what they’re agreeing to do. I think it’s important to be honest with the public.” (Varian,
Ballot Wording for Transit Tax is Approved, 2010). Despite that, many more tasks had not been
completed, not the least of which were the details of specific projects the money would be spent
on. Before the wording could be formally placed on the November ballot, public hearings once
again had to be held, agreements had to be made between the three cities, the county, and HART,
and the commissioners would then hold another vote. The most pressing and contentious
concerns were: 1) which road projects would be completed with this new influx of money (who
benefits?) and 2) how would this new light rail connect to the existing and expanded bus system?
Just two weeks later, by the end of March, commissioners approved a list of road projects
with a vote of 5-2, with the vote falling along the same lines as the previous referendum
statement vote. An argument was made to funnel this new revenue toward existing road
construction projects, but in the end, it was dedicated toward new projects. The results of these
decisions prioritized the 25% dedicated to roadwork toward county projects over the three cities’
needs to the tune of $588.1 million vs. $121.87 million (Varian, County Okays List of Transit
Road Projects, 2010). After ten years, the priorities would shift, however. Although not explicitly
stated, the outlying suburbs would benefit much more through the road projects than the cities,
with Plant City (the only city not included in the light rail system plan) earning the bulk at
$84.07 million. With less than eight months until the vote, this shift in funding and clarity of
future projects attempted to achieve two things. First, it allowed the supporters of the referendum
to change their messaging. Until this point, one major argument against the referendum depicted
it as simply a tax for a light rail system. With clear road projects outlined, supporters could point
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to hard evidence that traditional commuters would get something too. Secondly, it attempted to
bridge the divide between urban and suburban voters. Supporters of the referendum could point
to direct benefits for suburban and rural voters if they voted for the referendum. Still, the
opposition was strong.
By mid-2010, one of the key non-transit-related stakeholders intensified its involvement
in the public discourse around transit and the referendum. The St. Petersburg Times (now the
Tampa Bay Times) editorial board strongly advocated for a light rail system in the past and did
so in 2010 as well. In their first editorial on the subject that year, they clearly outlined the
purpose and reasoning behind the funding of a light rail system:
Hillsborough has had these ideas for decades. “But business and civic leaders finally
started building the case for a referendum after seeing how far the county’s transportation
system had fallen behind and realizing county political leaders were not inclined to act.
The tax would raise badly needed money for transportation, but this is really about jobs,
wages and remaining economically competitive…..Indeed, the desire for a seamless
transportation system along Florida’s west-central coast is what galvanized the business
community to finally bring a rail plan forward.” (A Vote on Transit and Region's Future,
2010) (author’s emphasis)
It is worth noting that the St. Petersburg Times also unknowingly uncovered the major
flaw and my major argument: in a choice ultimately decided by an election, failing to specifically
incorporate the public throughout the process either through a more participatory method or
through reflexive methodology greatly reduces the possibility of success. The reality of
policymaking in a representative democracy rarely follows a purely philosophical or democratic
position according to the capability approach theories. The actual process is much more likely to
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combine the two. Yet, this case under study demonstrates key details that would have allowed
for a strong deliberation with the public over concerns and questions. These events and critical
moments were often brushed over and ignored, forgoing the ability for stakeholders to take a
reflexive approach to self-correct for any issues that arose: “After three years of planning and
two years of political debate at the Hillsborough commission, it is time to give voters an
opportunity to decide the issue” (A Vote on Transit and Region's Future, 2010). In another
editorial later that summer, the editorial board stated, “The stakes could not be higher. But if
supporters hope to persuade voters to embrace this compelling vision, they need to get it right”
(Get County Transit Plan on Track, 2010) (author emphasis). Previous attempts at creating and
funding a light rail project in Tampa came from the local power structures: elected officials,
business leaders, transit authorities, etc. All those attempts failed, and this one seemed to follow
the same pattern. Rather than a more bottom-up, deliberative approach combined with
continuously reflexive corrective measures, those with greater political power and influence
dictated the terms and process from start to finish—almost to finish, that is. As with previous
attempts, this referendum would ultimately be decided by those barely incorporated into the
process, the voting citizens of Hillsborough County. Yet, no previous attempt had ever reached
this milestone. Could those in support of an LRT craft a marketing campaign strong enough to
convince those opposed or on the fence? Or would this plan meet the same fate as all others?
With the referendum set for the November election, intense political battles between
opposing sides occurred. Supporters of the referendum saw two major critiques that needed to be
overcome for a successful campaign. From a PCM perspective, the questions remained, “where
are we going?”, “who benefits and who loses from this?”, and “is this desirable?” In terms of this
case study, the questions that supporters had to address were 1) “what was the LRT plan?”, 2)
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“who would benefit from this LRT and who would not?”, and 3) “was a LRT worth it?”
Supporters of the referendum started with the one on most people’s minds in any political
decision: who would benefit?
A one percent sales tax increase sounds small, but anti-government, anti-tax sentiments
were high in mid-2010. I will address this countermovement in more detail in a subsequent
section. Moving Hillsborough Forward argued in a brochure sent out to Hillsborough County
residents that a one percent increase would only equate to a $12 per month increase per
household. However, this was coming from just one source of political power and an
organization that was concerned with downplaying the financial impact of the referendum on the
everyday lives of Hillsborough County citizens. Once again, the St. Petersburg Times flexed its
narrative muscle and bolstered this argument. Through their fact-checking subsidiary, Politifact,
the paper answered the question on everyone’s mind: “what is it actually going to cost me?”
Their findings? A “Mostly True” rating, stating that despite many ways to calculate the cost of a
sales tax increase, the range of potential household increases was between $142 and $383 per
year (Zink, Brochure Estimates Financial Impact of Hillsborough Transit Tax, 2010).
In a separate editorial that summer, the St. Petersburg Times downplayed the tax increase
and emphasized the potential benefits: “This referendum is the most far-reaching decision the
county has faced for decades. Hillsborough would have the highest tax rate in Florida but also
the most modern transportation system, which could transform the area economy” (Get County
Transit Plan on Track, 2010). The push to shift the narrative on a tax was one of political will.
Supporters, like the St. Petersburg Times, tried to paint the tax increase as worth the economic
changes. Still, political power is constantly in flux and shifting as other actors push in different
directions. Hard numbers and facts can be powerful. However, as Flyvbjerg argued, power often
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dominates rationality. Power creates rationality. The actual costs of a tax increase may be
proportionally low (say to current taxes, property taxes, etc.), but the perceived cost is another
matter. Opponents had their own rationality when it came to a one percent sales tax increase, or
any tax increase for that matter.
The philosophical approach to determining and valuing capabilities argues that two major
factors make it superior to the democratic approach. First, it claims that “philosophers,” or
experts/elites, have more knowledge in phronesis, or knowledge of the social world. Essentially,
those at the top should be given more authority to rank or value capabilities and then decide
which are worth developing in a given political community. Second, supporters claim that this
approach is not inherently anti-democratic. Experts do not have to purposefully omit the general
public from the process. Instead, they can incorporate citizens, albeit to a much smaller degree
than the democratic position. In the case of the 2010 referendum, I have laid out ample evidence
that the stakeholders involved followed more of a philosophical approach and missed
opportunities to take a more reflexive approach. In this instance, the philosopher’s position was
not successful. I will not attempt to make the counterfactual argument that a democratic
approach would have succeeded. Rather, I will show how the critiques of the philosophical
approach are indeed valid and supported by this case and that many opportunities for reflexive
reforms were available to stakeholders throughout the process.

Outreach and Public Involvement
One of the main points of contention in capability approach literature, specifically in the
determining and valuation of capabilities, is the degree to which this process needs to be
deliberative. The philosophical position approaches this in a more top-down, technocratic way.
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Although it accounts for points of public involvement and deliberation, the primary driver of
determining and valuing capabilities comes from a philosophical “elite” who creates a list of the
most important capabilities to be developed. To some degree in opposition, the democratic
position argues for a more bottom-up approach, with strong public involvement from the
beginning of any capability determination or valuation process. As I presented in Chapter Two,
these two theories are not necessarily in contradiction with each other. The reflexive position
allows for a process that works within a representative form of democracy, while still attempting
to correct for a lack of public involvement in said systems. To that end, I will dive more deeply
into the public outreach and involvement leading up to the 2010 referendum to analyze the
degree to which the process was deliberative and to indicate possible events that would have
allowed for a more reflexive approach.
The first claim by the philosophical approach is that it does not necessarily have to be
undemocratic. In a representative form of government, like the ones involved in the 2010
referendum, deliberation with the public on plans and projects is not the goal. Representatives
are entrusted with more authority to make political decisions by and for the community at large.
Republican commissioner Ken Hagan alluded to this in his interview, though drew a line as to
how far that representation went: “We don’t live in a democracy, we live in a republic. But on
the big things, the people should decide” (Hagan, 2019). Even Mayor Iorio, a Democrat, viewed
the outreach failure as a failure of representatives and not process: “You can count up all the
speeches you give: All the Rotary, Kiwanis, various groups, town hall meetings, they’re only a
fraction of the voters. No matter how much you get out and about. Which is why when you’re
going to do something like this, you need to have broad support of public officials” (Iorio, 2021).
To retain democracy in a republic requires transparency and oversight, both of which can be
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achieved through communication and outreach. Citizens of a democratic community should be
aware of what their representatives are doing through systematic communication at each step of a
political process. Outreach to the public, public hearings, educational meetings, workshops, and
marketing are the prime tactics to achieve this goal. Yet, in the case of the 2010 light rail
referendum, this was almost a complete failure.
On paper, one might argue that representatives involved in this political process did their
“due diligence” and were successful in their public outreach. From my interviews, a few elite
stakeholders who supported light rail said as much. In the years it took for the referendum to take
form and reach the ballot, multiple agencies and organizations held thousands of outreach events.
The MPO held public forums. The Tampa Bay Partnership hosted socials and happy hour events.
HART ran educational meetings on light rail. Mayor Iorio even took a position at USF to teach
an honors course on mass transit, growth, and light rail, a position she had previously turned
down three times. The County Commissioners had public meetings where citizens were invited
to speak their minds. One such meeting is instructive of these gatherings as a whole and offers
strong evidence in support of the philosophical position: the May 2010 meeting where the
County Commission voted to put the referendum on the November 2010 ballot.
Despite the loud (yet seemingly small) opposition, the County Commission voted in midMay 2010 to formally place the referendum on the November Ballot. Ten years earlier, a vote of
4-3 against spelled the death knell for a light rail project. But this time, in 2010, a vote of 5-2 in
support was enough to get the language onto the November ballot. In almost every interview I
conducted, interviewees recalled that the public hearing at this event was emblematic of the
entire process. Originally scheduled to be held in their normal County Commission office in
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downtown Tampa, the venue had to be moved due to the expected crowd size. Nearly 400 people
attended the public hearing at the All People’s Life Center in East Tampa.
This is one of the key pieces of support for the philosophical position. Citizens can
participate in the democratic process and add input into the determination and valuation of
specific capabilities to be developed. Yet, as I will show through the public comments of both
commissioners and the attending citizens, the details of the plan had already been determined.
The sales tax amount, the revenue split between roads and mass transit, the light rail project
(although not yet finished), and the specific road projects had all been decided at this point.
Rather than participating in the valuing and determination of capabilities, or even the specifics of
how to develop a capability, the citizens were simply voicing their opinion on a plan that had
been chosen for them.
Each commissioner had to explain their position before taking questions; a three-hour
round of questions and comments followed. The major theme of the night for both supporters
and opponents of the referendum was simple: give the people a choice. When I spoke with
Commissioner Hagan, he emphasized this point. Hagan claims to be a conservative Republican
and generally opposes tax increases. Still, his skepticism around light rail and the referendum
was outweighed by his desire to let the people’s voice be heard. Only two commissioners stood
adamantly against the idea in its entirety: commissioners Higginbotham and Norman. “Let me
say to you in a heartfelt way, I feel this plan is a terrible plan. This is the wrong time to put a 1cent sales tax on a community that is losing their houses, losing their jobs,” Norman stated
(Varian, County Okays Vote on Rail Tax, 2010). Their concerns were echoed by some in the
crowd, though these came from the minority:
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Opponents- many of whom arrived early and left before the commission voted- wore red,
some black. They sounded a variety of themes, though one in particular was prevalent:
This is the worst time to propose new taxes. ‘Economics 101 dictates that in a recession
you don’t raise taxes,’ said Sharon Calvert. Many in the con camp lived in suburban areas
of the county far from the proposed rail corridors. They objective to paying more taxes
for something they said they are unlikely to use and argued that details on how the money
will be spent are lacking. (Varian, County Okays Vote on Rail Tax, 2010)
The ensuing public comments in support of the referendum came from a wide range of citizens
and organizations: “Thursday’s public hearing drew unlikely allies, as representatives of the
Sierra Club donned green shirts along with members of the Greater Tampa Chamber of
Commerce and other business groups in support of the referendum” (Varian, County Okays Vote
on Rail Tax, 2010). A brief survey of some of the comments reveals the main thrust of “let the
people decide” as well as concerns about an incomplete rail plan.
Stuart Rogel (President and CEO of the Tampa Bay Partnership): “We thank you for
bringing us here, and we look forward to you voting in favor of putting this on the ballot
and allowing us to vote in favor of transit.”
Pam Iorio (Mayor of Tampa): I appreciate the fact that we are having this robust public
hearing tonight so that everyone can air their views. And mostly importantly, I appreciate
the fact that the voters will be able to vote on what I consider to be the most significant
public policy issue of this century. Thank you very for providing us this opportunity.”
Mariella Smith (Sierra Club leader from Ruskin): “would have preferred that all the new
tax money go to rail and bus service….But she’s hopeful that the road component will
persuade more people to support the proposal….Smith said she supports the tax because
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the rail piece will encourage growth in the urban part of the county and stop sprawl near
wetlands, wildlife and farmland….She blames the road problem in southern Hillsborough
County on bad planning during the real state boom. The roads are crowded even though
much of the development planned years ago hasn’t happened yet. But when the market
rebounds, she predicted, traffic will get worse.” (Zink, Penny Would Improve Roads,
2010)
Although this was a seminal meeting in the life of the 2010 referendum, it was by no
means the only public discussion. On top of this well attended public meeting and vote, hundreds
of public gatherings were held between 2009-2010 concerning light rail and the referendum.
Through sheer quantity, the elite stakeholders involved did their best to incorporate the public,
and this should not be seen as the sole cause of the referendum’s failure. Many of the people I
interviewed attended these events and painted a more nuanced and complex picture. One issue
with relying solely on outreach to incorporate the public is that timing is key, both during the
process and time of day. Most stakeholders held their meetings while they were working. This in
turn meant that most citizens were also working.
Me: Were the meetings well attended?
Sarah Thomas: Depended on time of day and where meetings were. Sun City Center [a
neighborhood of primarily retirees] was well attended. Core Tampa areas night meetings
as well. Best attended was when the County Commission voted to put it on ballot.
Hundreds of people. Split 50/50 for against, three hours of public comment. Younger
people for, older people against.
Fran Davin: I can’t recall exactly….not much. Mostly it wasn’t to the right groups,
wasn’t at the right times, wasn’t in the right way. It was too late, too little, in the wrong
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places. The community meetings were not held at great times: many were during the day
like 11am.
Although attendance was not recorded at most of these events, consensus from those not
directing these meetings and outside reporting held that attendance (and thus overall
participation) was often very low.
One final goal of this outreach was to educate the public and create at least a minimal
form of deliberation. However, those involved agreed that these meetings and outreach events
were not truly educational, and very little deliberation occurred.
Ray Chiaramonte
Me: Who attended these meetings?
Ray Chiaramonte: “A lot of the people that came to the meetings were already
supporters. We were preaching to the choir. I think we're under the illusion that was more
support than there was gotcha and we're under the illusion that people knew more than
they did (Chiaramonte, 2016).”
Sarah Thomas
Me: Was there a lot of conversation? Debate?
Sarah Thomas: “There wasn’t really a back and forth. It was just people standing up and
saying ‘no.’ I don’t know if you could have had a conversation back then. It was just no.”
One major critique of the philosophical position is that creating an a priori list of
important capabilities removes any possible deliberation by the community directly impacted by
the development of those capabilities. The solution, according to the democratic position, is to
fully involve citizens from start to finish. Countering this, the philosophical position argues that a
democratic debate can still occur, albeit after an elite group of experts of technocrats lay the
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groundwork. Here, this did indeed occur but in a shallow democratic way. Not only had the
specific capability (expansion of the ability to travel around the county by way of a light rail)
been predetermined by a small group, but some of the specifics had already been decided as well.
Many public meetings were structured educationally, partly because they occurred after the
major decisions had already been made. Citizens could participate by voicing their opinions or
concerns to elected officials after said officials had offered up a plan or policy. Yet, that
participation did not change the course of the referendum, a course that was years in the making
before those public meetings even took place. Stakeholders in charge of the referendum push
may not have knowingly been following a philosophical or democratic approach, but they
undoubtedly leaned heavily toward the idea that they as elite stakeholders should make the key
decisions and then focus their efforts on educational outreach, not democratic deliberation.
Because of this, throughout the established democratic process in Hillsborough County, many
opportunities for serious conversation or self-referent discussions were missed. This drawback
was highlighted in one of my conversations with a consultant for HART, James Fogarty, when
he discussed his general feelings about public outreach: “We’re telling you what our priorities
are. Maybe they don’t feel listened to. They don’t see that those projects are giving them the
benefits that maybe a highway project would have given them thirty years ago. The public is
wisely saying they the benefits that we’re getting overall from your transportation spending is
not what they once were” (Fogarty, 2016).
John Hill, an editor at the Tampa Bay Times, voiced similar concerns: “There weren’t
many minds to change. You can sit in a room of a couple hundred people. The people who show
up to these meetings are there to either support or oppose it” (Hill, 2019). He stated that most of
these educational presentations to the public were for the benefit of the county commissioners, to
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measure the extent of support or opposition present. According to Hill, high-level supporters of
rail had to strategically send out officials to certain parts of the county, based on their position in
government. Mayor Pam Iorio and Commissioner Mark Sharpe were the strongest government
proponents. Mark Sharpe stayed mostly in the county, unincorporated areas for public outreach.
Iorio remained mostly the city since she was mayor. Hill stated that the unincorporated people
did not connect with Mayor Iorio: “They saw her as someone who was pitching a plan that was
going to benefit her city, disproportionately, at their cost. So, they sent Mark Sharpe instead”
(Hill, 2019). These meetings, both in the city and in the unincorporated areas, offered ideal
environments for a more reflexive approach to this determination and valuation process.
Constituents could meet face to face with their representatives to give direct guidance on their
values and opinions, while representatives could then discuss how and if these ideas could be
incorporated into the process, thus making it more just and equitable. Rather than use these
public meetings as opportunities for true deliberation between elected officials and their
constituents, these meetings were more one-way “lectures” with little reflexivity and only
shallow deliberation occurring.
In my interview with Commissioner Ken Hagan, leader of the transportation task force
and one of the swing votes on the referendum, he stated that he heard the public outreach
meetings were well attended, though he did not attend any himself. Fran Davin, former assistant
to Mayor Iorio, was most critical of the public outreach for the 2010 referendum. She believed
supporters of the referendum should have targeted outreach and lacked support from some key
sectors of the community. There was no black community involvement, no cooperation with the
League of Women voters, no neighborhood associations, no minority outreach, and no Hispanic
outreach (Davin, 2016). Citizens groups that came out in support were late in the process,
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allowing for those against the referendum to marshal their forces more quickly. Davin reported
there were little to no educational presentations in the more rural areas, such as the politically
important Sun City Center. This argument was even supported by light rail opponents. Sharon
Calvert stated in my interview with her that “They say they do all these meetings, but they don’t.
In Hillsborough County, they did their meetings mostly along where the train station stops would
be. They sit in an echo chamber” (Calvert, 2018). To make matters worse, one of the key
political supporters of the referendum was conspicuously absent from many meetings. David
Armillo, CEO of HART at the time often missed these meetings, and his absence was noted by
others.
Davin argued that the most significant mistake of the whole outreach process was turning
it over to a small group of people in the private sector, in a strongly top-down philosophical
position. The Tampa Bay Partnership was the main financial backer of the support campaign; by
turning it over to them, the focus shifted to the business community and not other sectors of
society. They did not create a grassroots movement of neighborhood associations or community
groups. Instead, the mayor would often ask individuals on the TBP to reach out to individual
elite stakeholders to garner their support. Pat Kemp echoed these sentiments in my interview
with her: “2010 might not have been the best year to put this on. Not a presidential election year.
It was a really unwise year to put it on….it should have never been put on that year. There was
flawed community engagement and no plan” (Kemp, 2019).
Entering the fall of 2010, both sides ramped up the frequency of campaigning, brochures,
public meetings, and newspaper articles as they used their positions of power and authority to try
and sway the public. By October, a public opinion poll was released showing statistics that
emboldened supporters of the referendum. 64% of respondents rated the county transportation
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Figure 5. MPO Post Referendum Analysis (MPO, 2011)

system (roads and buses) as poor. Only 26% said good or excellent. Clearly, to the question of
“where are we going?”, citizens of Hillsborough County thought “nowhere, fast”, a positive sign
for referendum supporters. In the same poll, 51% favored the tax and 39% opposed it, with 10%
unsure. Demographically, 69% of African American voters supported the tax, along with 49% of
white voters, 57% of democrats, 42% of republicans, and 56% of independents. (Zink, Transit
Tax Finds Support, 2010).
Retrospectively, something significant in public opinion changed in the last two months
leading up to the vote. Not only did the number in opposition rise dramatically, but the level of
support by region shifted as well. The poll found roughly equal support for the tax between city
and suburban areas of Hillsborough County. One of the more politically active suburban areas,
Sun City Center/Apollo Beach, is home to large senior living areas. This area reflected 61%
support for the tax in October (Zink, Transit Tax Finds Support, 2010), but on the day of the
vote, well over half of the residents voted against the measure (Metropolitan Planning
Organization, 2011).
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One of two possible changes occurred during this short time: either many citizens in these areas
changed their minds about supporting the referendum or a larger than expected number of voters
turned out in opposition to the referendum. Regardless of the cause,
the effect had a large impact on the referendum’s failure.
Quantitatively, it seemed as if the measure had strong support. But lumping the “general
public” into a monolithic entity is inaccurate at best and misleading at worst. The 1.2 million
people of the county have diverse interests, political power, and involvement in the decisionmaking process. A combination of statistical data (polls previously mentioned) and qualitative
information (interviews, below) reveal a divided populace. A cross-section of citizens at the time
follows:
“Karen Goss, who lives in Ybor City and works for a commercial developer with rental
property in New Tampa, said she can’t embrace the tax. ‘I want to be open to it,’ she said.
But with unemployment so high, she doesn’t believe it’s the right time to increase taxes.”
(Zink, Bus Agency Talks About Transit Tax, 2010)
“Ray Kearney, a home builder who lives in New Tampa, said he remembers when the
Hillsborough County sales tax was only 3 percent. If the referendum passes, the county’s
tax rate will be 8 percent. ‘I see constant increase. Constant increases over the years,’ he
said. ‘It makes Tampa a lot less affordable.’” (Zink, Bus Agency Talks About Transit
Tax, 2010)
“Although most discussions of the propose sales tax focus on the fact that it could bring
light rail to the area, New Tampa resident Matt Palmer said he’s likely to vote for it
because of the bus component. ‘Bus service is more immediate, more flexible and more
cost-effective,’ he said.” (Zink, Bus Agency Talks About Transit Tax, 2010)
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“Rose Mary Ammons, 77, a retired psychologist who lives near Lutz in northwestern
Hillsborough, said she supports the tax even though she general prefers driving. ‘There
are people who don’t like to drive, and there isn’t much in the county for them,’ she said.
‘When I get older, …I might ride the bus. It just makes sense. It’s ridiculous to have all
this carbon pollution pouring out from all the cars we have.’” (Zink, Transit Tax Finds
Support, 2010) (Author’s note: This citizen’s optimism for long life should be
contagious)
“Sally Martin, 72, of New Tampa, agrees. ‘We are just overrun with traffic. We need
some relief from that and we need a way to move the citizen around town rapidly,’ she
said.” (Zink, Transit Tax Finds Support, 2010)
“Del Milligan, 64, who lives in Riverview, says money for transportation improvements
should come from existing budgets. ‘There will always, always, always be wonderful,
terrific reasons for raising taxes,’ he said. ‘But I’m taxed out.’” (Zink, Transit Tax Finds
Support, 2010)
In the constant back and forth of the narrative battle, either the supporters of the measure failed
to achieve their goal, or the opposition succeeded in theirs.
On one side, Moving Hillsborough Forward, HART, and the St. Petersburg Times
worked in these last few months to assure voters of the worthiness of the plan, despite the lack of
specifics in certain areas. They pushed education and awareness campaigns, seeing lack of
knowledge as the main source of opposition. However, from the fall poll, supporters realized
their largest obstacles were general opposition to new taxes and selfish concerns: “People who
oppose the plan say it’s because they generally don’t want new taxes or don’t believe the money
will be used in a way that will help them.” (Zink, Transit Tax Finds Support, 2010). The first,
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partially a product of the Tea Party movement and the No Tax For Tracks organization, was
generally a more difficult barrier to overcome. Supporters saw the second as simply a marketing
and education task.
Moving Hillsborough Forward, with its eventual budget of $1.6 million, funded much of
the marketing campaign while HART held dozens of public outreach meetings. Because of
Florida state law, transit authorities like HART are unable to advocate for a new tax. Its only acts
as an institution can be to educate. Katharine Eagan, chief of service development for
Hillsborough Area Rapid Transit, stated, “It’s our responsibility to educate folks. So we’ve been
educating a lot.” (Zink, Bus Agency Talks About Transit Tax, 2010). It’s worth noting that this
statement was made while Eagan addressed the New Tampa Chamber of Commerce, not the
public at large. She argued that in the year leading up to the vote, HART held over 250 public
meetings, compared to only 130 outreach events the previous year. Mayor Iorio shared these
concerns: “Most people she talks to believe the county’s transportation system needs improving,
she said. But the bad economy makes a new tax a hard sell, and it’s difficult to explain how the
new money will be spent. ‘This is not a sound bite campaign,’ she said. … ‘They’ve just got to
continue to get out and educate and share the information with as many voters as possible.’”
(Zink, Transit Tax Finds Support, 2010). Mayor Iorio argued that once people realized the
referendum was a tax for roads and buses in addition to a light rail system, they would change
their minds. Yet, the fact remained that light rail was the hot button topic of the three and citizens
wanted to know more about that. The question remained, what exactly were they telling citizens
about light rail at these educational meetings?
James Fogarty, a consultant brought on with HART for just this outreach, elaborated for
me. A typical meeting consisted of about ten to twenty people. Most people who came would
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have gone to those meetings anyway, meaning they cared about their community and were
mostly concerned with policing, public works, sidewalks, etc. Although most people in
attendance seemed enthusiastic, he admitted that it may have been because the city of Tampa
was the affected area under study and HART focused their outreach primarily in the city limits.
The County Commission and Moving Hillsborough Forward were the entities that primarily did
unincorporated, county-level outreach (Fogarty, 2016). Fogarty elaborated on the ease and
difficulty of his outreach, citing the fact that because Tampa had no kind of transit, they had to
often educate citizens who knew nothing about bus-rapid transit (BRT) or light rail transit
(LRT). He recalled concerns about a loud and obnoxious rail system barreling through
neighborhoods like a subway. Although these types of rail systems were included in some plans
as potential options, it was not likely because of the cost. The lack of knowledge concerning rail
systems emerged in confusion with a national policy proposal at the time: a high-speed rail
connecting Tampa and Orlando with federal funding from the Obama administration.
Fogarty believed this confusion was common among people who were only partially
interested in transit. HART tried to be clear that they were separate, but people in the more
suburban and rural areas were often misinformed and people in the city had a better
understanding of the difference between light rail and high-speed rail. Debrief studies of the
referendum confirmed this split of knowledge between urban/rural citizens. Fogarty was unsure
of if this had a major impact on the final vote: “It may or may not have been a factor in the
ultimate vote on the referendum” (Fogarty, 2016). One obstacle he did come across in urban
areas was distrust of government transit plans. In Carver City-Lincoln Gardens, an upper-class
neighborhood near the Tampa International Airport, old highway projects went through their
neighborhood which disproportionally hurt them over other areas of Tampa. Though a tough
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crowd to pitch a transit plan to, Fogarty said they were polite, just concerned about their
neighborhood. His circumstances gave him an advantage during this one meeting, as citizens ask
him facetiously, “If you think this is so great, put it in your neighborhood.” Fogarty lived in that
very neighborhood at the time.
All these attempts at public outreach hit a further roadblock with the national movement
against taxation. In my conversation with consultant Kevin Thurman, he explained how this was
the final nail in the coffin (from his perspective) on the referendum: “They were not matching
the concerns of the community while asking them to tax themselves. They tried to fix that later
with the jobs argument. But then they joined the national conversation of national
stimulus…which helped the Tea Party supporters. Straight into the [Tea Party/Anti-Tax] wave.
Ouch (Thurman, 2019).” By waiting so late to include the public in the political process, major
issues that could have been addressed emerged when it was too late. The shift in depictions of
light rail as a necessity for public transit to a driver of economic growth also changed the
countywide narrative to a conversation about economics, which put the spotlight on a purely
taxes vs. benefits comparison for many voters. And that conversation and rationality helped to
shore up the opposition, with a majority voting “no” on the light rail sales tax referendum, on
November 2nd, 2010.
Despite the libertarian and Tea Party opposition, supporters of the referendum continued
to shift the narrative away from light rail toward one of economic benefits for all. The St.
Petersburg Times published an editorial in early October stating that while supporters had a
worthy goal, their marketing needed work: “offering a compelling vision is one thing and selling
it to voters is another - particularly in this economy. Supporters of the transportation package
need to sharpen their message before voters decide its fate in November” (Sharpen the Pitch on
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Transit, 2010). This editorial and the next few before the vote worked to shift the narrative in a
direction that would hopefully help supporters of the referendum. Understanding that a major
critique from libertarian movements, the Tea Party, and No Tax For Tracks was simply adding a
tax at all, they reframed it as a “transportation package.” They derided critics for calling it a “rail
tax” since most of the money would go to buses and roads. The SPT editorial board used its
power to shape rationality around the issue. Calling it a rail tax, they argued, was disingenuous
and tried to pit urban and suburban citizens against each other while the three prongs, bus, rail,
roads, offered something to everything. For county residents, taxing themselves for a light rail
system they may never use may seem irrational, but voting against a plan that has something in it
that will directly benefit them is irrational (per this line of thinking).
This second point, the idea of something for everyone, was another example of
supporters reframing the conversation while addressing one of the major concerns of citizens:
“what’s in it for me?” The answer came in the form of power creating a new rationality:
Buses and rail would free up congestion on the roads and lessen the need for taxpayers to
condemn move private property for highways. Improving roads throughout the county
makes the region more economically competitive. Putting more money into mass transit
enables the county to draw down more federal aid for transportation. Mass transit gives
people who cannot or do not want to drive the ability to get where they want. And a more
balance transportation system grows the urban core while protecting suburban lifestyles.
(A Transit Plan With Plenty For Everyone, 2010)
More locally, two of the smaller cities within Hillsborough County, Plant City and Temple
Terrace, had specific monies and projects earmarked from this referendum tax. With both entities
outside of the possible light rail lines, the spending of money for road construction and
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improvement was a specific inclusion to garner support from more suburban and rural parts of
the county:
In addition to new road projects, the tax will add $2 million a year to Plant City’s
financially strapped street repaving program. Now, with about $1 million a year budgeted
for road repaving, the city has the money to resurface streets every 60 years. In Temple
Terrace, plans call for using $1.9 million in new tax money to install sidewalks and bike
paths on 56th Street between Fowler and Fletcher avenues and $1.5 million for a main
street that’s part of the city’s downtown master plan. (Zink, Penny Would Improve
Roads, 2010)
From the local and specific to the county-wide and big picture, supporters of the referendum took
two more approaches to reframe the conversation away from the lack of a light-rail plan and
toward other ideas. The first was the potential economic benefits of the referendum and the
second was an appeal to a sense of civic responsibility.
Increasing taxes during a recession is a tough argument to make. However, increasing job
opportunities during a time of high unemployment is much more amenable to the public. By
2010, the Great Recession hit full swing with national unemployment reaching 9.6%.
Hillsborough County was hit even harder, with an unemployment rate of 12.4%, higher than
even the state average (Transit Plan Good For Jobs, Too, 2010). If a sales tax increase could help
to solve this problem and address one of the most prominent public concerns of the time (traffic
congestion), it should increase its support among the public: “Increasing the sale tax by 1 cent
for roads, buses and a new light-rail system would create better and cheaper commuting options.
But the plan would also be a jobs creator, enabling the region to recover more quickly from the
recession and better compete against other communities” (Transit Plan Good For Jobs, Too,
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2010). Arguing for a tax increase becomes more palatable if the focus is on the potential, not the
tax itself. Recently elected and swing vote on light rail County Commissioner Kevin Beckner
agreed. Beckner maintained it was about the environment, economics, and “the people have a
right to decide if that’s the way they want their tax dollars to be spent” (Zink, Iorio makes
headway on mass transit, 2008).
HART confirmed this stance with a study that stated the referendum would create 25,000
jobs and produce more than $2 billion in-person income between 2011-2035 (Transit Plan Good
For Jobs, Too, 2010). Beyond the initial construction and tax revenue, an LRT can have longerlasting impacts on the local community. Rail stops become economic hubs. Commuters can
spend more time on activities beyond driving. Tourists can explore (and spend) more in the
Tamp area: “the money that flows back from creating a more efficient transit system could boost
those figures to 34,000 jobs and $3.5 billion in new spending” (Transit Plan Good For Jobs, Too,
2010). Supporters even emphasized that many of the rail stops would be in minority
neighborhoods, thus increasing economic development and job opportunities (Varian, Rail Plan
Still Taking Shape, 2010). The argument is a rational one. Yes, no one wants to pay more taxes,
but if it helps the Tampa Bay area lift itself out of the Great Recession, how could anyone vote
no? This use of power to shift the narrative seemed to have some effect, as public comments
during Board of County Commissioners meetings began to reflect these economic development
sentiments (Board of County Commissioners, 2010a).
Besides the job-creating prospects, the SPT editorial board made one final pitch to the
voters of Hillsborough County. Based purely on prestige and emotion, they argued that a “yes”
vote on the referendum would reshape Tampa’s image in the world: “Great civics projects
benefit communities for generations…..The measure would give Hillsborough the transportation
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system it needs to grow, compete in the modern economy and improve the quality of life that has
brought millions here” (For Region's Future, Vote For Transit Plan, 2010). The bus and rail
projects included in the referendum would remake Tampa into a world-class city, able to attract
large events like the 2022 World Cup while simultaneously boosting the University of South
Florida into a new national academic hub for research and biotechnology. This argument was
echoed in my interview with Ray Chiarmonte:
That’s the other thing is I think that the desire here was when we didn’t do it in the 90s
when our peer cities like Phoenix and Charlotte all that got their referendums past and
moved forward. We thought the solution is okay…we got to catch up to them. You know,
let’s jump across that track and catch right up with what’s out there. I think for a while
we were just going to go for the gold, you know, ‘we're feeling the oats’ and I was one of
them. You know, and I just don’t think that’s realistic anymore. (Chiaramonte, 2016)
Combined with the federally funded creation of a high-speed rail line connecting Tampa and
Orlando (to one day be extended to Miami), Tampa might very well become the dynamic
community it hoped to be. Despite the rhetoric on reshaping Tampa’s image, the SPT admitted
that may not be the driving factor for voters. In a bit of foreshadowing, it argued the final tally
would “hinge on voter attitudes about taxes, congestion, transit’s role in the economy and the
smartest use of transportation dollars” (Sharpen the Pitch on Transit, 2010). Rather than
following a more deliberative, bottom-up approach or even a reflexive one, the outreach and
public involvement during this case was almost entirely a top-down endeavor. Based primarily
on educating the public of an existing plan and shifting public opinion through a general
marketing campaign, this outreach had to make a dramatic about-face when support for a tax
faded in 2010. In addition to this failure, supporters of the referendum were also unsuccessful in
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their role as philosopher elites. Specifically, they failed to put forth a definitive plan to the voters
before they went to the polls in November of that year.

Technical and Political Expertise
The philosophical position to capability valuation and determination argues that everyday
citizens can still be brought into the democratic process, albeit in a less significant way than the
democratic position. This attempts to overcome the argument that it is a purely top-down,
technocratic approach. In the previous section, I showed how this minimalistic democratic
approach can potentially lead to whitewashing a policy-making process to make it seem
democratic when in fact it is anything but. The second major critique of the philosophical
position is that “philosophers,” or experts, are rarely true representatives of the general
population and often do not embody the values of it. As a rebuttal, these experts or technocrats
have knowledge that the average citizen lacks and thus should be helping to determine and value
capabilities before any democratic deliberation begins. One way to test this argument is to
examine the expertise and knowledge of these experts during a democratic process. Did their
additional knowledge allow them to create a situation that was more successful or efficient than
might have occurred? Although the counterfactual argument is difficult to make, in this section I
show that simply because someone is an elite stakeholder or expert in a field (say, mass transit)
does not necessarily mean they can create a successful campaign for that issue. Instead, a more
ideal approach would be reflexive, combining the expertise of the elite/technocrat/philosopher
stakeholders with the ideas and opinions of the citizens who would be most impacted by the
policy. This is no more apparent than in the 2010 light rail referendum in Hillsborough County,
in the final months leading up to the actual public vote. The philosophers or experts, in this case,
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had years of preparation for this moment, yet mistakes and missteps abound. The opposition to
the referendum used these missteps to help craft and bolster their arguments, mimicking many of
the general critiques of the philosophical position, intended or not.
As previously foreshadowed, when many of the expert supporters of the LRT plan and
referendum took fact-finding trips to other cities with successful LRT systems, one major point
was hammered home: the voters need a clear plan on exactly what they are voting for or against.
Yet, that was the major critique raised during the 2010 public meetings, a criticism that would
eventually be one of the major reasons for the referendum’s downfall. What was the plan? In the
framework of phronetic methodology, the key question is: “where are we going?” Quite literally,
residents wanted to know more specifics about this proposed light rail: costs, routes, economic
impact, etc. As one resident put it, “many people want to see improvements to the county’s
transportation network. ‘We hear, ‘No, no, no – don’t trust the government,’ he said. ‘Well, tell
me what the plan is” (Varian, Transit Tax Hits Wave of Skepticism, 2010). On the one hand,
many aspects of the referendum’s plan were indeed finished and detailed. The St. Petersburg
Times (a strong supporter of LRT and the referendum) ran a story over the summer of 2010 in
hopes of summarizing what was on the table. It laid out the partially completed plan in terms of
vision, plan, and benefits (Board, 2010).
VISION: Hillsborough ranks nearly last or last among comparable areas in its ability to
move people and goods. Commuters spend 50 hours a year stuck in traffic. Workers earn
less than national average. Spend more of their income on transportation, because mass
transit is poor.
PLAN: Tax would apply to the first $5000 purchases and generate $184 million per year.
Argues that it has something for everyone and has been vetted by every local
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transportation agency. HART double bus fleet from 220 to 440. Buses that run every 30
minutes would be 10-15. 134 miles of new local routes. 315 miles of new express service
connecting suburbs to center. Plan would pay for 46 miles of light rail: USF to downtown
and then west to West Shore and TIA.
The editorial says that plans are to later connect light rail to Brandon, south Tampa,
Carrollwood. This could be the foundation for a regional system and implies that seven
counties could be connected.
BENEFITS: County has billions of unfunded road projects. Main source of funding is
already allocated through 2026. 20% of the tax proceeds would be paid by visitors.
Although this article outlined many key details of the plan and expenditures, very little was said
about the LRT plan. The Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority (HART) was the
stakeholder in charge of finalizing these parts of the referendum’s spending: where would the
light rail lines go? Yet, just eight months before a potential vote on the referendum, HART
received updated projections on the costs of the light rail and no specific lines were agreed on.
Opposition to the referendum and light rail had an opening which they capitalized on.
NoTaxForTracks.com, founded by Karen Jaroch, was the primary anti-referendum
organization and eventually raised approximately $24,000 to mount its campaign. Although the
amount pales in comparison to Moving Hillsborough Forward’s $1.6 million, the referendum
opposition saw major cracks in the supporter’s arguments and exploited them in theirs. Their
rhetoric centered around three major points. First, imposing new taxes during a recession was
just bad economics. Asking citizens to tax themselves during an economic downturn is difficult
at best, but many of the concerns were overcome on an individual level by having conversations
between the citizens and the experts. Unfortunately for supporters of the referendum, these more
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reflexive approaches were not taken, and concerns about the economic impacts of a tax grew. At
meeting after meeting, citizens voiced concerns about new taxes (Board of County Commission,
2009c; 2009d, 2009g, 2010d, 2010e, 2010f). Second, the light rail system was the largest project
set for the tax revenue and the most visible. Despite this, there was not a concrete plan of how
taxpayer money was to be spent and how much the project would cost, unlike the road and bus
projects. Fears of where their tax money was set to go were not unfounded, with experts in this
situation failing to use their expertise to promote a comprehensive light rail plan. Finally, the
opposition latched onto the anti-government sentiment that grew during the time, both locally
and nationally (Polzin, 2016).
In the fall of 2010, Hillsborough County unemployment was higher than the national and
state averages, household income grew stagnant or even fell, and citizens were concerned about
their economic futures
Bill Kale, who lives in Lithia’s FishHawk Ranch, said he voted against it on his absentee
ballot. ‘The only road improvements that I was really concerned about are roads the
county has already approved and has funding for,’ he said. ‘We’re taxed to death as it
already is. It’s not a good time for a tax. I’m anti-tax right now, period,’ he said. ‘Three
or four years down the road, if the economy turns around, I think maybe I would support
it. (Zink, Penny Would Improve Roads, 2010)
Even Mayor Iorio, champion of the plan and referendum from the beginning, had doubts and
recognized the recession may harm the votes’ results: “I have felt for the past month or so that
it’s 50-50. If we weren’t in such tough economic times, I think it would be a different situation”
(Zink, Transit Tax Finds Support, 2010). In my interview with her, Pam Iorio expanded on this
to claim a few more reasons why the referendum ultimately failed.
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Me: Why do you think it didn’t pass?
Iorio: 1) We asked for tax increase during recession. 2) We did not have unified support
from elected officials. Mixed messages from different leaders did not help. 3) Money was
going to flow to HART. Our bus agency did not have a high positive profile at the time
and was not headed by a person who is a dynamic communicator. 4) The campaign itself.
$800,00 was spent on television ads and that was not a good thing. Voters needed to
receive something in the mail with specifics about what they were going to receive in
their area. (Iorio, 2021)
The opposition also pointed to the potential costs shouldered by residents. Although
supporters of the referendum cited possibilities of funding from outside the tax increase, the
process was moving slowly, and nothing had been approved as of October 2010: “HART
officials say they are simply following a process used in other rail communities. They ultimately
hope to win support from the federal government, which would help pay as much as 50 percent
of the construction cost, and the state, from which HART hopes to get another 25 percent”
(Varian, Rail Plan Still Taking Shape, 2010). Even if this funding could be secured, residents in
unincorporated parts of Hillsborough County raised trepidations about the benefits of a light rail
that only ran within the city limits. One of the cities involved, Plant City, had concerns about
whether a light rail system would be seen as a benefit to its citizens: “The rail portion overall is
good for the county and the region, but it’s not something I’m sure a majority of our residents
will feel connected to. In truth, it will be decades before they see any rail,’ said Plant City
Manager Greg Horwedel. ‘The roads are really the important part for east Hillsborough County”
(Zink, Penny Would Improve Roads, 2010). This concern was echoed by individuals at budget
meetings in the Board of County Commissioners, where citizens advocated for road issues in
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their own neighborhoods or raised concerns about the rail not benefitting them (Board of County
Commissioners, 2009f; 2010j).
On top of these concerns, the expert stakeholders lost faith and trust from supporters in
their failed cost estimates. Voters were looking for a specific LRT plan with routes outlined as
well as costs explained. Yet, from the beginning of this process (roughly 2008) to 2010, cost
estimates rose dramatically from initial findings. Between the time the county commissioners
agreed to put the referendum on the ballot and the month leading up to the vote, cost estimates
for the light rail rose over 20%. The original estimates, the ones that county commissioners used
to decide whether to put the referendum on the ballot, came from the MPO and put the cost at
roughly $70 million per mile of light rail track (Varian, Cost Projections for Light Rail Rising,
2010). After HART concluded its study that fall, they said it would be closer to $85-$120 million
per mile (Varian, Cost Projections for Light Rail Rising, 2010). HART stated that the previous
estimates were based on similar-sized cities to Tampa, but theirs was more localized. Dealing
with land purchases and local bridges increases the costs more than other parts of the country.
Despite this, supporters tried to downplay the numbers, insisting that they were conservative and
that it could still be on the cheaper side: “It builds in big contingencies for cost overruns, they
say. Still, they acknowledge that the best estimates will come later, when paths are selected and
engineering work is done. So how should voters view the numbers as they cast ballots? ‘Our
numbers are more conservative,’ said David Armijo, HART’s executive director. ‘All
this…analysis does is give you a back-of-the-envelope number’” (Varian, Cost Projections for
Light Rail Rising, 2010; Board of County Commissioners, 2010d). The issue of lacking details
and specifics ran through the cost and spending portion of the referendum to the actual light rail
system itself.
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The second major critique that the opposition took advantage of was the lack of a specific
light rail plan. If the government was asking voters to approve the spending of billions of dollars
on a light-rail plan, where was the plan? Even supporters of the referendum had a difficult time
articulating what exactly the paths of the light rail would be. Initially, supporters focused on a
completion date of roughly 2017-109 and the most plausible paths between USF, downtown, and
Westshore/airport (Board of County Commissioners, 2010b). Yet, by October, the St. Petersburg
Times ran an editorial stating that the plan would eventually connect USF, Brandon, downtown,
South Tampa, West Shore, and the airport with light rail. This was more wishful thinking than a
specific proposal, as it admitted the specific alignments of the lines have not been decided on,
and that could negatively affect the vote: “County officials should have decided on the alignment
of the rail line before the referendum, because the routes will help determine how much new
development occurs along the way” (Board, 2010). Even among the two most obvious paths
(USF/Downtown and Downtown/Westshore), officials were still unsure of which would be built
first.
In the end, the final proposal fell short of an actual plan. Ray Chiarmonte went as far as
to call it no real plan at all, though that should not have stopped it: “What we were proposing
wasn’t even doable. Combining CSX lines with new lines….CSX hadn’t even agreed to that. It
was a half-baked plan…That doesn’t mean that you shouldn't do a half-baked plan to get a
referendum passed for funding because all these details would come out” (Chiaramonte, 2016).
In August, HART announced it would not make a final decision on the alignments (specific
paths) for the first two routes until after the vote. With weeks to go to the election, Moving
Hillsborough Forward and supporters were asking voters to work with “back of the envelope
estimates” on a multi-billion-dollar project, and the opposition saw an opening. This late in “the

167

game” and the fact that proponents still did not have a full plan or a concrete cost estimate gave
the opposition all the marketing ammunition they needed to fuel their final argument and ride the
national wave of anti-government sentiments, which were often expressed at public hearings. All
of these aspects seemed to contribute heavily to the referendum’s failure, according to Dr.
Polzin:
[They] started out with one route, then realized from the study that the ridership wasn’t
there. So, they extended it and looked again. And again. Extending the time of the study,
never finishing up, never defining the details and alignment option because they were, I
think, searching for something that would be viable at the federal level. And so, then we
didn't have a crisp clean decent plan on our hands and then things get soft and fuzzy and
uncertain and it's hard to make decisions. And you know this last proposed referendum
here was that the opposite extreme. It was very much a trust me referendum. I mean at
least with respect to what turned into the high-profile issue that you know, may earn a
train to the airport thing. There's no plan there's no line and there's no cost estimate.
There's no ridership estimate. There's nothing. And it was give me money; trust me. And
had that gotten further, in my judgment, the exposure of that would have been crippling
to it. Maybe but maybe the media wouldn't have exposed it because they were so kind of
in the tank for it here. (Polzin, 2016)
Mandatory public hearings began in April 2010, and the two opposing sides drew their
battle lines. The narratives used to garner support for or against this referendum came into focus,
with the anti-light rail advocates dominating the discussion. One way to question the potential
expertise of experts in a determination and valuation process is to undermine trust in their
expertise itself. As most of the high-level supporters of the referendum were government

168

officials, the opposition had a simple theme to succeed: distrust in government. This rallying cry
found support in an unlikely place: the county commission: “Commissioner Al Higginbotham
played that card [distrust in government] repeatedly in a debate before roughly 100 residents of
Sun City Center. ‘When’s the last time you entered a contract with government, and they
honored the terms?’ Al Higginbotham” (Varian, Transit Tax Hits Wave of Skepticism, 2010).
The skepticism emerged in many members of the crowds at these meetings as well, including
County Commission public hearings (Board of County Commissioners, 2010c) and in my
interviews with light rail opponents, like Sharon Calvert. She argued that the real reason behind
the large-scale plan was sort of iron-triangle of favoritism: elected officials, taxpayer funded
agencies, and special interest groups. In other words, she argued it was a “I scratch your back
you scratch mine” situation (Calvert, 2018). At County Commission meetings, public comments
included many like: “‘I’ll believe it when I see it,’ said resident Uta Kuhn, to assertions that the
tax will be spent as planned and the rail system won’t encounter costly overruns” (Varian,
Transit Tax Hits Wave of Skepticism, 2010). The St. Petersburg Times editorial board echoed
these concerns, alluding to the power of faith (or lack thereof) in government as a key factor in
this vote. They realized that it was not just a vote for a new tax but “it is a question of whether
the public has faith that the government can deliver on its promises” (Get County Transit Plan on
Track, 2010).
Although seemingly in the majority, the public and commissioners in support of light rail
were on the defensive from this anti-government narrative and attempted to push back. At one
meeting, Commissioner Sharpe made the argument that there would be strong oversight on this
new money and its subsequent projects. An oversight committee would be created, made up of
the Hillsborough County government, HART, and a citizen committee: “‘I realize distrust of
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government is at an all-time high,’ Sharpe said. ‘Do you just throw up your hands and say you’re
not even going to try?’” (Varian, Transit Tax Hits Wave of Skepticism, 2010). Post-referendum
exit polling and my interviews revealed a strong anti-government sentiment. The Tea Party
movement was in its early stages, and anti-Obamacare ideals trickled down to local issues and
significantly impacted the narrative and outcome of this local transit referendum.

Reflexivity: Missed Opportunities
Not to be slowed down by the lack of a specific plan for the bulk of the referendum’s
revenue or strong public involvement in the plan-making process, supporters endeavored to shift
the narrative by the summer and fall of 2010. Previous political support for the movement from
the St. Petersburg Times partially eroded, with their editorial board frustrated by the lack of
progress on a definitive plan. They argued that most of the surveys and plans have been done
from previous LRT attempts and there are limited options to connect USF, Downtown, and the
airport: “officials had promised throughout the tedious and difficult process of getting the
referendum to the ballot that residents would know in advance exactly what they were voting for
– or against.” (Get County Transit Plan on Track, 2010). Interestingly, the editors argued that the
processes had indeed been deliberative, so the lack of a concrete plan gave opponents
ammunition and blemished the “orderly and deliberative political process” (Get County Transit
Plan on Track, 2010). This argument supports the concept of a reflexive approach, where a truly
deliberative process combined with reflexivity would not have reached this far into the process
without a fleshed-out plan, as it was one of the key components for stakeholders from the very
beginning.
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Power is not a monolithic “characteristic” that a stakeholder has or has not. It is not
something that continually pushes a project or narrative in one direction for all of time.
Stakeholders react to other stakeholders and their behavior. Actions and discourse from one
stakeholder may simultaneously give power to one form of rationality (pro-LRT) while also
supporting the opposition (anti-LRT). The amount of power that one has in a given moment can
vary dramatically and how a stakeholder tries to use that power just as much. Here, we see the
St. Petersburg Times continue its support for the idea of a light rail system, but add unintentional
support to the opposition by highlighting one of that side’s major concerns.
Ultimately, on November 2nd, 2010 voters had their final say on the future of the tax
referendum and a light rail transit system in Tampa and Hillsborough County. Through this vote,
they stated overwhelming that they did not support the referendum, with 58% against to 42% in
support. Despite the failure, this case study is an exemplary case to test the determination and
valuation of capabilities using the phronetic capability approach. By understanding the
limitations of the democratic position in a representative democracy, while simultaneously
recognizing the shortcomings of the philosophical approach, one can see that a tentative middle
ground may present a viable alternative. By being neither too strongly bottom-up nor top-down
and using a more reflexive “back and forth” method, political communities may be able to avoid
situations like those experienced in Tampa in 2010.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion - A Guide for Future Determination and Caluation of
Capabilities
“People are smart enough to appreciate that. The induvial is smart enough to vote in a
way to vote in away that makes sense for them to vote. Knowing the plan in some of the
suburban areas of the county was so roads focused, perhaps they didn’t feel like they
were going to get the economic benefit from the projects that were going to be in their
areas. And perhaps rightly, you can’t say they were right or wrong. They’re the voter,
they’re always right. If they don’t feel like supporting it, that’s the will of the people.
Regardless of how we feel in the public sector that’s what you have to learn.” -Brain Seel
(Seel, 2017)

The future of our planet is at a tipping point. Seven years is what the United Nations
climate models predict we have left to make major structural changes to effectively combat
global warming and the worst outcomes of climate change. While Less Developed Countries
(LDCs) may have a different path forward than More Developed Countries (MDCs), both
struggle to overcome a new wave of anti-democratic authoritarianism. For the future of
democracy, this new wave must be taken seriously. For the future of sustainability, the new path
forward must be one of inclusion and participation. Sustainable human development is one
framework encompassing these issues into a broad set of goals for humanity. Already we see
many making headway toward the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Yet, this framework and these goals often emphasize the outcomes, with measurable targets for
each country marked by a lack of focus on just how these goals are achieved. Theories of
sustainable human development require a broader understanding of the democratic process, with
a specific focus on just who is involved and how they influence development.
The trope in democracies is that “no one likes to see how the sausage is made,” which
refers to the fact that the democratic process is often messy, complicated, and potentially
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contradictory. Yet, understanding how and why this process occurs is fundamental to any goal of
making it more equitable and just. The capability approach, with its focus on a framework of
“capabilities,” offers a useful theory for sustainable human development in the 21st century. In
the 20th century, it created a new theory of development that attempted to bridge some of the
gaps between more resource-based and outcome-based theories. By zooming in on the actual
ability of people to choose lives of dignity, or what is coined capabilities, it showed that theories
of development can both embrace the differences between humans and stress the importance of
individual agency or choice. However, it lags in its understanding of how this development
occurs. How does a political community decide which capabilities are important? How does it
decide which capabilities are worthy of laws, regulations, and funding? Without more knowledge
about stakeholders, the roles they play, and the power they possess, one cannot truly understand
how the determination and valuation process works. In turn, one can then not put forth a plan to
make that process more sustainable: meaning more inclusive with an emphasis on participation.
Capability scholars began to address this in the 2010s, with two theoretical positions
emerging on the question of determination and valuation of capabilities. The philosophical
position, in essence, argues that there is a set of capabilities so essential to any democratic
society that they must exist a priori any determination or valuation process. Experts, elites,
technocrats, or simply “philosophers” of a community are those best situated to tackle this
problem of a list of necessary capabilities. Their knowledge of justice, philosophy, and the
democratic process gives them the tools needed to work through just what capabilities are
required for a fair democratic process to occur. By following this theory, a given political
community can guarantee that when the democratic process occurs (or the determination and
valuation of capabilities), it will be a fair and just one for all involved. It also gives a benchmark
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for what situations and outcomes are inherently unjust, which allows for many unwanted
outcomes to be avoided or corrected. Yet, this theory is not without critiques. If a democratic
process is intended to be one of the people and by the people, why then are they excluded from
the creation of the initial list of necessary capabilities? Is not a group of experts making decisions
for a community inherently undemocratic? The philosophical position’s strongest counter to
these critiques is that the initial list of essential capabilities is not set in stone, but rather open to
reform and changes from the political community. Yet this too engenders even more critiques. If
said capabilities are so fundamental to a fair and just determination and valuation process, why
then are they open to change?
The democratic position, on the other hand, argues that any list of capabilities must itself
be determined by those it affects, through a deliberative democratic process. In essence, an
inclusive, bottom-up approach is the only fair and just way of determining and valuing
capabilities for a given community. It makes procedural sense for those who are directly affected
by development to be involved in the process. The works of Rawls and Habermas, demonstrate
that through the deliberative process, an overlapping consensus on policy can often lead to a
more stable and legitimate democracy. From a normative sense, the democratic position argues
they must be involved because no expert or representative will ever truly know what the people
want without some type of deliberation. Yet even this approach has its critiques. If no
predetermined list of necessary capabilities for a fair democratic process exists, how can the
democratic position guarantee that all who want to participate are indeed able to? Furthermore,
what if said political community works through the determination and valuation process and the
consensus decides on a blatantly unjust outcome or policy? Without a fixed understanding of
what is just/unjust, the democratic position fails to explain what to do in this situation. With no
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practical solution, many democrats harken back to their theoretical underpinnings of Rawls and
Habermas and simply maintain that overlapping consensus of the diverse community would
prevent any such outcome to occur. While possible, this counter argument fails to take into
consideration the real-world implications of power dynamics between different stakeholders in
each community. Then, can these two positions on the determination and valuation of
capabilities be reconciled or reformed to address some of their shortcomings?
While not necessarily a dichotomous spectrum, the two theories vary widely in their
approaches and have serious critiques to overcome. With this in mind, my concept of a reflexive
position attempts to address some (though not all) of these critiques while bridging some of the
gaps between the two theories. A reflexive position reconciles some of the differences between
the philosophical and democratic positions. In the vein of the philosophical, one capability, the
ability to effectively participate in democratic deliberation, is indeed necessary for a just
determination and valuation process to occur. If all these normative theories of sustainable
human development rely on the democratic process as their foundation for a political decisionmaking process, regardless of what else follows, this is the one capability truly essential for a fair
and just democracy. Following the arguments of the democratic position, people in a political
community should be involved in any process of determining and valuing capabilities. In a
practical sense, however, how does one guarantee that everyone who wants to participate is able
to in a meaningful way, without creating a strong set of criteria a priori any democratic process?
The major addition to this question and the conversation about determination and valuation of
capabilities is that this process is not simply an either/or. Instead, it is an activity that requires
constant adjustments to create a more just process, with the understanding that it may be highly
unlikely that the goal of a perfectly just democratic process is achieved. With that goal in mind,
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per this theory, stakeholders must continually reevaluate their own democratic and deliberative
processes to expose any systems of inequality that hinder a person’s ability to meaningfully
participate in the process, if they so choose. These inequalities, which may be quite diverse and
unique to a given political community, can then be addressed to try and make a more equitable
and just process for future determination and valuation of capabilities.
To test this theory, I examined the case of the 2010 Hillsborough County tax referendum
to fund a light rail transit (LRT) system. One added layer to this case study and test of my
reflexive theory was that this community, like many around the world, is a representative system
and not a direct democracy. Citizens choose leaders who then are supposed to be at the forefront
of the determination and valuation process (policymaking process in most senses of the phrase).
In essence, these representatives are the experts or philosophers from the philosophical position,
given the power to determine what is best for a given community. How then can the reflexive
position work in this type of community? The key for this theory is for representative democracy
to truly utilize the deliberative spaces and mechanisms that often already exist to reevaluate its
democratic process. It was during these moments that I chose to focus much of my research and
what went well and what did not, according to the reflexive position.
At its core, this was a case of a political community participating in a determination and
valuation process from start to finish. In a community with major traffic issues and a world
trying to reach more sustainable outcomes (lower CO2 emissions), this case resembles ones
played out across hundreds of other cities in dozens of other industrialized democracies. Yet, its
circumstances are unique and not necessarily generalizable to a wider group of cases. As I
argued in Chapter 3, this is not necessarily detrimental to political science research as one might
expect. The overemphasis on falsifiable, generalizable theories has pushed political science
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methodology into one mimicking the natural sciences. Positive theories and a focus on
quantitative methods have downplayed the importance of qualitative methods and individual
case studies more specifically. Theorists like Bent Flyvbjerg argue that the social sciences must
reclaim their Aristotelian, phronetic roots and begin examining the world with the understanding
that theory is intrinsically about what constitutes the “good life.” Beyond that, individual case
studies need not be generalizable to a wider range of cases. Flyvbjerg and I argue that attempting
to make a case relatable to others diminishes the knowledge that a researcher can glean from the
case and thus its overall relevance. Combining the focus of capabilities as a space to be
researched for sustainable human development and approach to social science methods outlined
by Flyvbjerg, I outlined by phronetic capabilities methodology (PCM) in Chapter 3. The case
study presented in this dissertation is an effective example of how a case need not be
generalizable to still matter to social science and the community affected by the events at hand.
In this case of determining and valuing capabilities, specifically the ability to move
around a geographic area sustainably, there is a long history of attempted action. There were
conversations, debates, and policies around a better transit system in Hillsborough County for
decades. Starting in the 1980s, Hillsborough County and the city of Tampa realized that their
growth would need to be addressed by an increase in transportation funding and projects.
Although America is a car-centric society, cities around the country have turned to mass transit
as a more sustainable way of giving people the ability to move around their given community.
Subways, bus-rapid transit, and light rail transit are just some solutions to the problem of moving
more people more efficiently and in an environmentally less damaging way. Without the ability
to create a subway (due to the geology of Florida) and given that the already congested roadways
are not conducive for BRT, light rail was seen as a serious solution in the 1980s. Since that time,
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many attempts have been made to create and fund a light rail system. Yet each time, somewhere
along the process, these efforts failed to deliver. Although the 2010 tax referendum was part of
this list of failures, understanding what happened and why it happened is still important to this
community. The political environment and transit circumstances in Hillsborough County have
changed since 2010, but many of the same stakeholders and democratic mechanisms still exist.
The transit and mobility issues of a car-centric community still exist as well. This means that a
better understanding of the events in 2010, using PCM and the reflexive position, may help to
explain why the 2010 referendum failed and offer some guidance on a path forward.
Recall that the reflexive position is a normative theory of the determination and valuation
process, intending to create a more just and equitable democratic process with a focus on one
single capability. Leading up to the 2010 referendum, the process was similar in some ways to
previous attempts in Hillsborough County. The repetition of many of the same processes shows
that a reflexive approach might indeed be beneficial to this community. The laws and
mechanisms for this democratic process have changed little over time and indicate one reason
why little has changed. Each time this process is renewed, a set of stakeholders start from Point
A with the hope of eventually reaching Point B: a more sustainable transportation system in
Hillsborough County. Yet each time, very little is done to change the process to make it more
just and equitable. The reflexive approach argues that the process should almost always be
changing, with reforms and policies to allow for a more deliberative and consensus-based
process.
In the case of the 2010 referendum, I demonstrated that the system already has several
major “stations” or key points along the way of determining and valuing capabilities. These key
points are opportunities for elected officials, public figures, and average citizens to reflect on the
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process, then either go back or move forward. As I showed in Chapter 4, these key stops along
the way were seen as simple boxes to be checked, rather than important moments for deliberation
to occur. The eventual results were an outcome that many should have but did not predict: a
failed referendum to fund a light rail system in Hillsborough County.
The reflexive position is not just for these stops along the way of a democratic process,
however. As I stated in Chapter 2, even after a policy or outcome is implemented, the reflexive
nature of the process should continue. Stakeholders should examine what happened to determine
how it can be improved the next time around. By going into the process with this mentality,
stakeholders can be more honest with the variables that they can and cannot change to make the
process more just. In this case, the stakeholders with more power took a more philosophical
position (top-down). When the outcome was not what they had hoped for, it was that much more
difficult for them to realize the role that they had played in its failure. Instead, the focus of blame
was on either external factors like the economic environment or the psychological factors of
individuals (voting against their interests). Though these variables played a role in the failure, to
lay sole blame on them ignores the power relations between all of those involved.
Some of the stakeholders I interviewed did indeed realize this and made statements that
supported a more reflexive approach. Pam Iorio recounted a story of one of her public outreach
meetings in a rural community. An older gentleman at a Kiwanis meeting initially opposed the
referendum but changed his mind after having a conversation with Mayor Iorio. He said, “The
way you just explained that of the past 30 minutes made sense. Now if you can do that to the rest
for the county, we’ll pass this thing" (Iorio, 2021). However, based on the democratic process at
the time, the idea of public deliberation with the entire county was seemingly impossible. This
story convinced Mayor Iorio that the vote would fail, despite the successful conversation with
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this one man. Having to have that kind of conversation with suburban and rural voters to
convince them to support the referendum, “That’s when I knew it was going to fail” (Iorio,
2021). This brings me to the key findings of this case study.
The reflexive position to determination and valuation of capabilities is a normative
approach to how a democratic process should occur. The goal is a continuous reevaluation of the
democratic process to make it more inclusive and deliberative each time it occurs. With
statements like the above, from a “philosopher” of the philosophical position, there are definitive
concerns with how this reflexive position works in a representative system. This case study
shows that even in a representative democracy, many opportunities are built into the system
which allows for citizens and experts to evaluate their policy-making plans and the democratic
process itself. Based on this research and its findings, my first hypothesis (H1) was true: the
political process leading up to the 2010 referendum more closely followed a philosopher’s
position than the democratic position. My second hypothesis seems to be partially validated but
not entirely true. A lack of reflexivity, or capitalizing on the opportunities to reincorporate the
public into an otherwise top-down approach, did not lead to public distrust but rather missed
opportunities for the determination and valuation process to adjust to the voters’ concerns and
desires. Very little reflexivity between different stakeholder groups occurred. This allowed for
serious process and policy issues to go unaddressed or poorly reformed. In the end, it seems that
a more reflexive approach may have created a “winning” outcome with a majority yes vote on
the tax referendum, or for the process to simply stop because of a lack of a clear plan to present
in time for voters on the November 2010 ballot. In this type of democratic system, being aware
of voters’ preferences is a minimum for elected officials and policy-making experts, but truly
incorporating them into the process is a more successful approach.
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Finally, it is worth noting that the 2010 referendum was not the end of the pursuit for a
more sustainable transportation system in Hillsborough County. In 2018, the process began anew
with Moving Hillsborough Forward, a non-profit group that decided to approach things a bit
differently than in previous attempts. Rather than work through the County Commission, this
organization followed a different legal path to have a tax increase placed directly on the 2018
ballot for voters to decide on. Rather than working through all the previously mentioned stops or
“stations” that exist in a representative democracy, this process would jump to the end. The hope
was that by avoiding the “sausage-making” process, including the Hillsborough County
Commissioners, the possibility of success would increase. Furthermore, this group specifically
avoided nuanced public deliberation about the plan itself. The 1 cent tax increase was specific,
but beyond that, what the money would be used for was intentionally kept vague. The arguments
from the organizers were that the more specific a plan was, the easier it was to be shot down or
critiqued by the public. A citizen’s commission would be created to oversee the money that
would be raised and spent, so citizens could be involved…after the fact.
On the one hand, this process was successful and seems to support a more democratic
position approach to the determination and valuation of capabilities. The process in 2018 almost
entirely bypassed existing democratic institutions and instead was a movement that appealed
directly to citizens and left in their hands. In the end, those citizens voted to approve the 1 cent
sales tax increase to fund better and safer transportation and roads in Hillsborough County. On
other the hand, by following this process, it was left open to legal challenges that ensued by one
Republican County Commissioner. After a lengthy court battle the measure was struck down as
unconstitutional, and the future of a sustainable transportation system in Hillsborough County
remains unclear. This event itself presents another case study for future research to determine if
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opportunities existed for a more reflexive approach, one that was based on a movement that
attempted to circumvent many of the previous attempts’ obstacles altogether. Regardless of those
findings, however, the truth remains that Tampa and Hillsborough County remain a community
in need of sustainable transit and democratic reforms.
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Appendix A: IRB Consent Form

Informed Consent to Participate in Research Involving Minimal Risk
Pro # 00026674
You are being asked to take part in a research study. Research studies include only people who
choose to take part. This document is called an informed consent form. Please read this
information carefully and take your time making your decision. Ask the researcher or study staff
to discuss this consent form with you, please ask him/her to explain any words or information
you do not clearly understand. The nature of the study, risks, inconveniences, discomforts, and
other important information about the study are listed below.
We are asking you to take part in a research study called:
Democratic Deliberation in Sustainable Human Development: The Case of Mass Transit in
Tampa Bay
The person who is in charge of this research study is Eric Fiske. This person is called the
Principal Investigator. However, other research staff may be involved and can act on behalf of
the person in charge. He is being guided in this research by M. Scott Solomon.
The research will be conducted by phone or at your work office.

Purpose of the study
The purpose of this study is to understand the deliberative democratic processes that occurred
during two major light rail projects in the Tampa Bay Area: in Hillsborough County (2010) and
Pinellas County (2014).
Why are you being asked to take part?
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We are asking you to take part in this research study because of your direct or indirect work with
the process involved in the light rail projects in either Hillsborough or Pinellas County.
Study Procedures:
If you take part in this study, you will be asked to:
If you agree to be in this study, we will conduct an interview with you. The interview will
include questions about your job, your role in the process to bring light rail transit (LRT) to your
county, and your views on the process by which this happened. The interview will take
approximately 30 minutes to complete. This interview can be conducted by phone or at your
personal work office, at a time that is convenient for you. This will be decided upon between you
and Principal Investigator prior to the interview date. With your permission, we would also like
to tape-record the interview. Only the Principal Investigator will have access to these recordings
and they will be maintained for five years after the interview is conducted, after which they will
be erased. You can also consent to remain anonymous in the final research draft.
Total Number of Participants
About 20 individuals will take part in this study at USF.
Alternatives / Voluntary Participation / Withdrawal
You do not have to participate in this research study.
Benefits
You will receive no benefit(s) by participating in this research study.
Risks or Discomfort
This research is considered to be minimal risk. That means that the risks associated with this
study are the same as what you face every day. There are no known additional risks to those who
take part in this study.
Compensation
You will receive no payment or other compensation for taking part in this study.
Costs
It will not cost you anything to take part in the study.
Privacy and Confidentiality
We will keep your study records private and confidential. Certain people may need to see your
study records. Anyone who looks at your records must keep them confidential. These
individuals include:
•

The research team, including the Principal Investigator, study coordinator, research
nurses, and all other research staff.

•

Certain government and university people who need to know more about the study,
and individuals who provide oversight to ensure that we are doing the study in the
right way.

•

Any agency of the federal, state, or local government that regulates this research.
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•

The USF Institutional Review Board (IRB) and related staff who have oversight
responsibilities for this study, including staff in USF Research Integrity and
Compliance.

We may publish what we learn from this study. If we do, we will not include your name if you
wish. If you wish, we will not publish anything that would let people know who you are.
You can get the answers to your questions, concerns, or complaints
If you have any questions, concerns or complaints about this study, or experience an
unanticipated problem, call Eric Fiske at 727-242-0041.
If you have questions about your rights as a participant in this study, or have complaints,
concerns or issues you want to discuss with someone outside the research, call the USF IRB at
(813) 974-5638 or contact by email at RSCH-IRB@usf.edu.
Consent to Take Part in this Research Study
I freely give my consent to take part in this study. I understand that by signing this form I am
agreeing to take part in research. I have received a copy of this form to take with me.
_________________________________

____________

Signature of Person Taking Part in Study

Date

_____________________________________________
Printed Name of Person Taking Part in Study
Statement of Person Obtaining Informed Consent
I have carefully explained to the person taking part in the study what he or she can expect from
their participation. I confirm that this research subject speaks the language that was used to
explain this research and is receiving an informed consent form in their primary language. This
research subject has provided legally effective informed consent.
__________________________________________________

_______________

Signature of Person obtaining Informed Consent

Date

_______________________________________________________________
Printed Name of Person Obtaining Informed Consent
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